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Abstract
In 2019 we witnessed the possibilities of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-racial, multicultural, and multi-gendered democracy and a bottom-up democratization process led by women.
Sudanese youth and women led and participated in mobilization and demonstration that not only
reflected the mass character of the social formation, but also managed to subvert the Islamist
military dependent capitalist state (and its apparatus). Over the span of 30 years, the regime,
under Omar al-Bashir, managed to entrench and escalate structures and systems of exploitation
and oppression necessary for capital accumulation. The intensified neoliberalization and
militarization, at the expense of women’s super-exploitation, was made possible through
allegiance to imperialism and deployment of political Islam. Despite the historical efforts of
Islamization and Arabization and the repression ensued by successive military regimes, Sudan
has had a strong history of women’s and working peoples organizing and resistance. The
horizontal (non-hierarchical) networking and autonomous organizing of different groups and
sectors in society in 2018/19, however, challenged the power structure in Sudan and reorganized
politics and economy to serve the interests of the dominant social classes in Sudan. The
Sudanese struggle for social reproduction, embedded in the class and anti-imperialist struggle,
has reawakened many possibilities. However, much of the news regarding the uprising and
women’s role glossed over these possibilities along with the structural and cultural complexities
of Sudanese women. Unlike readings that situate the 2019 uprising in the Arab world and in
relation to the “Arab Spring,” this thesis is an exploration of the Sudanese uprising in Africa and
an acknowledgement of the radical possibilities it has brought. To counter the denial of
Africanity, the homogenization of women, and the simplification of complex societies and
organizing, I use an African/Black radical feminist approach that illuminates the realities of

Sudan and the people of Sudan. By investigating the role of women alongside other social forces
and reflecting on the working and living conditions of some of the most exploited and oppressed
groups in Sudan, this work explores how women are fundamental to liberation struggles with
radical possibilities.
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Introduction
In December of 2018, protests broke out across Sudan in areas like Al-Damazin (Blue
Nile State), before reaching the city of Atbara (River Nile State) and quickly spreading to other
cities and some rural towns (Hassan and Kodouda, 2019; Kadoda and Hale, 2020). The months
long sustained protests were maintained through grassroots organization, coalition building,
leadership of the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), and the coordination of public
sectors and informal networks. The SPA coordinated alongside organized entities like
neighborhood resistance committees, youth movements, National Consensus Forces, Sudanese
Associations and Trade Unions (SATU), MANSAM, and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF).
Various forces including professionals, civil/political society, armed groups, political parties, and
youth and women’s groups exerted pressure on the 30-year-old regime. The protests, largely
populated by women and triggered by an increase in bread prices, quickly evolved to demand the
removal of Omar al-Bashir and the overhaul of an oppressive system intensified under the
National Congress Party1 (NCP).
Throughout the period of the Bashir regime, there has been massive demonstrations and
protests, especially by youth (Deshayes, Etienne, and Medani, 2019). The tenor and protracted
nature of the protests slowly changed the character from simple demonstration to that of an
insurrection. In 2012, women students had held demonstrations at the University of Khartoum
regarding difficult living conditions (Medani, 2019). In 2013, a central bank hard currency
shortfall meant Sudan was unable to import enough wheat, causing bread shortages and related
protests in the capital (Reeves, 2014). Medical doctors also held strikes and demonstrations to

The NCP was referred to as the National Islamic Front (NIF) before the party split in 1998 (and Hassan al-Turabi’s wing
formed the Popular Congress Party). NIF/NCP will be used throughout this work unless period specific differences are needed to
be highlighted.
1

1

highlight the deteriorating health sector (Badri and al-Fatih, 2019). The same year, as per the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) recommendation, the government announced the lifting of
subsidies2 for essential products like fuel, and thousands went to the streets, only to be met by a
brutal response from the state and its security apparatus. Magdi el-Gizouli (2020a) has referred
to the 2013 protests as “a rehearsal for the December 2018 showdown” (2). Again, in January
2017, people took to the streets to protest the removal of wheat subsidies. And again, the state
responded violently and by detaining dozens of people. In 2018, protests followed after another
IMF based ‘economic reform,’ which meant austerity measures and cuts in subsidies, which
inflated the price of bread and other basic necessities.
The struggle for social reproduction, embedded in the class struggle and the antiimperialist struggle, is not materially and ideologically separate from the oppression of Sudanese
women. To make this case, this thesis evaluates the position and role of Sudanese women in
society, alongside the structures and systems used to exploit and oppress them. One of the most
circulated images of the Sudanese uprising was the powerful image of Alaa Salah chanting on
top of a car (Figure 1). There were numerous headlines in mainstream news about women
leading the protests and overthrowing Bashir’s regime, however, the single story of women or of
the uprising was not satisfying (Bearak, 2019; Read, 2019). Why were women leading the
protests? How did they organize? Why in Sudan? How do we differentiate “woman” in the
context of Sudan? Where are women located vis a vis the exploited working peoples of Sudan?
In an attempt to answer such questions, this thesis became a study of the structural positions of
Sudanese women, their location in the hierarchies of exploitation under the global capitalist
chain, and their role in the 2018/19 uprising.

2

The first budget that passed in 2013, post-South Sudan secession, contained a string of austerity measures (El-Gizouli, 2020a).

2

After four months of coordinated demonstrations
since December 2018, al-Bashir was removed, and after
eight months the military was forced to negotiate. The
mass refusal of the Transitional Military Council
(TMC), which had assumed power after the removal of
Bashir, led to a three-year transitional period (20192022) under a shared governing body composed of the
TMC and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). A
few weeks into the protests, the SPA, alongside
Figure 1 Alaa Salah on top of a car
(Taken by @lana_hago)

women’s organizations (Damir, 2020), drafted the
Declaration of Freedom and Change3, whose signatories

(22 organizations) made up the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). The FFC is a coalition of
civil, political, and armed resistance groups that is currently politically representing the civilian
forces in Sudan. At the time of this writing, the Sudanese working peoples continue to use the
streets to demonstrate and negotiate their demands. Within, roughly, the last 60 years, the
Sudanese people have managed to mobilize and end the rule of three oppressive military
regimes: in 1964, 1985, and 2019 (Berridge, 2020). It is important to convey that the 2019
uprising emerged from an impressive history of Sudanese organizing, which has not received
enough attention from academics or media (El-Affendi, 2012).
The intergenerational ability of some of the most exploited and oppressed groups, such as
women and working peoples, to organize and form alliances in multi-ethnic, multilingual, and

3

The Declaration of Freedom and Change, which became a sort of agreement among some of the most visible forces in the
uprising, was drafted following the outbursts of protest. The issues that were listed on the declaration – including an end to civil
wars and centralized/corrupt state structures with an emphasis on social welfare – at the very least, speak to the clarity of the
Sudanese people and their ability to take specific grievances of specific groups and collectively demand for redress.

3

regionally diverse communities that have been manipulated against one another is central to this
work. In a country that has been referred to as the “microcosm of Africa,” (Elradi, 2018; Musa,
2018) women and youth led an insurrection that has challenged, subverted, and/or supplanted,
oppressive and exploitative systems and structures cloaked under political Islam, and maintained
by militarization and global capital. The 2019 uprising has not only provided us with a model of
organizing that could challenge and potentially transform hierarchical power relations in
complex societies, but it has offered a glimpse of the possibilities of political and economic
organizing by and for the dominant social classes in society – the working peoples and youth. As
I deal with the possibilities the uprising has brought and the sustainable elements, the work also
reflects on women farmers, their centrality to society and therefore, their organized potential.
This thesis focuses on the intervention of the grassroots (exemplified by the Sudanese Tea
Sellers Association and the neighborhood resistance committees) and their dialectical process of
organizing with other sectors of the working peoples (such as the professional class exemplified
by the SPA). I argue that the autonomous and non-hierarchical (horizontally) structured networks
of organizing, led by women and youth, has created radical possibilities 4 of a multi-religious,
multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multi-gendered democratic society.
To substantiate my argument, this thesis is organized in five chapters. Chapter one
provides the reader with the historical maturation of political Islam in Sudan, and the dominant
forms of political organizing and contestation in Sudan. The historical background provided in
chapter one is not just to provide context, but to illuminate that the Sudanese working peoples,
led by women and youth, challenged historical systems and structures that have intensified and
reemerged over a long period of time. Chapter one is also meant to show how politics and

4

Radical is meant to convey transformation of social relations and social reality, and possibilities, is reference to the theory
coming out of practice.

4

political theory is informed by or cannot be detached from history, while revealing how
oppression and exploitation have a continuity that requires a break (or a radical shift). Chapter
two describes how this work is conceptualized, and why I have chosen to deploy specific
theoretical approaches to researching Sudan and Sudanese women.
In 2018/19, the Tea Sellers Association, longstanding labor unions, youth groups,
neighborhood resistance committees, and many other groups not highlighted in this work,
transcended, utilized, and reflected the social processes to which they were subjected. Therefore,
to situate women and better understand the process and impelling causes for mobilization, while
alluding to sustainable elements in the struggle, chapter three looks at the working and living
conditions of women and working peoples in Sudan. Chapter four, which is the heart of this
thesis, provides a detailed overview and analysis of the autonomous and non-hierarchical
(horizontal) forms and networks of organizing witnessed from December 2018 to July 2019. We
will conclude by reflecting on what the organizing of Sudanese women and working peoples in
2018/19 could mean for a democratized African social formation.

5

Chapter 1
Dominant forms of Political Organizing and Contestation
Before the Sudanese state adopted Sharia law in 1983, there had been repeated attempts
to make Sudan an Islamic republic, mainly to protect the interests of a dependent capitalist ruling
elite, dominated by a specific group of Northern-Arab Muslim men. Under military regimes,
these attempts were enforced through Arabization and Islamization of the state and society. The
exploitation of specific social groups in Sudan, the exclusion or relegation of women in formal
politics, the repression of progressive groups and autonomous organizations, the domination of a
Northern Arab Muslim group over the politics and economy of Sudan, and the continued
mobilization and resistance of Sudanese working peoples against these forms of oppression have
remained a recursive pattern in Sudanese history. The use of recursion and recursive in this work
is based on Fractal thinking 5, which is embedded in the epistemological and ontological
approaches of multiple African knowledges and cultures (Eglash, 1999). In the mathematical
sense, fractals are geometric representations that are able to “keep track of the number of
elements in an infinite set” (Eglash, 1999: 8). Recursion is one of the five elements in fractals,
which allows us to conceptualize history in all its present impacts. It is a cyclical process that
emerges as a loop whose output acts as an input for the next loop (Eglash, 1999: 17). The
possibilities for Sudanese democratization are infinite, but the dominant political inputs, thus far,
have been crippling those possibilities.
The early Sudanese state, the Mahdist state, has an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist
legacy that has often been manipulated to serve the interests of sectarian political groups and

5

I have been taught about Fractal thinking and the rethinking of political processes by Horace G. Campbell, who like Ron Eglash
(1999) has used this epistemological and ontological approach in his work. See Campbell, H. (2010;2015). Barack Obama and
twenty-first-century politics: A revolutionary moment in the USA. Pluto Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183p2ms Other
scholars have also used fractals to describe forms of organizing. See Brown, A. M. (2017). Emergent strategy: Shaping change,
changing worlds. AK Press.
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military regimes after independence in 1956. This chapter provides a brief history of the
emergence of Sudan’s dominant political groups and the manner in which they have evolved
over different periods. This chapter is meant to highlight how the 2019 uprising did not just
challenge a system that overextended itself over 30 years but one that has been maturing since
the colonial history of Sudan. Sections three and four briefly looks at the popular uprisings of
1964 and 1985, to the extent they relate to or are distinct from the 2019 uprising. To illustrate
how political Islam “aligns itself with the camp of dependent capitalism and dominant
imperialism” (Amin, 2007: 2), the fourth section looks at the institutionalization of political
Islam under the military regime of Jafaar Numeiry. The last section of this chapter deals with the
literature concerning the 2019 uprising.
Early Political Organizing
Historically, nomadic Arab Muslim groups, which had adopted Islam and Arabic as a
language, settled and intermarried with locals and became nomadic stockbreeders (Amin, 1972).
These groups began to arrive around the Red Sea coast and westwards towards the Nile
(Mohammed and Welsby, 2011). Around the confluence of the Blue Nile and White Nile, central
Sudan maintained sedentary farming traditions, while the nomadic Arab communities dominated
trade6 between Egypt (North) and the South. Near the end of the Neolithic period, systematic
food production, herding practices, and industrial production were accompanied by proliferation
of urban settlements to the North. To the West, similar urban complexes formed large
metropolises like Kerma (2400 BCE) within political formations like the Kingdom of Kush

6

After 1850, the ascendancy of the Arab nomads was abetted by Egypt, which had benefitted from and looted gold, ivory, and
enslaved peoples from Sudan, particularly South Sudan. Samir Amin (1972) uses the terminology oriental mercantilism, to
situate the primitive accumulation of Egypt in the emerging capitalist chain of that period: “Upto 1850 it was the Egyptian army
itself which hunted for slaves and robbed Sudan of local products. After that date, the soldiers handed the job to Sudanese
nomads, particular the Baqqara, who sold the slaves they seized to Turkish, Copt, Syrian, and European merchants established
under the aegis of the Khedive.” (Amin, 1973: 514).
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(Mohammed and Welsby, 2011). After the end of the Christian Nuba kingdom, and the sixteenth
century rise of the North-Central Funj Sultanate, Arabization increased (Sharkey, 2008). The
Funj kingdom is considered to have been populated by Blacks from the West, and Arabs who
quickly ascended “numerically and culturally.” After 1850, Egypt’s sub-contracting of Sudanese
nomads (mainly the Baggara) to supply enslaved 7 labor and Sudanese products transformed their
social systems 8. Egypt, under the aegis of the Khedive, also installed Sudanese Sheikhs to collect
taxes. Some of the Sheikhs were also granted land from dispossessed peasants, making them
rapidly rich (Amin, 1972). The inhabitants of the central areas of Northern Sudan, around the
Nile Valley, have historically identified as (one of the multiple groupings of) Arab, spoken
Arabic, and claimed Arab descent (Sidahmed, 2011).
In the West, the Fur and Masalit Sultanates persisted until the twentieth century 9. The
rulers and subjects of these sultanates were Muslims but did not identify as Arab or speak Arabic
as their main language. Other communities in the far North and East also practiced Islam but did
not identify as Arab or lose their language. This remains true in some communities today. The
Beja, from the East, for instance, use Arabic as an institutional 10 language but continue to speak
Bedawi (Sidahmed, 2011). Speaking dozens of languages; tracing their places of origin beyond
what is considered former Nubia; practicing Islam, Christianity, or neither; and some still using
pre-Islamic matrilineal11 social organizations, the Nuba in Sudan exemplify the complexity and
inextricability of differences in Sudan (Ryle, 2011).

“Often a companion to, or a secondary effect of the ivory trade, the slave hunt-or ghazwa as it came to be called-became a
common fact of life for the non-Muslim groups south and west of Sennar prior to 1860 and for the people of Bahr al-Ghazal
[South Sudan] and Darfur after 1865.” (Lobban, 1990: 611)
8 Changes in social systems included clan organization, territorial base, and the domination of warrior nobles. (Amin, 1972)
9 Early twentieth century also saw a flux of Hausa and Fulani migrants from Nigeria. (Sharkey, 2008) Mayrno, Blue Nile State,
one of the first peripheral areas where protests broke out, have large populations that claim Fulani heritage.
10 To indicate public and state affiliated institutions.
11 The destruction of matriarchal societies that existed in the Nuba Mountains has been related to colonialism (Ali, 2015).
7
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The top-down imposition of Islamization and Arabization, by successive regimes in
Sudan has contributed to and forged the systemic oppression of those that did not linguistically,
religiously, historically, and regionally identify as Northern-Arab or Muslim (Jok, 2007). Unlike
other West and East African regions with similar experiences, Sudan’s Arabization “was
doubtless due to the prolonged and thorough ascendancy exercised by the Arab nomads of the
north over communities,” which was further manipulated through Ottoman, British and Egyptian
conquests, and later through despotic military regimes (Amin, 1976: 46). Arabization led to the
conception of a national Arab identity and Arabic becoming the lingua franca and literary
language of Sudan. Sharkey (2008) calls Arabization, in Sudan, the partner of Islamization.
Islamism or Islamization is different from Islam. Valentine M. Moghadam (2001) provides a
good distinction by classifying the former as a political movement and the latter as a religion
(sociology versus theology) (43).
According to Samir Amin (2007), the political traditions of certain (Muslim) countries
have been marked by “the radical currents of modernity, 12” which has led to semi-democratic
nationalist movements mainly steered by the national bourgeoise (6). In Sudan’s case, the
earliest form of a semi-democratic nationalist movement can be considered the Mahdist
movement. In the late 1900s, Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi became the face of the nationalist
movement and the leader of the Mahdist state, which lasted from 1885 to 189813; a period
imbued with nationalism and Islamic revival. The Islamic efforts of the Mahdist state rejected
the erosion of Sudanese Islam and promoted “indigenous Sudanese popular Islam,” which was
populist Sufi that was considered “decentralized and egalitarian” (Fluehr-Lobban, 1990: 614).

12
13

Amin (2007) offers the “Algerian National Liberation Front, Tunisian Bourguibism, [and] Egyptian Nasserism” as examples
Anglo-Egyptian forces re-conquer Sudan in 1898. Sudanese independence would come 58 years later in 1956.

9

Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban (1990) contextualizes the Mahdist state as “the only truly antiimperialist, Islamic republic of its time in Africa” (615).
Although the Mahdist state emerged as a struggle against imperialism 14 launched by “the
people of the village communities, the slave-peasants of the estates and the craftsmen, slaves and
beggars of the market-towns,” those social groups did not achieve liberation (Amin, 1972: 514515), after the death of the Mahdi, the state was restructured, estates were seized and taxes
levied, by and for the advantage of military leaders and Baggara 15 warrior chiefs, under Caliph
Abdullah (Amin, 1972). For Sudanese peoples like those of the South Sudan, and Darfur –
neighboring peoples but foreign to the state – the Mahdist state, was a period of Northern Islamic
conquest, enslavement, and forced Islamization (Nugud, 2013; Fluehr-Lobban, 1990).
This would not be the last time in Sudan’s history that popular uprising would be
manipulated to benefit a group of Northern-Arab elite and military men. The significance and
representation of the Mahdist movement, however, became a source of legitimacy and appeal to
popular elements in mobilization:
The Mahdist movement in particular left a legacy not only of Islamic
identification with the state, but also of Islam's role as an anti-colonialist force
and an integral component of Sudanese nationalism and independence due to its
revolt against Ottoman-Egyptian rule and the Anglo-Egyptian condominium.
(Esposito, 1986: 185)
From 1920 onward, religion and politics, at least at the discursive level, began to merge in the
central and northern parts of Sudan, with very few secular political movements. Most nationalist

“Peasants were taken from their villages and attached to these lands as half-slaves and half-serfs; the proceeds of their
commercial farming went to swell the Egyptian Treasury. Other peasants, hunted by the nomads and impoverished by the
sheikhs, flocked into the market towns, established by the army at cross-roads, and on the borders of the slave-raiding areas. A
craft industry grew up, distinct from agriculture, while on the land given to the beys and sheikhs Egyptian farming methods were
introduced with higher productivity. By 1870 it was feasible to replace the tax in kind with a money tax, because of the increased
marketed surplus. The Sudan was becoming unified, Islamised, and Arabised.” (Amin, 1972: 514)
15 As mentioned above, the Baggara were subcontracted by the Egyptians and associated with the monetary and numeric
ascendancy of Arab nomads. Baggara groups in Sudan include the Rizeigat and Misseriya groups.
14

10

movements appropriated Arabic literature and songs, whereas mosques continued to be a space
for political speeches (Fluehr-Lobban, 1990). Nationalist movements were led by a colonially
educated class of men from the Northern riverain regions (Ali, 2015). Most of these men
received education under British colonial rule that sought to develop “a cadre of government
administrators, as well as a cadre to run the cotton schemes” (Ali, 2015: 42). These middleclass
men (some of which form the Graduate Congress) not only define “Sudan’s national identity as
Arab and Islamic,” (42) and inherently masculine, but also dominate post-independence
Sudanese politics and economy. The educated and property-owning ruling class, predominantly
from and in the North, dominated the public sphere and would use political Islam to assert their
legitimacy. Regardless of periods of parliamentary rule in 1960s and again in 1980s, scholars
agree that the social character of the ruling class in Sudan has persisted as “an alliance of
traditional agricultural and merchant capitalist forces,” which maintained their power through
state bureaucracy (Ali, 2015: 44).
Dominant Political Parties
In the 1940s, the Ansar and Khatmiyya Sufi sects16 developed political parties – the
Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party17 (DUP), respectively. Some members of these
political groups organized under the Graduate Congress, which consisted of the colonially
educated intelligentsia that spearheaded the nationalist movement. The Ansar were Mahdists
(followers of the Mahdi and Sudanese Islam) and mainly reflected the interests of agricultural

16

The Sammäniyya and the Khatmiyya tariqas were a regional revivalist Sufi sect that made their way to Sudan in the last years
of the Funj Sultanate. During the time of Ottoman occupation of Sudan, the Khatmiyya sectarians allied themselves with the
state, which wanted to “standardize” and institutionalize Islam. This history reveals the complex relations of the Sudanese state,
imperial powers, and religious groups, and the common economic interests from which they emerge. The Sammäniyya and the
Khatmiyya Sufi sects are important not only because “their style of Islam set the patterns for what became the normal Islamic
social life in the Sudan,” but also because they went on to create the dominant political parties in Sudanese politics. See Voll,
1986.
17

The DUP was first established as the National Unionist Party (NUP).
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capital (Ali, 2003). Whereas the Khatmiyya, which had historically collaborated with the
Ottoman empire and called for Sudanese union with Egypt during the Anglo-Egyptian
Condominium, reflected the interests of merchants and traders (Esposito, 1986: 183). The
sectarian differences of these groups have contributed to the nuanced appeal of political Islam in
Sudan. With most Sudanese subscribing to either sect of Islam, both parties garnered the support
of the rural masses (Ali, 2015).
Until the late 20th century, however, Sudanese women’s participation in the Umma and
DUP parties were limited. In the DUP, for instance, women’s participation was limited to voting
for elections. Most of women’s activities and organization were in the forms of charity. Female
party members or groups, such as the Society for the Prosperity of Women, did not address
issues of gender equity but focused on charity activities (Ali, 2015). Ifi Amadiume (2000) looks
at how the practice of relegating women to working in charity was inherited from colonial
structures that maintained “women’s role in the public sector as limited to welfare activities, and
welfare as an extension of women’s domestic role” (Amadiume, 2000: 4). In Sudan, political
Islam, has been used to justify similar restrictions and representations of women’s roles.
Dominant parties unaffiliated with the Sufi sects, and emerging in the North, included the
Sudanese Communist Party (CPS), which formed in 1946, and the Muslim Brothers’ Islamic
Charter Front, which formed in 1953. The Communist Party organized its base around workers
and “has since been supported by the educated middle class in towns, laborers in agricultural
schemes, and railway and port workers” (Ali, 2003: 33). The first formally organized political
women’s group emerged within the CPS and its successor the Sudanese Women’s Union (SWU)
was formed in 1951 (Tønnessen and Kjøstvedt, 2010). The early CPS membership of women
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was made up of the colonially educated18 class, which by the 1990s demanded the party address
public and private oppression of women (Ali, 2015). However, in moments of transition and
rupture, the party has been reluctant to endorse the need to transform gender relations in Sudan,
to appease the dominant sectarian Umma and DUP parties (Ali, 2003).
When the SWU called for suffragette rights – structural changes (i.e. reform in family
law and suffrage) were not achieved until the 1964 popular uprising (Anis, 2001) – women that
did not endorse women’s political agency broke off to create the Women’s Front under the
Muslim Brothers movement (Ali, 2015). The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan began in 1940s,
“under the influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood” (Sidahmed, 2011: 164). The Muslim
Brothers would contribute to the repression and ejection of the CPS under Jaafar Numeiry, and
the consolidation of political Islam in Sudan. Economically, the Muslim Brothers represented the
interests of merchants and finance capitalists (Ali, 2015), tied to global capital 19. Led by Hassan
al-Turabi, a political iteration of the Islamist movement (referred to as the Sudanese Muslim
Brotherhood movement by 1954) is established as the Islamic Charter Front. The Islamic Charter
Front is considered as the precursor for the National Islamist Front (NIF) 20. Since rural masses
already supported the Sufi sectarian groups, the Muslim Brothers base targets and origins were
among youth in high school and university (Ali, 2015). Women’s participation in the Muslim
Brothers emerged in the form of a publication (al-Manar) and then the, above mentioned,
Women’s Front.

Before starting to recruit from the population at large, the SWU’s membership was restricted to “literate” members or families
and supporters of the CPS (Anis, 2001). On the other hand, efforts by individuals like Babiker Badri to expand the education of
women was met by colonial resistance (Ali, 2015).
19 The Wahabis movement of Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt were established by and received significant
support from the United States and Britain (Amin, 2007).
20 Before Bashir’s ascendancy, the NIF was led by Muslim Brothers fundamentalist Hassan al-Turabi. After a split within the
party in 1999, it is renamed the National Congress Party (NCP). And Hassal al-Turabi goes on to form the Popular Congress
Party (PCP).
18
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A year after Sudanese independence, achieved in 1956, the Umma Party (Ansar Sect) and
Khatamyia Sect made a joint statement about making Sudan an Islamic Parliamentarian
Republic. Equipped with colonial education and more politically organized than other regions in
Sudan, by virtue of colonial histories, the northern politicians dominated the negotiations of
independence with the British, and not a single southern Sudanese was present (Jok, 2007: 56).
Except the CPS (the only northern party concerned about the “southern question”), all postindependence political parties sought an Islamic Sudanese State. Religious convictions [and
capitalist interests] were so strong, “the post-independence constitution committee, for example,
rejected southern requests for federation and called, instead, for a united Islamic Sudan” (FluehrLobban, 1990: 617). In a multicultural, multilingual and multireligious formation, postindependence attempts to spread Islam and forge Arab identity have been met with resistance,
especially in South Sudan (since the 1950s) (Sharkey, 2008). In 1957, the SWU proposed a
memorandum-programme demanding political, family, and labor rights for women, at a
conference with all political parties. The parties 21 agreed to all the demands except political
rights (Anis, 2001).
Amina Mire (2000) analyzes fictional and non-fictional texts to argue how the conquest
of women’s bodies was integral to colonial conquest. Although all black bodies were
dehumanized, women were objectified and defeminized. Furthermore, the African women’s
body was dehumanized and made synonymous with African land. The feminized African space
and the dehumanized African body were, therefore, ripe for exploitation and appropriation. On
the same level, national struggle was framed as reclaiming the motherland, the feminized space,
and simultaneously, reclaiming the defeminized women. This resulted in African women

21

“A notable exception was the Anti-Imperialist Front whose members fully endorsed all.” (Anis, 19)
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entering “the national literary and political imagination, not as subjects with political goals of
their own but as mothers of the nation’s children and wives of men that are the political subjects”
(1). In dismissing South Sudanese calls for a Federation, and excluding women from formal
politics, the Northern-riverain elite ensured the iteration of masculinized and homogenizing
colonial structures, in post-independence Sudan, that function with a particular gendered division
of labor and centers and peripheries of capital accumulation.
Two years after independence, the first military coup in Sudan happened at the instigation
of a conservative party (Anis, 2001). According to Jok Madut Jok (2007), Ibrahim Abboud’s
military coup – distinct from the coups under Jaafar Nimery and Omar al-Bashir – succeeded
because of the northern civilian and sectarian politicians fears of southern self-determination,
and preference of militarized domination. However, Abboud’s military regime banned political
parties (including northern sectarian parties). The military regime pursued national integration by
making Arabic the national language and forcing Islamic education and conversion (FluehrLobban, 1990). The regime’s Islamization and Arabization policies 22 were particularly
oppressive to multiple peoples in Sudan that not only practiced Christianity and other religions,
but also spoke languages other than Arabic 23 (Ali, 2015). Abboud’s regime eventually dissolved
SWU and created the “All-Sudan Women’s Council.” All women’s organizations were
registered under the “Charity Organizations Law,” which legally restricted women to charitable
and/or religious activities, thus preventing political mobilization (Anis, 2001: 21). Once again,
women were solely associated with welfare activities. By the 1960s, the SWU had reached a

22

Making Arabic the national language and the medium of instruction would cause more Southern alienation and discontent.
Under British rule, there was an influx of Christian missionaries to the south, which contributed to more cultural differences
between the south and other regions. Other policies included nationalizing Christian missionary schools in the South, denying
Christianity (along with Islam) as a state religion. (Sharkey, 2008)
23 Colonial rule treated the North and South very differently. One significant difference was that English was made the main
language of the South, and Arabic in North.
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membership of 15,000. Women continued to mobilize underground, and the SWU used its
existing networks, like housewives’ cooperatives, to mobilize women during the 1964 uprising
(Anis, 2001).
Post-Independence Uprisings
The 1964 uprising, referred to as the October Revolution (Woodward, 2011), “became
the inspiration for all subsequent action in Sudanese politics. Every political group or regime
ever since sought to derive legitimacy from that event” (El-Affendi, 2012: 292). Demonstrations
against Sudan’s first military regime began as early as 1959, by entities like the Khartoum
University Student Union (KUSU) (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). Unlike the two other popular
uprisings, Abboud might’ve been criticized for relying on American aid, but opposition towards
the regime was based on social and political (less economic) issues (Berridge, 2015). The 1964
uprising saw high levels of participation by women (Ali, 2015).
Urban discontent and the oppression of and discontent in the South, contributed to mass
mobilization, but the first protests were triggered by the death of a student protestor at a student
led forum on South Sudan. The following day, during the funeral procession, about 30,000
people joined the protests in Khartoum (Niblock, 1987), with majority being university and
secondary school students (Berridge, 2015). Berridge (2015) writes that “laborers and students
had provided the uprising with its principal foot soldiers” (33), with most leaders being urban
dwelling Northern professionals that were associated to political parties in Khartoum.
Considering the urban economy during that period, street protests and resulting deaths were
majority men, but women like Fatima Ahmad Ibrahim24 also led demonstrations (Berridge,
2015).

24

On October 24, Fatima Ahmad Ibrahim, [then] president of the WU, led demonstrators to the palace to present the
memorandum created by the professionals.
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The days of October 22 and 23 were filled with protests across Khartoum’s towns, before
a memorandum led to the coordination of various groups25. Protests began spread across other
areas, particularly “the whole Northern part of the country” (Berridge, 2015: 34). The uprising
saw the coordination of urban workers and the intermediate strata by the professional class,
which brought the representatives of workers' and tenants' “together with representatives of
lawyers, doctors, teachers, etc. to form the national professionals' front” (Niblock, 1987: 225).
The Professional Front – which resembles the makeup of today’s Sudanese Professionals
Association (SPA) – consisted of professionals and trade and labor unions, which would
negotiate with the government (Berridge, 2015). The Front – renamed the United National Front
after a group of political parties (the National Front) joined and resembling the Forces of
Freedom and Change (FFC) – coordinated effective general strikes. The strike by government
employees, factory workers, medical professionals, etc. brought Khartoum to a standstill (ElAffendi, 2012). Abboud was forced to step down in November 1964 as opposition continued in
the North and the South.
Between 1965 and 1969, Sudan was under weak coalitions formed between the sectarian
Umma Party and the DUP. By 1969, having banned the CPS, under the leadership of factions
from the Umma and the Khatmiyya party, all political parties in the Constituent Assembly voted
to make Sudan “a presidential republic with an Islamic constitution” (Esposito, 1986: 184).
However, days before the national elections expected to ascend Ansar leaders as prime minister
and president, Sudan underwent its second military coup d’état. The transitional government had
failed to address some of the most imperative issues like the civil war in the South and the

On October 23, “a meeting of Sudanese members of staff in the university drew up a memorandum calling for a return to
civilian rule, with the signatories simultaneously submitting their resignations from their university posts. Similar meetings were
soon being held among teachers, doctors, lawyers, judges and civil servants, with similar memoranda being produced.” On
October 24, Fatima Ahmad Ibrahim led demonstrators to the palace to present the memorandum created by the professionals.
(Niblock, 1987: 225)
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growing economic and regional grievances. For such reasons, scholars have written that the May
1969 military coup that unseated President Ismail al-Azhari and the democratic coalition came as
no surprise (El-Affendi, 2012). It is important to delineate the forces attempting to Islamize the
Sudanese state, from the forces that instigated and populated the 1964 uprising. The first protest
in Khartoum erupted from “the violence employed by the army in breaking up a students'
meeting convened to discuss the situation in the South” (Niblock, 1987: 225).
The Free Officers May coup was led by military leader Jafaar Numeiry, who came in
with a secular socialist agenda that acknowledged the multiplicity of Sudanese peoples and need
for Southern autonomy (Ali, 2015). Numeiry and the Free Officers were part of a larger/longer
movement in the region, from Egypt’s Free Officers and Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s, to
Libya’s Free Officers and Muammar Qadafi in 1969 (Berridge, 2015). The initial policies,
especially economic policies, put forth by Nimeri’s regime were radical, especially considering
the interests of the consolidated masculinized Northern sectarian political class. Factories and
land in the hands of families affiliated to the two sectarian parties were appropriated (Niblock,
1987). Banks and other private and foreign-owned companies were nationalized (Woodward,
2011), and state companies that would control international trade were established (Grawert,
1998). During the first few years, women were able to gain more labor, political, and social
rights, which also increased women’s representation in the public sector (Ahmed, 2014). For
these reasons, during the coup and in his early years in power, Numeiry had support from the
CPS, SWU, and other progressive groups in Sudan whose mobilization help bring him to power.
It did not take long for the alliance between progressives and Numeiry to decay. The
SWU revoked its support for the regime, after Numeiry referred to the legal reforms regarding
women as “imported laws” (Anis, 2001: 36). Ifi Amadiume (2000) has shown how post-
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independent state officials in Nigeria manipulated “symbols and norms from the different moral
systems…both African and European,” to legitimize their power (Amadiume, 2000: 6). Whereas,
Amin (2007) discusses how different currents of political Islam have chosen to conduct their
struggle on the terrain of culture. Successive regimes in Sudan, the SSU and NIF/NCP included,
have used the language of revolution, civilization, and morality; alongside “sinister manipulation
of tribalism, [gender,] and ethnicity,” to legitimize their power (Musa, 2018: 14). During
Numeiry’s period it was the “legislative revolution,” whereas, under NIF/NCP it was the
“National Salvation Revolution,” which framed campaigns that structured and reformulated
socioeconomic life to the advantage of aspiring military capitalists.
By 1971, Numeiry’s regime dissolved the SWU and established the Union of Sudanese
Women (USW). The regime clamped down on autonomous, political, and progressive organizing
and organizations. Nada Mustafa Ali (2015) discusses the overall limited participation of women
– distinctly active were women from urban areas, South Sudan, and western Sudan – in activism
and politics during the 1970 and 1980s. The SWU “alienated progressive women who were not
members of the CPS, or who were not guaranteed to follow the party line” (71). Further,
“women’s issues” was not being raised by autonomous organizations. Women’s political
mobilization included supporting male politicians/activists, working under the USW, and
organizing in specific urban-based leftist political organizations (Ali, 2015). During the same
period, however, Islamist women’s organizations burgeoned in urban areas, and there were failed
calls by sectarian parties, like the Umma Party, to establish a national women’s organization
(72). Although this work does not explore women’s sectarian organizations, Liv Tønnessen
(2016) shows the dynamics and possibilities within sectarian women’s groups, by showing how,
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during the period of NIF/NCP (1989-2019), their autonomous organization led to challenging
exclusionary practices and beliefs in formal politics.
The same year, in 1971, the CPS rejected Numeiry’s call to form the Sudan Socialist
Union (SSU), which he would go on to form by 1973 as a centralized “mass revolutionary
party”. Numeiry resorted to exiling CPS’s leadership and ejecting communists from the RCC,
which meant the one southern Sudanese in the RCC (who was also a CPS member) lost his
position (Ali, 2015: 45). The CPS organized a coup against Numeiry, but within three days, with
the support of Egypt and Libya, Numeiry executed leaders of the short-lived coup (Esposito,
1986: 186). Indicating the purpose of political Islam before its adoption, Numeiry charged CPS
members for having “atheist affiliation[s]” and being “anti-Islamic” (Ali, 2015: 50).
Deployment of Political Islam
In 1976, Numeiry faced another attempted coup organized by the National Front, a
coalition of sectarian political groups, led by once rivals, Sadiq al-Mahdi26 (of the Umma Party),
Sharif al-Hindi (of the National Unionist Party), and Hassan al-Turabi (of the Muslim Brothers).
Having lost the support of the CPS and SWU, Numeiry proposed a formal agreement, the 1977
National Reconciliation, which was signed between the regime, the Muslim Brothers, and the
Umma Party (Ali, 2015). This agreement dissolved the National Front in return for the political
participation of politico-religious leaders. Hassan al-Turabi and Sadiq al-Mahdi joined the SSU’s
central committee. According to John L. Esposito (1986), “the agreement brought not national
unity but limited cooperation, selected political participation, and resistance from a variety of
sources: sectarian, military, and the south” (187).

“[S]ince independence, the great-grandson of the Mahdi, Sadiq al-Mahdi, has twice been prime minister, 1967-69 and 198689” (Fluehr-Lobban, 1990: 615).
26
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By 1978, Sadiq al-Mahdi goes into voluntary exile after claiming the reforms promised
under the 1977 agreement were not being fulfilled, and Turabi becomes the attorney general
(Woodward, 2011). After 1978, the Islamization of Sudan intensified under the Muslim Brothers.
Many of their members held key sociopolitical and economic positions in the public sector and
the SSU (Esposito, 1986: 190). The Muslim Brothers further asserted their control by influencing
and integrating27 themselves in “universities, student and professional organizations, mosques,
and cultural centers” (Esposito, 1986: 190). Reaching a wider public and establishing financial
organizations, Islamic banks and charity organizations were also formed in this period. Taking
advantage of tax exemptions that resulted from Islamic laws, Islamic banks, such as the Faisal
Islamic Bank (FIB), and insurance companies, such as the Islamic Insurance Company, emerged
(Ali, 2015). Such access and institutionalization not only enabled the Muslim Brothers to
increase their economic base, but also increase their social and economic power as the Islamic
banks targeted “petty traders, entrepreneurs, and Sudanese expatriates in the Gulf countries”
(Ali, 2015: 53).
By 1979, the same year Chevron confirms the presence of oil in Upper Nile (now part of
South Sudan) and South Kordofan, Numeiry’s regime reaches an agreement with the IMF, which
worked with the World Bank, to develop the Economy Recovery Program. The program required
the adoption of neoliberal policies including privatization, liberalization of trade, bank credit
restrictions, currency devaluation, interest rate increase, hold on new development projects,
removal of farming subsidies, social service expenditure cuts and public sector layoffs

“The integration of the Brotherhood within the government was not without its critics. As might be expected, many military
and secular nationalist leaders, as well as those in the predominantly non-Muslim south, were concerned that al Numayri's
increasing Islamic orientation and the Brotherhood's new political status would lead to the escalation of sectarian politics. A
minority within the Brotherhood itself continued to view al-Numayri as an opportunist and considered al-Turabï's
accommodation as a betrayal of all that the Brotherhood had come to represent. Some broke away while others were eventually
expelled.” (Espositio, 1986: 190)
27
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(Prendergast, 1989: 43). Although the IMF and World Bank had supported the Breadbasket Plan
(James, 2011) and increasing mechanized farming schemes, by the time the agreement was
reached, the World Bank halted funds to mechanized farming schemes and offered rehabilitation
plan for cotton producing infrastructures (Prendergast, 1989). The “export-led growth model”
encouraged by the IMF and World Bank, and supported by the U.S. and Gulf countries,
benefitted traders, religious leaders, military officials, and large land and agri-business owners
with access to capital (Prendergast, 1989). The Islamic banks flourished during this period with
limited involvement in Sudan’s productive sectors (agriculture28 and industry). Under the blanket
of Islamic principles of murabaha (profitability) and mudaraba (speculation), and claiming
interest rate on stock as un-Islamic, they limited their activities to “short-term operations with
secure profit” (Ali, 2015: 54). Ali (2015) briefly discusses how the banks were also involved in
hoarding and monopolizing sorghum in the 1980s, to create fake crises and raise their profits
(54). Sorghum is a staple in Sudan, and was mainly exported to Saudi Arabia, which subsidized
sorghum imports from Sudan until 1982: “[e]ven in 1983, when the crop failure due to the
drought was already visible in west Sudan, sorghum 29 was exported and not stored.” (Grawert,
1998: 182).
Elke Grawert (1998) argues, along with the SSU and the transitional government that
follows, the IMF and World Bank should be held responsible for the economic decline and food
insecurity that resulted from disarticulated policies of the 1980s. John Prendergast (1989) argues

28

When they did get involved in agricultural production, it was mostly in the form of lending to merchants with large-scale
projects that would then extend finance to small-scale farmers who were expected to pay after harvest. Ali (2015) refers to this
lending process, shail, as exploitative. If harvest, due to rainfall or many reasons, was not as expected, one could assume these
farmers would become indebted to merchants.
29
Tenant’s unions and regional governments in the Eastern region of Gedaref, where Sorghum was mainly cultivated at the time,
attempted to curb export of Sorghum to fulfill local consumption demands, at the disagreement of merchants and the central
government. One of the transitory government’s (1985-1989) food policies was a ban on sorghum exports, which would be lifted
once the NIF came to power, under recommendation from the World Bank (Grawert, 1998).
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that the IMF recommended policies were, in the first place, designed with a flawed perception of
the Sudanese economy (49). Farming was restructured to privilege export rather than local
consumption, which not only affected food availability and affordability, but also created export
dependency (Prendergast, 1989: 44). With small land holders pushed of their land to make space
for mechanized and irrigated schemes, the austerity measures, including subsidy removals,
exasperated food shortages and price increases. As the central government seceded from social
services, as per fiscal policies, Islamic organizations remained functional, and at times, the only
source of relief (Ahmed, 2014). The Muslim Brothers under Numeiry also established several
charity organizations (Ali, 2015), creating structures of exploitation on one hand and structures
of dependence on the other.
Between 1978 and 1985, the state had cut development and social service spending by
half. The austerity measures limited the state’s responsibility in social reproduction by
decreasing the expenditure on the health sector (from 10 to 4 percent of GDP between 1980 and
1985) and exasperating regional underdevelopment of medical services, with rural areas least
serviced. Although education services were not as impacted as negatively as health services, the
quality (related to the decreased wages of teachers) and expansion of education (in rural Darfur
and South Sudan) was limited (Grawert, 1998). As access to healthcare, affordable food, and
clean water deteriorated, government expenditure on “general administration and defense more
than tripled during the same period” (Prendergast, 1989: 47). These patterns of production, trade,
and state expenditure, along with the structures of exploitation and control, are important to
understand because they allow us to understand the iterated political and economic elements
under the NIF/NCP.
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Though the Sudanese annual economy fluctuated, the economy did not recover. Between
1977 and 1983, account deficit rose, foreign debt more than tripled, GDP per capita declined,
and the Sudanese currency depreciated. Between 1982 to 1983 alone inflation rate increased 20%
(J. Prendergast 1989). Along with famine, drought, and war-related displacements, the state’s
withdrawal from the public sector instigated the suffering of the Sudanese working peoples
(Wohlmuth, 1994), and specifically Sudanese women (Ahmed, 2014). Walter Rodney (1975)
writes, “[t]he incapacity to prevent or deal with drought and famine and the fantastic hardship
which ensues are all related to the socio-economic structures of neo-colonial Africa and to the
way that our economies are located within the international imperialist system” (16). Indeed,
although scholars have agreed that drought was a causal factor for the famine in parts of Darfur
and Kordofan, many have also agreed the economic crisis was a causal factor (Grawert, 1998:
66). Peter Woodward (2011) writes, “[t]he government did little or nothing to alleviate the
sufferings of Darfuris. Many died before international assistance arrived” (160). It was not long
before professional associations, tenant unions, and working peoples were organizing again to
challenge their exploitation and exasperated conditions.
With growing disapproval, and mass protests in 1979 and 1982, the regime tried to
restructure the state and hold on to power. By 1983, Numeiry declared Sudan an Islamic
Republic, with himself as the religious-political leader (Imam), and Sharia as the governing law
– the first of what became known as the September Laws (Gordon, 1985). By the time Sharia
law – “a version of Islamic law, which included the hudud30 punishments” – was passed, the

“Crimes against God in Islamic penal system are called hudud. Hudud crimes are violations of “natural law” as interpreted
within the specific cultures of the Islamic State. Hudud crimes as violations of God’s rights must merit divine displeasure.
Declaration of war against an Islamic state is interpreted as making war against Allah and his messenger” (Okon, 2014: 229).
Hudud crimes include fornication, adultery, theft, drinking alcohol, and murder. Applied vaguely and arbitrarily, as has been
done in Sudan (Gordon, 1985), one can see how such laws can strengthen the power of those implementing them, and
simultaneously, oppress people engaging in daily life activities.
30
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Muslim Brothers influence in government was evident (Woodward, 2011). Retreating to the
subjugating practices and discourse of political Islam, Numeiry dissolved the regional31
governments of the South and discharged senior army officials, which ended the brief period of
peace that was reached with the South. Numeiry justified implementation of Islamic law “in
terms of returning to the country's roots and ridding the state's legal system of the last vestiges of
colonial influence” (Gordon, 1985: 798). Discussing the application of Islamic law in Sudan
under Numeiry’s regime and the NIF/NCP, Jok Madut Jok (2007) writes:
[T]hey are not genuinely interested in advancing the cause of Islam or improving
the lives of Muslims, but rather in advancing their political agenda, strengthening
the hegemony of a political party, controlling businesses, and silencing opponents
in an attempt to imply the regime and its supporters are more Muslim than the
rest. (160)
When the state of emergency was declared in 1984, Numeiry started his speech with quotes from
the Quran and continued referencing the Quran and divine law. The state of emergency was
followed by suspending of constitutional laws and setting emergency regulations and courts
(Gordon, 1985). According to Numeiry, the Emergency Courts established were meant to be
uphold God and the Prophet’s laws, deeds, and words (805).
The September laws, which include Sharia, were among numerous provisional decrees
passed by Numeiry in his effort to centralize power and Islamize judicial and legislative
structures. Most of the new laws were drafted by the committee in the Presidential Palace
(limited to Numeiry and his advisors) and passed as “provisional orders” and presidential decrees
(Gordon, 1985). Although the People’s Assembly had to approve the laws and had the alleged
power to initiate its own legislation, neither did the body amend Numeiry’s laws nor initiate
legislation in the period between 1983 and 1984 – also the period of Numeiry’s “legislative

Under the Addis Ababa Accords, South Sudan had gotten regional autonomy. This was in Numeiry’s early years (before the
coup attempts and his alliance with the Muslim Brothers) and had created relative peace from 1972 to 1983.
31
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revolution” (Gordon, 1985: 799). The laws passed between 1983 and 1984 affected the
operations and regulation of courts and court personnel, along with substantive, tax, civil and
religious laws, which increased state control and affected the private and public lives of
Sudanese people (Gordon, 1985: 795). Numeiry arrested individuals like Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader
of National Umma Party, and Mahamud Muhammad Taha32, leader of Republican Brotherhood,
for publicly disapproving the September Laws, and alienated sectarian political parties and civil
organizations (Fluehr-Lobban, 1990). He dissolved the dominant partnerships among the
sectarian parties and formed another coalition that included unions and marginalized political
parties. However, neither religious invocation, nor including the exploited and oppressed groups
in Sudan, would be enough to outlast the conjunctures of the period.
In yet another display of “people’s power” (El-Affendi, 2012), in 1985, popular uprising
resurfaced to remove yet another military regime, while calling for the repeal of Sharia law and a
peaceful solution in the South (Ali, 2015). After the introduction of stringent economic measures
in 1981, per the IMF’s recommendation, there were already strikes among Atbara’s railway
workers and protests in Khartoum (Ryle, Willis, Baldo, and Jok, 2011: 321). The social forces
that put pressure on the regime, similar to those in 1964 and 2019, included armed groups, youth
and university students, professional and political (including sectarian) class, and the political
society (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). Similar to the National Professional’s Front of 1964, the
National Alliance for National Salvation (NANS) – a coordination of political parties, trade
unions, and leaders of professional associations that resemble the composition of the Forces of
Freedom and Change (FFC) in 2019 – which emerged from the Trade Union Alliance33, led

“Ultimately, Taha was hanged for his opposition to the Islamization” (Fluehr-Lobban, 1990: 620).
de Waal, Alex. (2013). Sudan’s Elusive Democratization: Civil Mobilization, Provincial Rebellion and Chameleon
Dictatorships. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 31, no. 2: 216.
32
33
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coordinated demonstrations and effective general strikes (Khalid, 2012). The NANS showed
high levels of coordination by planning for extended periods of civil disobedience, and even
placing shadow committees that would take over incase the steering committee were arrested (de
Waal, 2013). However, the SWU struggled to have women’s voices represented in the NANS
(Anis, 2001). Nada Mustafa Ali (2015) highlights the shortcomings of organized women to
intervene in the activities of the NANS and the transitory34 government.
Having lost most of his allies, including factions of the military who, once again, refused
violent retaliation against the masses, Numeiry was removed from power (Branch and Mampilly,
2015). Between 1985 and 1989, transition councils and unstable coalitions of political parties
were formed and, once again, dominated by sectarian parties: the Umma Party, National Islamic
Front (NIF) (formerly Islamic Charter Front), and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).
Disputing claims that political Islam is the will of the Northern working peoples, during the
transition period multitudinous crowds came out to receive Ahmed al Mirghani after his
agreement with John Garang on freezing the September laws (Khalid, 2003: 190). After a
turbulent series of coalition parties, however, another military coup occurred on June 30, 1989,
“the same day the cabinet was scheduled to meet and adopt the draft legislation repealing the
September laws.” (Khalid, 2003: 188). The coup installed the National Islamic Front (NIF) with
Omar Hassan al-Bashir as president.
2019 Uprising
Since 2010, Sudan, like other parts of Africa, has seen a significant rise in popular
demonstration which has been met by increased repression (Mustasilta, 2019). In Sudan’s case,

34

The turbulent years before NIF also witnessed a rise in the mobilization of women in/of different regions and the emergence of
multiple women’s groups, networks, NGOs, and political positions, to address varied concerns, such as FGM, health, poverty,
etc. (Ahmed, 2014).
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some literature has framed this rise as spontaneous acts or as residual effects from the “Arab
Spring” (Ottaway and Ottaway, 2019; Baldo and Oette, 2019). Scholars like Bahreldin (2020)
have offered alternative narratives by referring to the Sudanese uprising as the Nile Spring;
whereas Nisrin Elamin (2020) and Hisham Aidi (2018) have reconceptualized the uprising in the
African context. Before Bashir’s removal, as Baldo and Oette (2019) point out, Western media
portrayed the protests in Sudan as “spontaneous bread protests” with “images of suffering and
powerlessness.” A similar approach was used to frame the Tunisian uprising of 1984 (Zghal,
1995). In their book, Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change, political scientists,
Adam Branch and Zacharia Mampilly (2015) counter these narratives by providing a series of
movements, political acts, and collective action that preceded and succeeded the “Arab Spring.”
Considering anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 60s and the wave of protests across the
continent in the 1980s to 2000s, many contend Africa is experiencing its third wave of protests
(Branch and Mampilly 2015; Mueller, 2018). In 2019, Sudan experienced its own third wave of
popular mobilization, which overthrew the third oppressive military regime, since independence
in 1956. Many readings of the 2019 uprising have been reductionist, simplistic, and/or
pessimistic. By emphasizing, Islamist fundamentalism (Omer, 2020), dictatorship (Hassan and
Kadouda, 2019), failed statehood (Young, 2020), and/or isolated violence without equivalent or
relational focus on the forms of organization and collective action demonstrated by Sudanese
women and men, many analyses fall short of a comprehensive reading and therefore, of the
possibilities.
For this work, Sudanese women’s mobilization is analyzed as vital to democratizing
Sudanese society because of 1) the structural positions occupied by women, 2) the militant role
of women, and 3) because African social movements have historically provided “the substantive
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uncertainty that is necessary to create accountability among political elites to their marginalized
citizens, thereby advancing a more sustainable human-oriented development agenda” (Ellis and
Kessel, 2009: 3). This claim is echoed by Abdelkader Zghal (1995) who views the political
participation of the masses as mitigating the “implementation of an unpopular political decision,”
which we witnessed as the Sudanese people refused the TMC (102). For Claude Ake, popular
protest, can be a mechanism towards self-realization and “new visions of democracy and
development in which popular interests come first” (as cited on Branch & Mampilly, 2015: 6).
Indeed, since the term “New Sudan” was coined by John Garang, to the chants during the 2019
protests, popular protest has visibly modified the conceptualization of Sudan and Sudanese
identity, socioeconomic and political structures, and popular demand. In an interview about the
2018/19 uprising, youth activist Sara Elhassan responded, “people are fighting for a new Sudan,
in which this marginalization should be, first of all, remedied, if not actual reparations being
given to people of marginalized areas and conflict zones” (Elmahadi, 2020). Some debates center
the formation of collective identity in the categorization of social movements, but similar to the
identity-oriented politics critiqued by Adam Habib (2009), one might argue multiple identities
were welcomed in the 2019 uprising and mobilization efforts (Arman, 2019).
The most widely quoted literature assert that the December 2018 protests broke out in
Atbara (North-East region) and spread to Zalingei and Nyala (Western Darfur), Port Sudan and
Gedaref (Eastern region), and Wad Medani (East-Central region) (Kadoda and Hale, 2018).
Atbara has a robust history of working class organizing that began in the 1940s. Atbara has been
the headquarters of Sudan Railways and a center for the Sudanese labor movement, which was
once the most organized and dynamic labor movements in Africa and the Middle East (Sikainga,
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2010). Considering the historical railway unions and strikes of West Africa 35, the mobility and
literacy of transport workers has always been crucial to mobilization. Considering that the
railway workers in Atbara (which made-up the Railway Workers Union) formed the core of the
unions constituting the forces of both the 1964 and 1985 uprising, protests in Atbara were not
surprising. After 1989, many unions went underground and others were consumed by the
Sudanese Worker’s Trade Union organization, which was politically affiliated to the NIF/NCP
(Fadl, Abdelgalil, and Ahmed, 2019). Despite the Bashir regime’s repressive campaign against
labor organizations, including removal of civil servants and persecution of union and political
leaders, resistive organizations persevered underground or in practice:
Railway worker Ishag Ali said the idea for a convoy [to join a sit-in in Khartoum]
was discussed in railway workshops and voted on by workers, an action
reminiscent of the activism that gained Atbara’s workers their reputation in the
past. (Amin, 2019)
On the other hand, Gada Kadoda and Sondra Hale (2020) have provided other accounts that
protests first broke out in “peripheral” areas. The first protests were in Mayrno (South-East
region) on December 6, 2019, then spread to Al-Fashir (Central Darfur), and Ad-Damazin
(South-East region), before reaching the Sudanese city of Atbara on December 19, and finally
spreading to other cities including Khartoum by December 25. Most detailed reports on
organizing focus on Khartoum, but the participation of rural communities, particularly in the
North and around Gezira State, has been stated and explored (Deshayes, Etienne, & Medani,
2019). Regardless of which accounts are most accurate, such distributed and simultaneous
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Ousmane Sembene captures the railway strikes that cut through many cities in the 1940s, in his book Gods Bits of Woods.
From East to West, the Dakar-Niger railway extended from Koulikoro, Mali to Dakar, Senegal. From South to North, it stretched
from Dakar to Saint-Louis, Senegal. It is within these cities that a good number of delegates and representatives of unions (from
various cities) and workers met to strategize on the strike. The strike received support from workers in Guinea, Dahomey, and
France, itself (220). Financial resources were used by strike committees to run a social welfare program that rationed food for
families of the strikers. From Dakar to Koulikoro, the strikers were organized in committees and subcommittees, including the
women’s committee, that held assemblies for discussion and voting (160).
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eruptions of popular protest not only indicate the conjunctures of the period, but also the scale,
rate, and level at which popular mobilization was happening. It is important to note that in the
early period of the uprising, “the mass of protesters were drawn from poor town dwellers and
from people who have lost out in the reworking of land relations in rural Sudan to the benefit of
commercial agriculture” (El-Gizouli, 2019c).
Movements that originate in the ‘peripheries’ and rural areas have been regarded as
grassroots, whereas movements that spring up in urban areas have been regarded as social
movements (Hassan and Kodouda, 2019: 94). In this work, distinctions like urban and rural, or
social movement and grassroots, are considered depending on specific contexts. For instance,
describing Soba, an area on the fringes of Khartoum, which is commonly regarded as village,
Steel, Abukashawa, and Hussein (2019) use the term “peri-urban” to refer to “transitional zones
between rural and urban areas, characterized by a high heterogeneity of land uses, mixed
livelihoods, population densities and pressure on land resources” (47). Continuous shifts in
demography36, lack of up-to-date data, along with the continued mobilization of heterogenous
groups in what have been called ‘shanty towns’ (Willis, Egemi, and Winter, 2011) and ‘urban
peripheries’ (Assal, 2011), prevents rigid classification or identification of urban-rural in
Sudanese grassroots movements, which is considered a social movement.
On April 6, 2019, a few days before Omar al-Bashir was removed from power, the
Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) had intensified demonstrations and called for a march
on the same day (April 6) as the fall of Nimeiri’s military regime (Hassan and Kadouda, 2019).
The same day demonstrators started the sit-in in front of the Sudanese Army Forces (SAF)
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Due to livelihood, security, and environmental concerns there has been historical migrations to Greater Khartoum. The 2008
census estimated the population of Khartoum to have surpassed 5 million (Assal, 2011), with roughly a quarter of the population
considered as internal migrants (Ibrahim, 2019).
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headquarters37, which attracted more people from other cities, to the extent that security forces
had closed roads and bridges entering Khartoum (Amin, 2019). Hundreds of workers took a
convoy of trains from Atbara and Port Sudan to join the sit-in in Khartoum. Sudanese in the
diaspora also38 returned to participate in demonstrations (Elhassan, 2019). These realities force
us to complicate our thinking about the nuances and collective power of the gender, class, race,
and regions, of the forces that participated in the movement. The networks of people that
mobilized and migrated shows complex movement and organization that transcend simplistic
categorizations.
Perhaps the two most common terms used to describe the Sudanese demonstrations and
collective action demonstrated in 2019 are uprising and revolution. Depending on the
composition of movements, scholars like Moghadam (2019) have made distinctions between
resistance and revolution, but these distinctions are commonly rooted in social transformation,
i.e., changes at different levels of social reality. However, there is no consensus to what
constitutes a ‘revolution’ (Kraminick, 1972). Many have specified and broadened our views of
resistance (Amadiume, 1995), and the politics of refusal (Grande, 2018). For the 2019 uprising,
the labels of revolution and uprising were developed based on the removal of Bashir; the
concessions forced on the military; the anti-Political Islam sentiments (Berridge, 2019); urbanrural networks (Medani, 2019); organizing across the most exploited classes and identities (Aidi,
2020); and/or civil society’s estrangement from the state (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). Kadoda
and Hale (2020) refer to the uprising as a “popular revolution,” but this work considers the 2019

The defense ministry, the presidential residence (Bashir’s house), and the headquarters of the National Intelligence Security
Service (NISS) were all housed in the compound where the sit-in was staged.
38 Football players’ absence from training shows the broadness of the sectors and groups of people that participated in the
uprising.
37
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protests and mobilization as a popular uprising with the capacity for revolution, or as part of a
revolutionary process.
Considering the long history of Sudanese organizing, movements in Sudan have
oscillated between resistance, which appeared as anti-systemic and anti-imperial, and organized
efforts, with extensive grassroots organization and network building. Kadoda and Hale (2020)
argue the 2019 uprising was distinct from the past two movements in Sudan because “instead of
being anti-statist, [the current movement] envisions the formation of a supposedly ‘democratic’
state” (76). Studying movements as an ongoing process, unlike a static event, allows us to
understand the (dis)continuity of movements and the historic necessity of their emergence
(Rodney et al., 1990).
Although Baldo and Oette’s (2019) formulations of failed state 39 and corruption do not
offer a satisfactory analysis of the uprising, they are not alone in declaring the 2019 uprising as
“a popular, peaceful, genuine grassroots uprising – a people's revolution in the making.” To my
agreement, Mohammed Elnaiem (2019) has referred to the 2018/19 Sudanese protests as being a
“grassroots African revolt.” Grassroots movements are considered as having non-hierarchical
(horizontal) structures that are organized at the local level. To avoid confusions, the definition
for grassroots used for this work is based on the work of African/Black radical intellectuals, and
aligns with Julie Fisher’s (1993) comprehensive statement:
By grassroots movements we refer to community-based initiatives, actions, and/or
organizations that address issues of practical concern to their constituents and are
generally committed to making better the lives of local people. Grassroots
organizations are also sometimes known as base groups, people's organizations,
or local organizations. However, named, they are groups that emerge and/or work
at the local level to improve and develop their communities either through
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Other critiques of this formulation include its homogenizing aggregation of formations with distinct political and economic
structures (Call, 2011).
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community-wide or more specific memberships, such as women or farmers. (as
quoted in Bystsydzienski & Sekhon, 1999: 10)
Decentralized and participatory forms of organization within grassroots mobilization were
reflected in Sudan and among Sudanese women’s organization. For Mustaslita (2019), nonviolence, resilience, and strong organizing structures stand out as the strengths of the 2019
uprising, which she refers to as “non-violent revolution.” In 2013, the September protests
resulted in the destruction of gas stations, pharmacies, companies, police stations, banks and
state buildings (de Waal, 2013). In 2019, the first demonstrations, in Atbara and Dongola,
included setting fire to the National Congress Party’s headquarters and looting the Zakat
chambers. Additionally, this work avoids strict categorization of violent and non-violent
demonstrations because 1) armed groups under the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF)40
played a role in the 2019 uprising (putting in question the impact of the threat of violence), 2)
because earlier demonstrations outside of Khartoum were not necessarily non-violent, and 3)
because we cannot delineate the impacts the violent demonstrations in 2013 had on the choice to
adopt non-violent organizing in 2018.
The “anti-statism, anti-antiauthoritarianism, and non-hierarchical structures,” (Mustaslita,
2019) in the 2019 movement might lead to its characterization as part of New Social Movements
(Aidi, 2019). Steven Buechler (1995) argues that theories used to describe New Social
Movements (NSM) are historically dependent and geographically informed and cannot be
described as one paradigm or theory. In contrast to older rigid theorizations of social movements,
these theories better account for the dynamics and flexibility found in African social movements.
However, the rigid classifications of new movements versus old movements, the limited

“Established in 2011, the SRF joined the main Darfur armed movements, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement led by Abd
al- Wahid Mohamed Nur, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement led by Minni Minawi and the Justice and Equality Movement
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement in North Sudan (SPLA/M-N).” (El-Gizouli, 2019a).
40
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conception of collective identity, and the framing of cultural movements as inherently different
from political, applied in New Social Movement theories, still fall short of conveying what
happened in Sudan. The 2019 uprising included different forms of mobilizations and complex
intergenerational networks among multiple regions, classes, and identities, which are not
appropriately explored in NSM theories.
The initial protests in 2018 were triggered by an increase in bread prices. A sequence of
strikes and protests that followed pointed to the reality of networks of organizing which the state
sought to extinguish over the past twenty years. Based on statistical data collected across African
countries, political scientist Lisa Mueller (2018) claims the most common motivating factors to
join protests in Africa have been economic. Others have pointed to the impacts of economic
liberalization and declining living standards on popular uprisings (Larmer, 2010). However,
some analyses, such as W. J. Berridge’s (2015) analysis of the 1964 Sudanese uprising, do not
support the claim that the economy was the leading cause for mobilization. Too often debates
centering the economy ignore the conjunctures that compel diverse and intersecting groups to
mobilize (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). This work attempts to reveal how labels of economic
issues conceal the struggle for social reproduction, and the struggle for humanity and dignity 41.
There is overwhelming consensus, among academics, journalist and activists, is that most
of the demonstrations were populated by youth and women. Youth have been estimated to make
up 80% of the protestors (Elmahadi, 2020), whereas 70% of protestors in Khartoum were
estimated to be women (Engeler, Braghieri, and Manzur, 2019). Based on Aalen (2020), 60
percent of Sudan’s population is within the age group between 15 and 30. Women were present
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Horace G. Campbell defines Pan Africanism as the struggle for the restoration of the humanity and dignity of African peoples.
I use the struggle for humanity and dignity here in relation to this definition and essentially to emphasize that the struggles of
economic, political, social and environmental justice and equity boil down to the realization of people’s humanity and dignity.
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at all levels of organizing and forms of protest. Though political Islam, state oppression, and
gendered socioeconomic structures have created shared experiences among Sudanese women,
the broad articulations of women’s demands 42 and organizations 43 show the extent of different
experiences, and therefore, motivation. Women, from all sections of society, were not only
leaders in professional, political, and civil groups, but active participants in all forms of
demonstrations: “[women] demonstrated, took over the streets, built and protected the barricades,
initiated the demonstration, participated in the sit-in and the sit-in events, and prepared food and
drinks for the protestors in the sit-in space” (Bahreldin, 2020: 13). There is limited scholarly
data, especially regional data, on which women or women’s groups participated at which point of
the uprising.
Literature on women’s participation in 2018/19 has related women’s resistance to state
repression; institutional attempts of controlling women’s identity, mobility, labor; and to
normalized patriarchal relations in society (Nugdalla, 2020). Under Bashir’s regime, Sudanese
women have experienced state repression and discrimination, which included arbitrary
detentions and torture houses (Elnaiem, 2019), and will be explored in chapter three. The
gendered and racialized nature of war, displacement, and violence has also been linked with
women’s multiple form of oppressions, especially in areas with conflict (Kadoda and Hale, 2020;
Tønnessen, 2018; Macklin, 2004). Others have related the low participation and exclusion of
women from public space (Nugdalla, 2020). Since the removal of Bashir, women have also been
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Ali (2015) mentions that homosexuality and advocacy for LGBTQ communities is outlawed in Sudan and South Sudan.
Although not included in this work, a young organizer from the Noon Movement, which emerged during the 2019 uprising, has
mentioned to me their efforts included advocacy for LGTBQ communities in Sudan.
43 Hale, S. (2015). Sudanese feminists, civil society, and the Islamist military. OpenDemocracy (London), Journal, Electronic.;
Hale, S. (2016). Notes on Sudanese Women’s Activism, Movements, and Leadership. In F. Sadiqi (Ed.), Women’s Movements in
Post-“Arab Spring” North Africa (pp. 159–176). Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-50675-7_11
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protesting their exclusion from negotiations – also recounting what happened during negotiations
following the 1964 and 1985 uprisings – in the FFC (Tønnessen and al-Nagar, 2020).
Women’s movements and organizing in Sudan started as early as the independence and
anti-imperialist movements of the late 1940s (Anis, 2001). In fact, one of the earliest recording
of a woman leading a major protest is of Alaazza Mohammed Abdallah, in 1924 (Elhassan,
2019). Women were not only active in the Mahdi revolt against Turkish/Egyptian rule, but
women like Mandy Ajbna, from the Nuba Mountains, were instrumental in forming solidarity
across multiple groups for the struggle against British colonialism (Kabalo, 2012). In 1946, Dr.
Khalida Zahir, who becomes one of the co-founders of the Sudanese Women’s Union (SWU),
was flogged for her anti-colonial resistance against the British (Salih and Wilson, 2019). Amira
Osman (2014) documents some of the Pan-African and anti-colonial liberation struggles
Sudanese women have engaged. The SWU organized protests during the execution of Patrice
Lumumba, they protested in front of the French embassy against the arrest of Algerian freedom
fighter Djamila Bouhired, and they have shown solidarity with Arab women freedom fighters in
many countries including Palestine. Similar to how Alaa Salah represented one out of many,
these individual women (and the SWU) provide insight into the extent and longevity of Sudanese
women’s activism.
Despite being active forces, the dearth on Sudanese women’s contribution to anticolonial,
anti-imperialist, nationalist, and liberation struggles portrays men as the only actors in the
historical process (Sharkey, Vezzadini, Seri-Hersch, 2015). Crackdown on women scholars and
state attacks on institutions like the Gender Center for Research and Training (GCRT), which
happened in 2004, have only contributed to this insufficiency (Osman, 2014). Much of the
literature on women is not only concentrated on women in the North, but it “is largely by women
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on women” (Osman, 2014: 46). Pointing to the extent of limitations based on women’s structural
positions, regions experiencing protracted conflict and uneven development, like South Sudan
and Darfur, have had even less women scholars and scholarship on women. Perhaps the most
documented women’s organization is the Sudanese Women’s Union (SWU), which was
established by teachers and graduates before independence, in 1952 (Damir, 2020). Very few
works discuss Sudanese women’s movements without mention of the SWU and, as Ali (2000)
has indicated, too often reduce the entirety of the Sudanese women’s movement to the SWU.
The social forces that populated many of the protests in most cities occupy specific
positions in social reproduction and material production: small-scale producers, precarious
workers, the urban middleclass and workforce, and the unemployed (El-Gizouli, 2019c). In the
book, Political Protest in Contemporary Africa, Lisa Mueller (2018) counters simplistic
explanations of popular mobilization in Africa. She argues that the position of the new
middleclass in Africa would necessitate the class be at the forefront of denouncing authoritarian
rule. It is important to note that Sudan’s urban (professional) populace has been identified as
those that “share neither the comforts nor privileges associated with the ‘middle class’ in the
popular imagination” (Elnaiem, 2019: 15). In the African context, material and cultural
discrepancies often make contextualization of rigid class categorizations necessary.
Elnaiem’s (2019) categorization of the middle class is similar to what has commonly
been referred to as the ‘urban underclass44. According to Branch and Mampilly (2015), the
political identity45 of this class is better emphasized if referenced as a political society46:
“political society is a category that typically comprises the economically most deprived, bringing
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In his book, the common wind, Scott (2018), refers to a masterless class (runaway slaves, freed slaves, merchants, and
generally those that were at the bottom of the class stratification) whose position allowed them to defy authority and social
conformity, resembles the relation of the political society in Sudan to the state.
46 Branch and Mampilly (2015) write that the term political society is derived from the works of Partha Chaterjee.

38

together the unemployed, the underemployed, informal workers, and even parts of the petty
bourgeoisie” (21). This political society normally has no formal agreements or guarantees from
the state or political elite, who often relate through coercion. As will be seen in succeeding
chapters, women make up a significant part of Sudan’s political society, which often suffer most
at the hands of the state. ‘Shammasha’ is a local term used to refer to parts of the political society
in Sudan, particularly the unemployed youth and street vendors (Branch and Mampilly, 2015).
The Sudanese Tea Sellers Association, with a membership of 27,000, is one of the largest
organized bodies that emerged from the Sudanese political society and participated in the 2019
uprising.
For Elnaiem (2019), the Sudanese uprising was composed of three layers: grassroots,
civil society organizations, and armed and unarmed opposition. Elnaiem (2019) considers the
grassroots in Sudan – which represents an inter-class alliance, unaffiliated with political parties
and tied to the underground civil society – as the base layer of the struggle. He describes civil
society organizations as “unions, student groups, and clubs, both underground and officially
recognized,” whereas, the opposition consists of armed and unarmed organizations that currently
makeup the Sudan Call (11). I agree that Elnaiem’s three layers have been the most organized
and impactful groups. I also agree that the grassroots served as the base.
Regardless of their potency, however, I believe there were and have been more layers to
Sudanese resistance. First, as Ellis and Kessel (2009) argue there is a lack of emphasis on the
diaspora and exiled (inside and outside the continent) in discussions of African social
movements: “when a significant part of a country’s population lives abroad, the diaspora may
take on an important role in framing debates or interpreting them for the outside world” (15).
Geographer Alice Franck (2019) explains diaspora demonstrations, such as the one held in front
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of the Sudanese embassy in Paris, started as early as December 25 (a few days after protests
erupted in Atbara). At the height of repression in June, the government curtailed access to the
internet and the Sudanese diaspora took on the role of advocacy and exposure (Achar, 2020).
Mainly because of the nature of the repressive state, the Sudanese diaspora have always played
an integral role in mobilization and organizing (Ali, 2015). It is also important to at least mention
this layer, because Patricia Daley (2020) warns of the “fault line separating ontologically the
diaspora from the continent of Africa” (1).
Second, Elnaiem’s (2019) focus on the SPA leaves no explicit claims that situate the
resistance committees as part of the base layer, the grassroots. This work considers the resistance
committees, many formed by women, as alternate strategies (Zerai and Campbell, 2006) and
apparatuses (Rodney et al., 1990), which were not only crucial to the uprising, but also warrant
more study. Although I do not undertake this task, I believe some of the layers are also worth
expanding. I believe military strongmen and their interests overshadow the fact that the rankand-file, part of some of the most exploited classes, have repeatedly rebelled by joining
protestors on the streets they were meant to patrol. Historically, during the 1985 uprising, “the
field commanders flatly rejected the suggestion” that the military shoot demonstrators that
breach the barricades of the palace, which led to a close decision to depose Numeiry between
factions in the military (El-Affendi, 2012: 297).
Both the 1964 and 1985 uprisings were ignited by students, in Khartoum, and led by the
trade unionists and professionals, which garnered an unexpectedly large and consistent support
from the masses (i.e. political society). These forces not only made-up the core group that
contributed to the removal of the military regimes of 1964 and 1985, but they were also some of
the most progressive forces calling for “secularism, democracy, and pluralism” (Sikainga, 2010).
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Some key players in Sudanese politics and counter-revolution also emerged during these periods.
Hassan al-Turabi, for instance, was a university lecturer organizing against Abboud and would
once again oppose and moblize against the military regime led by Numeiry. Numeiry himself
was one of the officers who refused to violently respond to protestors during the 1964 uprising
(Berridge, 2015). As students and professional associations took lead in coordination, political
parties and military followed, with the political society, including the shamasha47, comprising
the base in both uprisings (El-Affendi, 2012: 298). The trade unionists and professionals in both
uprisings have been accused of being “shaped by a sense of the superiority of the ideals and
culture of the riverain centre they hailed from” (Willis, 2011: 117), which also happened to be a
“relatively affluent, well-educated, and socially homogeneous” centre (Berridge, 2015: 60). The
material and social shifts throughout the years, and particularly after Bashir’s regime came to
power, have shifted the demography of the central-Northern region, and therefore, the
demography of those leading and participating in the 2019 uprising (Ibrahim, 2019).
A significant difference between recent organizing of women and the 1964 and 1985
uprisings is the extent to which diverse social groups and regions were represented. Unlike the
two previous uprisings, which erupted in the Greater Khartoum region, the 2019 uprisings began
in “peripheral regions” (Kadoda and Hale, 2020). Such findings are key to this work because
radical possibilities emerge from the organization of the most exploited social groups (Andaiye,
2020; Jones, 1949), which in Sudan tend to be women, working peoples, and those from regions
of conflict and unequal development. Another important distinction from past women’s
mobilization is that many groups that formed over the last few years and contributed to the
ousting of Bashir are not affiliated to political groups (Elradi, 2019; Kadoda and Hale, 2019).

‘Shammasha’ is a local term used to refer to parts of the political society in Sudan, particularly the unemployed youth and
street vendors (Branch and Mampilly, 2015).
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The autonomy of women’s groups, which continue to demand they be included and represented
in the transition (al-Nagar and Tønnessen, 2020), could mean that “women’s issues” will not be
relegated or compromised as before (Ali, 2015). Valentine M. Moghadam (2019) views the
inclusion of women’s agendas as having been and continuing to be necessary for a revolution.
Conclusion
This chapter began with the emergence of the state in Sudan, which restructured social
and political life. Since the Mahdist revolt, we have repeatedly seen the mobilization and
rebellion of the working peoples of Sudan, only to be comprised by sectarian and military groups
with capitalist interests. Despite the rich diversity of the Sudanese peoples, and except brief
transitory periods, Islamization and Arabization, coupled with militarization, has been the
recursive mode of politics in Sudan. This has not only caused the devastation and subjugation of
women, working peoples, and those that are not considered Northern-Arab Muslims, but it has
proliferated different forms of resistance, rebellion, and organizing. The chapter provided brief
overviews of the 1964 and 1985 uprisings, but it did not delve into the various and prolonged
forms of organizing throughout Sudan, particularly the armed struggles in South Sudan, Darfur,
South Kordofan, and Eastern Sudan, and the over 10048 political parties present in the country.
This is not to minimize the struggle, oppression, and contribution of these forces, but to focus on
the possibilities of demilitarized bottom-up democratization in Sudan. The legacy of Islamization
and Arabization is also evident in literature regarding Sudan, which situates the African country
in the Arab world. The next chapter will look at the theoretical approach used to understand and
study Sudan, Sudanese women, and the 2019 uprising.

48
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Chapter 2
Understanding Sudan and the 2019 Uprising
This work bases the conceptualization of organizing and resistance, on historians and
theorists that have attempted to provide us with complex and articulated understandings of
resistance among Africans and the African diaspora. Too often resistance and organizing in
Africa has been diminished, misinterpreted, rigidly classified, and in Sudan’s case overlooked.
To provide a comprehensive analysis of the 2019 uprising and avoid reproduction of work that
ignores the pivotal contributions of women and Africans, I weave the voices of Black, African,
and African diaspora intellectuals. The works of C.L.R James, Walter Rodney, and Amilcar
Cabral, were important in shifting my imagination of mass mobilization and resistance regarding
African peoples. There are also many women, peers of the men mentioned before but less
recognized, that have theorized and broadened our understanding of women and mass
mobilization. I use the interventions of Claudia Jones and Andaiye to expand Rodney’s and other
Black Marxists’ articulations of popular struggle and women’s positions and roles. Of course,
these works span resistance to colonial, imperial, neocolonial, and neoliberal yokes of oppression
and exploitation, so one must carefully articulate how and when each work is used. In Sudan’s
case, and as this work attempts to show, an interconnected and culminated form of these
oppressions have manifested as iterations of what radical African feminist, Nawal El-Saadwi, has
called the global imperialist class patriarchal system49. Considering the shifting and nuanced
mode of politics maintained by militarization, this formulation is subject to expansion. The first
and last section of this chapter discusses the theoretical approach used to reveal the realities in
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Nawal el-Saadawi passed away March 21, 2021, and her formulation was mentioned in Fawzia Afzhal-Khan (2021) recent
article in her memory.
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Sudan, and the global imperialist class patriarchal system that super-exploits women. The second
section reviews the literature on social movements in Africa.
Theoretical Approach
As an African who has received most of her higher education in foreign institutions not
only located in the global North, but also epistemologically based on western neoliberal
hegemony, I am conscious of the experts, methodologies, and overall ethics of researching
Sudan. Therefore, “identities, locations, and institutional affiliations, as well as the
epistemological and methodological constraints and choices” have been considered when
conceptualizing the theoretical framework for this work (Mama, 2007: 7). The male-centric
approach to struggle and politics, especially emphasized in Sudanese literature, has also been
considered (Ali, 2015). I have been intentional about building on and being grounded on
theoretical work that not only studies [women in] Africa, but poses questions on the ethics,
framing, and process of producing knowledge on Africa, in hopes of countering the “neoliberal
paradigm that dominates the literature on “failed states,’ [and positions] the ethics of making
profits before human life” (Campbell, 2008: 149). Language and formulations of “resource
curse” and “failed state” are avoided in this work – even if authors used in the work use such
formulations – because not only do these formulations conceal the reality of a global capitalist
system that requires instability and underdevelopment to function, but they also posit the
Western world as the center of progress.
Amina Mama’s (2007) discussion of Africans studying liberation struggles reminds us
that studying revolutionary processes/phases must “defy disciplinary grids” (9). A writer’s
attempt to understand resistance and/or changes desired at different levels of social reality
inevitably leads to a discussion of “consciousness, culture, ideology, politics, and economics,”

44

essentially making “African anti-imperialist thought…undisciplined” (Mama, 2007: 9). In a
special journal issue on popular struggle in Africa, historian Miles Larmer (2010) agrees that
“social movements are best studied in situ and in depth, utilizing the techniques of social
anthropology alongside those of political science” (252). As I was unable to collect primary data
(due to Covid-19 related restrictions), the methods and data used to support this work was based
on extensive documentary research on the historical and cultural contexts of Sudan, alongside a
thorough review of the expanding (yet insufficient) literature on the 2019 uprising. As a young
woman and a Pan African scholar, the findings of this work have offered me with an
understanding of pragmatic possibilities towards an emancipatory politics and political
organization led by women and youth.
Social movements and mobilization influence, and are influenced by, a wider social,
political, and economic environment, whose understanding is necessary to grasp the context in
which movements operate. Therefore, this work is intentionally guided by intellectuals who
apply an anti-imperialist, contextualized, expanded, and integrated approach to history, political
economy, gender, culture, and society. Black/African radical intellectuals and those that have
joined struggles of liberation have shown us that 1) theory emerges from practice (Andaiye,
2020), 2) liberation movements have identifiable trends (Rodney et al., 1990), and 3) social
movements are reflective of social processes (Mamdani and Wamba, 1995).
The interventions of radical African/Black women, instrumental to this work, have
sharpened the interpretations of social and grassroots movements. Radical Black feminists50 have
made substantial contributions to the implications of the nexus of exploitation, which now goes
under the label of intersectionality. These feminists have extended our understanding of super
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Some of the women I am referring to, such as Andaiye, have been hesitant to claim the term feminist. I refer to them as
feminists to highlight their work on gender and women’s liberation.
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exploitation and deformed masculinity. They have allowed us to understand women’s
exploitation and resistance through nuanced analyses of “the inherent connections among those
who are exploited” (Andaiye, 2020: 12). Failing to engage with race, religion, and gender in an
analysis of class or adhering to the alienated analysis of private or public spheres contributes to
the obscurity of women’s role in sustaining social reproduction. Such obscurity is perhaps why
women being at the forefront of struggle comes as a surprise.
In her book, Gender, Race and Sudan’s Exile Politics: Do We All Belong to this
Country?, Nada Mustafa Ali (2015) provides us with an integrated approach to race, gender,
social class, and politics, and the ensuing discourse and power relations in Sudan. Ali’s extensive
research and historical account not only provides the reader with a contextualized understanding
of women’s mobilization and resistance, but also offers critical analysis of gender within the
historical (including colonial), cultural, political, economic context of Sudan, as well as within
the framework of globalization and capital flow. Ali’s works, which range from analysis of
politics and political organizing to the interaction of formal politics with women’s groups and the
dynamics within women’s groups, are the foundational texts from which this work extends itself.
Building on Ali’s (2015) work, I use Claudia Jones’ (1949) articulation of superexploitation, to understand the intersectional and differing forms of exploitations faced by
women in Sudan. The category women itself can be a homogenizing term which obscures the
structural hierarchies of exploitation: “the assumption of women as an already constituted,
coherent groups with identical interests and desires, regardless of class, ethnic or racial location
or contradictions, implies a notion of gender or sexual difference or even patriarchy (as male
dominance – men as a correspondingly coherent group) which can be applied universally and
cross culturally” (Mohanty, 2003 :52). To avoid homogenization of women in Sudan and the
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different forms of oppression and exploitation they face, Nada Mustafa Ali’s (2015) formulation
of gender is considered:
I define gender as the sociocultural and political construction of sexual difference.
It is the roles, responsibilities, and traits that societies allocate to men and women.
Gender is also a tool of analysis and a power relationship. It is part of an
intersecting web of power relations that are based on the mutually constituting
categories of class, race (which I believe is a sociocultural construct and a
resistance discourse), and sexuality, among others. Like Anthias and Yual-Davis
(1993, 9), I believe that in the context of Sudan’s and South Sudan’s
contemporary politics and society, we should not consider racism and sexism as
relations between sexes or races respectively. These are rooted in social,
economic, and political structures, institutions, and power relations, in the
dominant culture, and in dominant ideologies. (25)
To understand the dominant ideologies and gender relations rooted in structures and
systems of the Sudanese state, chapter three will explore the living and working conditions of
Sudanese women. Jones’ (1949) framework of super-exploitation allows us to begin
understanding the different forms of exploitation Sudanese women experience and resist through
the culmination of “special oppressions” as a raced, ethnic, and religion specific ‘citizens,’ a
subordinated gender, and as workers of the “most menial and underpaid” jobs (318). Similarly,
Andaiye (2020) points to the seldom recognized super-exploitation of women in unwaged labor
and care work. Andaiye’s (2020) thoughts on organizing are influenced by her experience of
years of political and grassroots organizing in Guyana, the Caribbean and globally. Andaiye and
Walter Rodney organized under the Working People’s Alliance (WPA), and her critiques of the
structure of organizing and the role of women has been useful in understanding necessary
interventions in leftist and progressive organizing. Her theories on care work and counting
unwaged work are equally as radical as her thoughts on organizing, which should not be about
“the management and control of people,” but the “revolutionizing of human relations – including
the relations of production.” (Andaiye, 2020: 23). The focus on tea sellers and precarious labor in
this work is an attempt to locate some of the most exploited women in Sudan, to reveal their
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centrality to Sudanese society, and reflect on what their mobilization and organization could
mean for many others who share similar positions, such as farmers in areas like Jebel Marrah
(Darfur region), petty traders in urban and urban-peripheries, or single mothers in South
Kordofan and Blue Nile States.
Occupying some of most exploited and oppressed positions in societies under capitalist
production, with relatively least power, are working women. Tithi Bhattachraya (2017) proposes
reconceptualizing the working class by 1) restating the working class as a revolutionary force, 2)
broadening “working class” to include unwaged laborers, and 3) reconsidering the class struggle
as more than a struggle over wages and working conditions (240). This work evaluates the 2019
uprising, not just as a class struggle, but as the struggle for social reproduction, which by virtue
of specific women’s positions in society, has made them fundamental forces in the uprising.
Furthermore, to avoid rigid and inapplicable class categorizations, which might fail to recognize
“a vision of insurgent working class power capable of transcending sectional categories”
(Bhattacharya, 2017: 196), the term working peoples will be used to refer to waged and unwaged
workers in Sudanese society.
This work does not seek to contribute to ideas that frame women’s empowerment as
being achievable through waged employment or “including” women in the market. In a context
where women are already doing much uncompensated work, ensuring they are included in
waged work only ensures they will do more jobs than they are already doing (Andaiye, 2020).
The microcredit and microfinance projects peddled by multilateral and bilateral organizations,
such as the World Bank and USAID, have caused more harm than benefit to women in the global
South (Turshen, 2010; Andaiye; 2020). Capitalist economies rely on unwaged and unrecognized
activities – mostly conducted by women and commonly referred to as care work, affective labor,
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or subjectivation – that “serve to produce new generations of workers and replenish existing
ones, as well as to maintain social bonds and shared understandings” (Bhattacharya, 2017: 82).
Women’s unwaged social reproductive activities, which range from child-raising and housework
to subsistence farming, sustain social reproduction. As chapter three attempts to reveal, this
stands true for the majority of Sudanese women. The section on women’s and working peoples
precarious work is to show that women are already doing work that is essential to life and
society, and so empowering them through this work translates to un-obscuring their positions and
realities.
In order to understand the 2019 uprising (a social event), and avoid homogenizing
women in Sudan and their experiences, I deploy a dialectical materialist approach, which focuses
on social processes in which social events occur. According to Maurice Cornforth (1978),
“dialectical materialism considers that, in the manifold processes taking place in the universe,
things come into being, change and pass out of being, not as separate individual units, but in
essential relation and interconnection, so that they cannot be understood each separately and by
itself but only in their relation and interconnection” (48). Social life begins with the process of
social production, making production the primary social process around which other social
processes develop (Cornforth, 1978). Chapter three will attempt to reveal the correlations
between production, production induced relations, and women’s and working peoples
dissatisfaction of the state; followed by their corresponding role in the uprising in chapter four.
The demonstrations (El-Gizouli 2019c) and articulations (Nugdalla, 2020) of Sudanese
protestors in 2018/19 have revealed dissatisfaction with the dominant mode of production, its
supportive ideology (Political Islam), and the manifestations of a masculinized and militarized
state. According to Hetland and Goodwin’s (2013) content analysis of some of the leading
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journals and published texts on social movement studies, many social movement theories and
studies lack the necessary analysis of class struggle and the global capitalist system. The
relations of production, which modify women’s position, allows us to understand the
participation of women in Sudan and the gendered nature of social movements and mobilization.
Women’s social reality and their positioning under the current global capitalist system not only
exacerbates their domination and exploitation (Alexander and Mohanty, 1997), but also makes
them fundamental actors in popular uprising (Moghadam, 2019). In Sudan, the different
exploited and oppressed positions of women, have been sustained through Political Islam, which
has indirectly created the necessary conditions to form cross-class, multi-religious, and multiracial alliances witnessed in 2019.
[African] Social Movements
The quest to understand causes and processes of popular mobilization has led to multiple
approaches of studying and interpreting social movements. Ellis and Kessel (2009) outline the
development of social movement theories and find that earlier theories viewed protest as
spontaneous and irrational. More studies, however, have led to theories that consider movements
and popular mobilization as politically charged rational acts. In African Studies in Social
Movements and Democracy, Mahmood Mamdani and Ernest Wamba dia Wamba (1995)
describe social movements as reflective of “concrete social processes,” which include varied
forms of organization, production relations, sociopolitical processes, internal and external forces,
etc. Many interpretations of social movements have centered “the political structure that defines
opportunities and constraints, the human and financial resources that enable a movement’s
mobilization and operations, and [or] the identities that provide the impetus for actors to become
involved and provide legitimacy for the movement” (Habib and Opoku-Mensah, 2009: 46).
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Though these interpretations remain important to understanding social movements, they have too
often been approached rigidly and/or separately (Mamdani and Wamba, 1995).
After discussions held among the editorial team for African Studies in Social Movements
and Democracy, scholars came to an agreeable definition of African social movements as a
“broad crystallization of group activity autonomous of the state” (7). Although ‘autonomy from
the state’ would benefit from further contextualization51, this broad definition was a result of
avoiding the fixed juxtaposition of “a variety of distinctions…whether between ‘class’ and
‘community’, or elite and popular, or political and social, or organized and unorganized” used to
describe social movements (Mamdani and Wamba, 1995: 7). Much to my agreement, and as will
be demonstrated throughout this work, Mamdani, Mkandawire, and Wamba (1988) complicate
counterposing of rigid distinctions, such as center and periphery. Rigid and mostly inapplicable
distinctions of middle-class vs lower class, urban vs rural, violent vs non-violent, political vs
economic, etc. in mainstream social movement theories have lacked the necessary dynamics to
study popular mobilization in Africa (Ellis and Kessel, 2009).
Fragmented analysis and rigid distinctions purported by different school theorists,
including social movement theorists, have reduced complex and interconnected processes in the
democratic struggles launched in Africa. Most theories and existing literature of social
movements have been based on studies from North America, Latin America, and Europe.
Western and Eurocentric narratives have often framed uprisings in Africa as the antithesis to
modern democratic processes marred by riots, warlords, child soldiers, and other violent
depictions that eventually require humanitarian assistance (Branch and Mampilly, 2015).

In Sudan’s case, we have seen organizations and movements associate with the state as strategy and/or for survival, See
Elnaiem, 2019. There have also been organizations like the Sudanese Women’s Union (SWU), which was formed before
independence, but was reestablished by the state in 1971, forcing former members to go underground. “Under al-Bashir’s
government, the group was also partially co-opted into the political apparatus of the al-Bashir government” (Tønnessen ,2017).
51
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Mamdani et al. (1988) explain how rigid and Eurocentric interpretations of social movements
emerged from contending schools of thought; and “while economists, focused on the state and
the modern economy, political scientists on the state and nation-building, and sociologists on
urbanization, ‘social anthropologists who pervaded the countryside maintained their traditional
fixation on 'tribes'” (979).
In the 1990s, under a wave of global protests, the theory of New Social Movements grew
traction. In light of this new wave, Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani authored a few books,
including Social Movements: An introduction, which Ellis and Kessel (2009) have referred to as
an “authoritative book” (14). Due to unanticipated class roles and alliances, and the inability of
complex African social movements to be appropriately interpreted by rigid social and
anthropological theories based on other places has resulted in a neglective or reductive analysis
of African and Sudanese social movements (Aidi, 2018). The second edition to Diani and della
Porta’s text was less authoritative and construed less rigid class formations because of the
unanticipated “broad coalitions of very heterogeneous actors against neoliberal globalization”
(Ellis and Kessel, 2009: 14). Diani and della Porta claimed that working-class action is ‘back
with a vengeance’ – which can be misrepresentative of the African context. Though we might
have witnessed repressed and quiescent periods in labor struggles and popular uprising in Africa,
including Sudan, one cannot designate something that never left as having come back. As Walter
Rodney (1990) has put it, “it is not a gap. I think it's a response to a historical necessity" (89).
Therefore, in the case of social movements in Africa, and considering African anti-imperialist
thought as undisciplined, broader and more in-depth contextualization and expansion of theories
and interpretations is necessary.
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In her contribution to African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy, Ifi
Amadiume (1995) argues that for many indigenous women’s movements in Africa, resistance
was not only expressed through desired change, but also through “anti-power” movements that
defended their autonomy. The “anti-power” formulation can be used to grasp the different forms
of Sudanese resistance and expression of class struggles, including the burning of state buildings
and looting from Zakat52 chambers (El-Gizouli, 2019c). Amadiume’s (1995) argument also
obliges us think of the varied ways Sudanese women have engaged in the politics of refusal:
“one that rejects the exploitative relations of racial capitalism and [neo]colonialism” (Grande,
2020: 6). In the text, The common wind, Julius S. Scott (2020) provides a radical reading of the
18th century struggle to end slavery by accounting for the intricate networks from below and the
impact of a reconstructed labor force. Sudanese women’s and working peoples networks from
below and shifts in demography of labor force, which will be particularly addressed in chapters
three and four, have made significant contributions to the 2019 uprising. According to Loloa
Ibrahim (2019), urbanization and migration patterns (which resulted in the reconstruction of the
labor force) under the regime of Omar al-Bashir “ultimately accelerated the [Sudanese] people’s
call for democracy” (2).
Ahmad A. Sikainga (2010) explains how the forms of resistance among railway workers
in Atbara emerged from the social process of workers during a specific period and under a
particular environment. The institutional hierarchies, “chains of command, strict rules, and a high
level of discipline” embedded in railway employment, manifested in the form and discipline of
organizing adopted by railway workers (37). In the same vein, the Tea Sellers Association and
the neighborhood resistance committees emerged from the unique nature of precarious work,
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interactions with the state, and the struggle of social reproduction. Unlike hierarchical
(“Stalinist”) forms of organizing that was adopted by the CPS and SWU (Anis, 2001), and the
historical affiliations of progressive women’s groups with political parties/groups (Ali, 2015),
the 2018/19 uprising adopted different structures for organizing. Instead of a top-down
hierarchical format, organizing and networks featured a horizontal and non-hierarchical structure
with autonomous organizing of different sectors. What we saw in the 2019 uprising, particularly
during the sit-in in Khartoum, or within the networks of mobilization, is the organization of the
unique social processes of different groups within the working peoples, youth, and women.
Although this work does not explore the cultural elements of social organization that
might have emerged from or influenced the 2019 uprising, one cannot move on without mention
of nafeer. Mamdani and Wamba’s argument that social movements are reflective of concrete
social processes holds true when we consider the process of nafeer, as a form of social
organization based on cultural elements. According to Kadouda and Hale (2015) nafeer is a
social tradition “used to mean ‘cooperative labour,’” whereas Albahari and Schultz (2017) claim
the word translates into “a call for collective action” in Arabic. During the floods of 2013 in
Khartoum and surrounding areas, which affected almost 200,000 people, young Sudanese men
and women organized to successfully provide the necessary relief the regime had neglected
(Albahari and Schultz, 2017). During the 2018/19 uprising, the practices of the neighborhood
resistance committees and activities at the sit-in reflected the social process of nafeer.
This work follows that an effective struggle necessitates organizers of the struggle
understand (or share) the cultural and material realities of the masses (Cabral, 1974). Marxist
feminist, Tithi Bhattacharya (2017) supports these claims when arguing that if not reflective of
“people’s [raced, classed, and gendered] concrete experience,” mobilization runs the risk of
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abstracting experience and “conflating analytical categories and subjective realities…onto
people’s lived realities” (195). Amilcar Cabral’s (1974) claim has also been corroborated by the
“groundings” grassroots activists like Ella Jo Baker and Walter Rodney (1969) have insisted.
Rodney and Baker, similar to Jones and Andaiye, participated in the raced and gendered
movements which they have theorized and criticized. For Baker, empowering grassroots
organizations was “simply the democratic idea that an oppressed group, class, or community had
the right to determine the nature of the fight to end its oppression” (Ransby, 2003: 300). Baker
believed the masses had an instinctive ability to speak and act for themselves, which Stokely
Carmichael (2003) called it her “unfailing confidence in the democratic political instincts in the
grassroots” (393). Baker’s model included building strong relationships, trust, and political
engagement within the community (Ransby, 2003: 270). Considering the self-organization and
self-articulation of grassroots and professional organizations in the 2019 uprising, this work
evaluates the 2019 uprising as reflective of the experiences of various working peoples in Sudan.
The links between the state, material production, gender relations, religious affiliation,
social reproduction, and struggle have been evident in Sudanese protests, which have historically
been triggered as a response to state policies such as subsidy cuts and shortage of bread (Amin,
2016). The extended labor strikes across sectors, including medical personnel, street vendors,
port workers, journalists, and teachers reveals the dissatisfactions intersecting identity, class, and
gender. Popular mobilization in Sudan has often manifested anti-capitalist characters, by
targeting issues from privatization to lack of social services. During the 2019 uprising, in West
Kordofan, protestors held a vigil in front of the state Ministry of Oil condemning the impacts of
oil production on the environment and the health of inhabitants (Radio Dabanga, 2019d). In
Kalakla (southern Khartoum), residents protested for the removal of rainwater from the streets of
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the densely populated district. In yet another protest in Kassala, herders expressed their
opposition to “farmers' encroachment on pasture lands and the poisoning of livestock,” by
holding a vigil in front of the state Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Radio Dabanga, 2019d).
One must note the criticism of Mamdani et. al (1988) to state-centrist approaches of
analyzing social movements, which position the African state as the sole and primary subject for
African development. Understanding the Sudanese state is necessary to understanding women’s
grievances and their chosen/available forms of organizing. Sudanese protestors call to dismantle
and remove the “deep state” were clear in the 2019 demonstrations (Acquah, 2019), however, the
state is but one element in a social formation, and its rejection, but one expression of the
Sudanese peoples’ discontent. According to Abdelkader Zghal (1995), exclusively centering the
state and the political elite to understand social movements “bypasses two key-aspects of the
social reality,” 1) the masses, which are not always organized (especially the youth), and 2) the
fact that the “stakes of alliances and confrontations of such organizations at the local level are
not the same as the national level” (Zghal, 1995: 100-101).
Formulations of “failed state,” dictatorship, and sole emphasis on the state as a causal
force (Prunier and Gisselquist, 2003), not only distorts the influence of external actors and the
power exercised by the masses, but it ignores the fact that the Sudanese state itself emerged from
the anti-colonial movement’s confrontation with and concession to British and Egyptian colonial
administration. A good example of a state-centrist approach to the 2019 uprising, which bypasses
Zaghl’s mentioned components of social reality, is John Young’s (2020) Sudan Uprising:
Popular Compromises, and Revolution Betrayed. Young’s reading of the 2018/19 uprising is not
only reductive and pessimistic, but also dilutes the role of external forces and the power
demonstrated by the working peoples in Sudan. Although Young (2020) briefly reflects on the
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impacts of Gulf countries and IMF policies, he is reluctant to spell out the impact of global
capital and the nature of the global economic structures he mentions; perhaps because the report
was financed by the U.S. State Department. In this reading of the uprising, Young (2006) seems
to have forgotten his earlier work, which showed the impact of the U.S. and its allies in
undermining peace and democratization in Eastern Sudan.
The role of imperialism and regional external forces is significant when analyzing Sudan
as a formation. British capital had been substantial in the Sudan up to the time of independence
in 1956, but since the seventies the oil producing states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have
had tremendous impact on the society and these states have substantial numbers of Sudanese
immigrants, especially the professionals (Assal, 2012). Sudan’s relation with that of Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, and other centers of regional financial architecture significantly shape the
formation. As Young (2020) admits, arbitrary US sanctions and Western support for the SaudiUAE-Egyptian camp has also had significant impacts on Sudan, and therefore the uprising.
Whether we consider the Reagan administration’s alliance with Numeiry, or the support of Bush
to Bashir, the US has played a direct role in destabilizing the region (El-Affendi, 2012) by
forming alliances with its dictators (Volman, 2003). In the chain of the reproduction of capital,
the centrality of the Bretton Woods Institutions, such as the IMF, and their imposition of
structural adjustment programs that further burden women, external forces cannot be excluded
from an analysis of the 2018/19 uprising.
Approach to Sudan
Sudan, which has been studied under academic disciplines with Eurocentric and
patriarchal limitations, has burdened the reproduction of ahistorical categorizations (Sharkey,
Vezzadini, & Seri-Hersch, 2015). When using the word Sudan, itself, one needs to be aware of
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the period specific nature of the state: Sudan was colonized by the Ottoman empire, Britain, and
Egypt; and it was not until 1840 and 1916 that Kassala and Darfur regions, respectively, were
incorporated in the region we now refer to as Sudan (Lees and Brooks, 1977). After the
independence of South Sudan in 2011, and the followed restructuring and creation of new
regional states, there remains border disputes with South Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kenya
(Ryle and Willis, 2011), which complicates political spaces in the African context. To reveal
these complications and “transcend the confinement associated with colonial imaginations of
space” (Daley, 2020), Sudan will be analyzed as a social formation.
According to Samir Amin (1976), social formations are “concrete, organized structures
that are marked by a dominant mode of production” (45). In this work, the dominant mode of
production in Sudan is considered as capitalist, whereas the Sudanese state is considered a
dependent capitalist state. To analyze a social formation, one needs to consider how surplus is
generated, transferred (from and to other formations), and internally distributed: “[t]hen we need
to know the extent to which the given society lives on the surplus that it produces for itself and
the extent to which it depends on surplus transferred from another society” (18). To understand
the realities of Sudan as a social formation, chapter three analyzes some of the top surplus
producing sectors in Sudan in relation to how surplus is distributed and transferred among
different social groups. Amin (1976) writes that “not just material conditions, but ideological and
political functions are necessary to sustain a given or linked mode of productions.” In Sudan’s
case, Political Islam, which has been denounced by young men and women in the 2018/19
uprising (El-Gizouli and Thomas, 2020), has been used as the ideology to sustain the capitalist
mode of production. Considering neoliberal policies and their impact on women, alongside the
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impacts of property-related laws and forms of land ownership (Tønnessen, 2019), land and
capital will be evaluated, not as mere property, but as relation (Grande, 2020).
Even more complex is Sudanese racial, ethnic, lingual, and religious intersections and
diversity, which has earned the formation the title “microcosm of Africa” (Elradi, 2018).
Sudanese historical, ethnic, and cultural ties have led to characterizations of the country as part
of the Arab and African world. Despite these complexities and the obvious facts that Sudan is
located south of the Sahara Desert and populated by Africans, much of the literature concerning
the 2019 uprising, situates Sudan in the Arab world (Ottaway, 2020) and regards Sudanese
collective action as part of the “Arab Uprising” (Dwamena, 2019). Although I acknowledge the
Arab identity claimed by those in Sudan and other parts of Africa, my work does not situate
Sudan as being part of the Arab world (especially considering that Brazil, Caribbean nations, etc.
are not typically viewed as part of the African world).
The denial of Africanity continues to frame social movements and organized political
acts in Africa. The attempt to divorce African social formations – like Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan
being framed as part of the Arab world – from their geographic and historical realities not only
distorts what is happening and what has happened in Africa, but what might and can happen
(Branch and Mampilly, 2015). Reflecting on the studies included in the Movers and Shakers:
Social Movements in Africa, Ellis and Kessel (2009) state “social movements in Africa
frequently have a pan-African dimension” (4). Studies on African social movements, however,
not only use disarticulated regional categorizations such as “sub-Saharan,” (Ekwe, 2012), but
also negate the influence movements in Africa have had on one another (or globally) (Aidi,
2018). Classification of the Sudanese uprising under the “Arab Spring,” is not only implicit
ignorance of the role and presence of non-Arab populations, but it fails to account for the
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dynamics and role of neighboring African countries (Anderson, 2019; Aidi, 2020). Furthermore,
according to W.J. Berridge (2015), much of the literature in Middle Eastern Studies have
unfortunately presented the historical uprisings in Sudan “in passing” and without “rigorous
analysis from which serious conclusions can be drawn” (2).
Relating and contrasting the 2019 Sudanese uprising with global uprisings like the “Arab
Spring” or the Occupy Movement can be revealing, but one must do so with caution (Gadoda
and Hale, 2020; Ardol, 2019). Boundless comparisons can be made with the 2019 Sudanese
uprising and other movements, by analyzing similar trends such as the resistance against Political
Islam in the Muslim world; the “lack of leadership and ideology” observed in recent social
movements (Moghadam, 2019); the effect of Structural Adjustment Programs on women’s
mobilization (Turshen, 2010); or even the resemblance of the FFC Charter to Charter 77 of
Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution (Dwamena, 2019). Although many works situate the
uprising under the ‘Arab Spring,’ very few acknowledge the historic resistance of the Sudanese
people to Arabization. Since the Anya-Nya53 movement that opposed military leader Ibrahim
Abboud’s Arabization in the 1960s, there has been a consistent attempt to avoid this
dichotomous imposition (Fluerh-Lobban, 1990; Anderson, 2019). The chants in 2019 protests,
which included references to Sudan’s matriarchal and African histories, seemed to continue this
opposition to imposition: “the discourse of this generation is generally embracing diversity,
equal citizenship, anti-racism, and the other demands of the revolution” (Arman, 2019).
According to the last census, taken in 2008, the population of Sudan was 39 million, but more
recent estimates from the World Bank and other sources relay the population has reached 42.1
million, with 21.5 million being women. Greater Khartoum, comprised of three cities

53

"The 'Anya-Nya' had been established in 1963 as the military wing of the Sudan African National Union (SANU), a political
movement that had been formed by exiled southern Sudanese politicians" (Berridge, 2015: 17)
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(Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North or Bahri) that include “shanty towns” and four
camps for internally displaced peoples, makes up the largest urban center in the country.
Roughly 35 percent of Sudan’s population lives in urban areas and about a third of that
population is concentrated in Greater Khartoum (Tønnessen, 2019). Although contested (Willis,
Egemi, and Winter, 2011), the last census shows South Sudan and Darfur as the most populated
areas, with the Northern and Eastern regions as the least populated areas. It is important to note
that after a referendum held in 2011, years of resistance and armed conflict culminated to result
in the secession of South Sudan. Any reference to ‘Sudan’ in this work, therefore, should be
periodically considered. The process of independence and the post-independence reality of both
formations has been complex and violent: conflict and armed resistance continued in parts of
South Kordofan, Blue Nile,
Darfur, the Beja region
(Eastern Sudan), and the
recently formed South
Sudan. Many have related
the rebellion and discontent
in different areas to unequal
regional development and
related lack of public
Figure 2 Map of Sudan (United Nations, March 2012)

services (Sikainga, 2009;
Jok, 2007).

Sudan is currently divided into 18 administrative states (Figure 2). The 9 administrative
provinces under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium were first restructured in the 1970s, and

61

again in 1991 and 1994 (Willis, Egemi, and Winter, 2011). The 26 states established in 1994
underwent additional restructuring after the secession of South Sudan. The environmental terrain
of and within the current 18 states ranges from desserts to savannahs. In Darfur, for instance, the
southern part lies within a rich savanna, the central part is a plateau dominated by the Jebel
Marra Mountain, and the northern part is a desert (Sikainga, 2009). Such an environment also
means different geological endowments, which have resulted in different attempts to control and
extract resource, including the Nile river. Having no significant tributaries except the Atbara
river, the Blue Nile flowing from Ethiopia and the White Nile from South Sudan meet in
Khartoum and flow across the Nubian dessert (Willis, Egemi, and Winter, 2011). References to
older maps (Willis, Egemi, and Winter, 2011) shows higher population density concentrated
around the Nile. Having intense cultivations on either side, the Nile has served as the source of
life for Sundanese farming and pastoral communities. It has also attracted colonial and largescale state projects, such as the Gezira scheme. Initiated under British colonialism, to satisfy
cotton needs for Britain’s textile boom, the scheme and the post-independence “development”
initiatives it set in motion have indefinitely (re)structured Sudanese socioeconomic, cultural,
political and production patterns and relations (Bernal, 1995).
Sudan has more than 597 single unit social organization groups– which, for this work,
will not be articulated through the commonly used colonial term tribe – and over 100 languages
and 400 dialects, with Arabic as the lingua franca (Musa, 2018; Elradi, 2018). Although the most
practiced religion is Islam, people, especially the Beja and those around the Nuba Mountains,
still practice Christianity and animistic religions (Elradi, 2018). Social organizations in Sudan are
based on single units founded on blood-based relationship and networks of clans, each with their
own norms and rules. Subscription to these units varies across individuals, as it is determined
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and impressed by “local, regional, and national socio-cultural, economic, and political contexts”
(Musa, 2018: 14). For example, South Kordofan state’s population includes more than 50
ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse groups (Klugman and Wee, 2008). While the
ethnic landscape is numerically dominated by various Arab and Nubian groups, there are
multiple other groups including the Fulani and Hausa, whose origins can be traced back to West
Africa. The term ‘Nuba’ itself refers to the 1.5 million non-Arab people who inhabit the state but
are comprised of about 10 ethnicities, multiple religions, and 92 single-unit organizations. In
contrast, in the Darfur context, for the most part the term "Arab" can be used as an
occupational/production-related rather than an ethnic or race-related label, because the majority
of the Arabic speaking groups are pastoralists (Musa, 2018; Sikainga, 2009).
Varied histories of colonialism, production, enslavement, Islamic Nationalism, etc.,
which have been shared among specific groups with specific cultures, religions, and/or
geographic locations, play into current characteristics of identity and state formation (Sharkey,
2008). According to Jok Madut Jok (2007), and other scholars who have expressed ethnic
identification as a matter of ‘convenience,’ “one can assume that race and racially identity are 1)
ideological and historically contingent and 2) is a structured phenomenon, ‘I.e. a response to
economic marginalization, exclusion from power, and other forms of inequality’" (8). These
inequalities have been exemplified and exasperated by the political, economic, and cultural
hegemony of a small group of Arabic-speaking Sudanese elites, mainly from the North, who
have held power and systematically exploited the non-Arab and non-Muslim groups in the
country's ‘peripheries’ (Sikainga, 2009). The Arabization policy promoted by Northern riverain
political elites contributed to the “growth of an ideology of Arab cultural and racial supremacy
that is now most evident in Darfur” (Sharkey, 2008: 21). Some scholars have accused the
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Northern political elite as favoring particular groups in Sudan, such as the Shayqiyya, Ja’aliin,
and the Danagala (El-Tom, 2006). The dominance of the “Arab-Muslim power bloc” is related to
the favoritism of British colonial policies (Sharkey, 2008) and the followed internalization of a
Sudanese Arabic national identity (Berridge, 2015).
Conclusion
To understand women’s mobilization, and situate Sudanese women, it is necessary to
comprehend the contradictions born from their economic exploitation, and their racial, ethnic,
and gendered oppression. Exploitation and oppression, i.e., inequalities, in Sudan have been
exemplified and exasperated through the “political, economic, and cultural hegemony of a small
group of Arabic-speaking Sudanese elites who have held power” and systematically exploited
the non-Arab and non-Muslim groups in the country's ‘peripheries’ (Sikainga, 2009). Regardless
of resistance and rejection of the former group’s Islamization and Arabization efforts, literature
continues to frame the 2019 uprising as part of the Arab Spring. Despite the complexities in
Sudan’s territorial base, racial and ethnic categories, and the historical nature of resistance and
rebellion, literature on Sudan has been simplistic. To adopt conceptualizations that will reveal
the realities of Sudanese people and their struggles, Sudan is analyzed as a social formation, and
women’s oppression explored through hierarchies of power and super-exploitation. To
understand the power structure in Sudan and the conjunctures that led to the 2019 uprising, an
understanding of social organizations and production patterns alongside an analysis of the
Sudanese state, its ideologies, apparatuses, and structures, will be discussed in the following
chapter.
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Chapter 3
The Struggle for Social Reproduction
After the Islamist military coup in 1989, the NIF/NCP wasted no time entrenching and
establishing systems and structures of control and extraction with the support of global capital.
Politics was structured from top-down as a means of control and surveillance, while the economy
was structured to reward the masculinized Islamist dependent capitalist class. The privatization
and liberalization policies of the regime were coupled with nepotistic and military patronage
networks that left private and public companies under the ownership or micro-management of
the state, security apparatuses, or regime leaders and their families. Militarization was intensified
to sustain the power structure, and political Islam was used as a justification. The regime created
unlivable conditions for the working peoples of Sudan. In violent forms of exploitation,
suppression, coercion, dispossession, and displacement, women remain super-exploited.
The purpose of the chapter is twofold. First, it serves as an introduction and
contextualization of the living and working conditions of some of the most oppressed and
exploited groups in Sudan, which resulted from the specific forms of militarization and
neoliberalization substantiated by NIF/NCP’s use of political Islam. Second, it is meant to offer
insight regarding the militarized power structure that was challenged, disrupted, and subverted
during the 2019 uprising. The last section of this chapter highlights how political Islam has
sustained patriarchal ideologies necessary for capitalist production, and indirectly created
conducive conditions for cross-class alliance of women in Sudan.
Consolidation of Political Power
Following the repressive and recursive patterns of Nimeiry’s regime, the NIF suspended
the 1985 constitution (until the 1998 constitution) and bypassed the legislative process by issuing
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Constitutional Decrees. The Emergency laws of 1989 once again accorded the army and National
Security with considerable power 54 (Ali, 2015). The decrees, along with the Public Facilities Act
of 1990, allowed the regime to privatize the public sector. The decrees also accorded the new
National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council (NSRCC) – dominated by Islamists and
“including three Southerners, one Nuba and two from Dar Fur,” none of which were women
(Khalid, 2003: 197) – with absolute legislative and judicial power centralized within the
executive branch (Abbas, 2015: 356). In 1994, the NIF adopted a federal structure as provinces
were restructured into states to apparently promote regional development (Ahmed, 2018).
However, the 1996 election were not only considered a sham (Khalid, 2003), but it was not until
2010, state officials were appointed and not elected55 (Sidahmed, 2011). Political opposition
instigated threats from security forces, arrests, exile, and even death. According to Mansour
Khalid (2003):
[T]he government took over all the centers of power and wealth in the country
and moved to fleece the economy and reshape the country to its Islamist
image…In their first five years in office, The NIF kept busy entrenching
themselves in power, taking over the army, police, security agencies, banks,
media, education, mosques, trade unions and anything that was left of the civil
society. Having populated the judiciary, armed forces and the civil service with
their supporters, the NIF proceeded to expunge from the services all those who
posed a real or potential threat to the regime. Some were arrested and detained.
(198)
The NIF not only infiltrated different forms of organized and influenceable bodies, but it
also established and strengthened its own systems and structures of control, exploitation,
appropriation, and dependency, as will be demonstrated throughout this chapter. In 1993, the
Ministry of Social Planning was established and outlined a 10-year strategy for “Islamic

“Including the authority to obtain information from any political opponent and the freedom to investigate and/or confiscate.
Any belongings and [the] arrest any person for any period of time without legal procedures” (Ali, 2015: 48).
55 “The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) occupied Abyei in May 2011, and then the NCP won a delayed and disputed election in
South Kordofan in June – at which point the SPLM northern branch took to arms.” (Verjee, 2012: 25)
54
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transformation.” The ministry was granted jurisdiction over state departments concerned with
“social welfare, youth, sports, religious endowments, and zakat” (Sidahmed, 2011: 183). The
NIF had established an Islamic social welfare system, which was based on zakat56, “a tax which
is imposed on Muslims who have capital savings, assets, or livestock… Zakat is collected by the
state administration and annually redistributed to the poor” (Grawert, 1998: 197-198). When
protests erupted in the 2019, some demonstrations in Atbara and parts of Kordofan (al-Rahad
and al-Nuhud) included the looting of Zakat chambers (El-Gizouli, 2019c). Funds made
available to Islamic organizations and charity donations from Zakat were not accounted for
under the NIF/NCP (Ali, 2010). In 2020, the Holy Koran Association, one of the many
organizations created under the regime with funding from Zakat Chamber, was dissolved after
the Anti-Corruption Committee (established post-uprising) found the organization owned a gold
mine in the River Nile State and other assets in Khartoum (Radio Dabanga, 2020c).
At the local level, the NIF established “popular committees,” and conferences to mobilize
political support (Sidahmend, 2011), and “legitimize its rule through giving the impression of
wide popular participation in governance” (Ali, 2016: 7). In reality these committees, run by
“retired army officers, merchants, land brokers, the mosque imam and the in-service security
eye” (El-Gizouli, 2020a: 2), had become tools of surveillance and control (Ali, 2016). The
resettlement camps, in the peripheries of Khartoum and Omdurman, were also run by Popular
Committees that were neither locally elected, nor representative of “the diverse populations of
“Fur, Dinka, Nuba, Nuer, Shillouk, Azande,” and other ethnic groups from Darfur and Kordofan
areas, which are employed in precarious jobs, such as tea and alcohol selling and construction

“Zakat is a Muslim religious obligation and constitutes an annual tax of around 2.5% on wealth. A government managed Zakat
Fund was established in Sudan in 1980 on a voluntary basis. Zakat was made compulsory in 1984 with the establishment of the
Zakat Chamber and further formalized with the Zakat Act of 1990.” (El-Gizouli, 2019c: Footnote)
56
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work (Assal, 2011: 125). Some of the Popular Committees in Khartoum were supplanted by the
neighborhood resistance committees during and after the 2019 uprising.
In yet another recursive and repressive pattern, the regime banned secular and political
women’s groups. Reversing gains made during Nimeiry’s early period, the NIF purged women
from the public sector. By the end of the 1990s, more than half of women in the public sector
had lost their waged incomes (Ali, 2015). Decrease in real wages almost always affects women
most because they must make up for the wage lost that is necessary to reproduce labor power.
Trade unions were merged and brought under the Ministry of Justice and other organizations,
newspapers, and political groups were banned (Grawert, 1998). Many corporations in the public
sector were privatized or disbanded, which will be highlighted in the next section (Sidamed,
2011). The regime would not reach an agreement with the IMF57 until 1997, but it installed its
own austerity measures in the early 1990s, which favored merchants, entrepreneurs, and high
earners. The “Islamic” structural adjustment policies disproportionately affected women –
“especially hard hit were those women who came to town as drought or war refugees and did not
find relief but again problems in access to food” (Grawert, l998: 196). Food aid in Sudan has
also been manipulated to serve the interests of the regime.
Violence and Militarization: Sustaining Power Structure
Militarization, and the integration of security forces in the masculinized Islamist
dependent capitalist class, would intensify under the NIF/NCP period. The regime not only
commissioned paramilitaries to fight its wars and ensure extraction of resources, but it used
political Islam to obscure its intentions. Some of the first things the NIF did once it came to

During the Gulf Crisis (1990-1991), Omar al-Bashir’s support to Saddam Hussein resulted in oil exporting countries, such as
Saudi Arabia, withdrawing financial assistance to irrigated schemes. The international backlash included the IMF’s declaration of
Sudan as “non-cooperative.” Bashir also lost the support of the U.S., Egypt, and other Middle Eastern countries.
57

68

power was sell all grain reserves (which could have lessened the impact of the famine in 1991) to
purchase weapons and increase the money supply for the war against the South (Prendergast,
1991). The regime mobilized and armed groups like the Reizgyat and Misseiriya Arabs, to fight
the central government’s war against non-Arab groups in the South (Khalid, 2003: 187).
Militarization of society was not only facilitated by arming and mobilizing working peoples
differentiated by livelihood, race, and ethnicity, but through discourses of jihad and educating the
young58 to become mujahadin59 of the state (Grawert, 1998).
Jok Madut Jok (2007) demonstrates how the regime’s lack of response to natural
disasters (famine and drought) (perceived as racial discrimination by locals), the unequal
development of peripheral regions vis a vis the center of accumulation (Khartoum and NorthCentral riverain region), and the decline and inaccessibility of social services, have triggered
condemnation and criticism from the working peoples across Sudan. Response to resistance and
dissent (in peripheral regions and against peoples that do not fit within the regime’s Arab and
Islamic identity) has been brutal. Research conducted by Jok (2007) indicates that some youth
join rebel movements as a result of the violence intentionally unleashed on civilians. Based on
Jok (2007), “eye-witness interviewed in recent years have spoken of slave raids, rape, looting,
and destruction of assets: all because the entire population of a region is stigmatized as anti-Arab
and against the government or its Islamic ideology” (Jok; 2007: 41). According to a Human
Rights Watch (2012) report on the conflicts that began after South Sudan’s independence:
“Since the conflict started [in Blue Nile and South Kordofan], Sudanese forces
have carried out indiscriminate aerial bombardment and shelling in populated
areas, killing and injuring civilians and causing serious damage to civilian
property including homes, schools, clinics, crops, and livestock. Government
“Many displaced children have been kidnapped and brought to so-called jihad ('holy war') education schools where they are
trained to be the future mujahidin (warriors) of the Islamic state. Also higher education has been closely linked with participation
in military training. In autumn 1994, a decree was released saying that the 33 000 Sudanese university students had to undergo
six weeks of compulsory military training.” (Grawert, 1998: 199)
59 Mujahadin generally refers to “one who wages jihad,” but has broadly been used to refer to freedom and guerilla fighters.
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forces, including Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Popular Defense Forces (PDF),
have also conducted ground attacks on villages during which they deliberately
burned and looted civilian property, and arbitrarily detained people. Soldiers have
also assaulted and raped women and girls.” (HRW, 2012)”
The militarized and politicized response to dissent and criticism, from the regime (and the
dominant political parties), has created the militarization of local politics and the reproduction of
violence (Jok, 2007).
In a social formation whose working peoples have had a “remarkable revolutionary
heritage” (El-Affendi, 2012), the regime had to intensify the militarization of the state and
society to ensure exploitation, control, and appropriation. In resourceful regions like Jebel Amir,
North Darfur, the arming of militias has led to cycles of violence. Paramilitary forces under the
command of men like General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo “Hemeti” and Musa Hilal 60 have been
competing for control of the gold mines in the region. Although the establishment of paramilitary
forces funded by the state began during the 1985 transition period (Khalid, 2003), it was under
the NIF/NCP that groups were intensely mobilized and armed against one another. From which
emerged men like General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo “Hemeti,” and Musa Hilal, who were
once Janjaweed commanders, but are now vice chair of the TMC and one of the richest men in
Sudan, respectively (Tubiana, 2019; Elhashmi, 2017). Musa Hilal left his position as presidential
advisor in 2013, and “began forming his own movement” (Tubiana, 2020). It was under Hemeti,
who remained relatively loyal to al-Bashir, paramilitary groups were formalized under the Rapid
Support Forces (RSF) (Verjee, 2012). The RSF, whose precursor is the Janjaweed61 militia, were
mobilized to fight Darfuri rebels on behalf of the regime, and it is reported that they have

The extent of exploitation by Hilal’s forces is intense. “It is estimated that Hilal and his armed followers make $54 million a
year from their control of the gold mines” and the territories around the gold mines. “It remains to be seen how many health
facilities the state, as a tax collector, has established in Jebel Amir.” (SDFG, 2017, p. 5, p.26)
61 “These Arab militias have since engaged in mass killings, rapes, lootings and burning of villages, to a degree never witnessed
anywhere in Muslim regions of the country in recorded history. The government was, however, quick to announce that the
attacks were triggered by tribal hatreds and that it had no role in the violence…” (Jok, 2007: 21)
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“attacked villages, burned and looted homes, beat, raped and executed villagers” (Elhashmi,
2017: 13). Al-Bashir would import62 violence to Khartoum by calling on the RSF to suppress the
protests of 2013, which led to the death of at least 200 people, and again in 2018 (Tubiana,
2020).
Although this work does not do justice to the rank-and-file who are forced, compelled,
and/or manipulated to join these different military-security groups, or to those among them that
have repeatedly stood with the Sudanese people protesting on the streets, it is important to at
least highlight that they also make up some of most exploited groups in Sudanese society. The
regime and the RSF have been sending Sudanese mercenaries to Yemen to fight Saudi Arabia
and the UAE’s war (Achcar, 2019; Tubiana, 2019). Although the generals in the RSF have
denied the truths, Radio Dabanga and other news sources have reported that RSF militiamen
were deployed to Libya to aid General Khalifa Haftar (Radio Dabanga, 2020d). This allegiance
is compensated – for instance, in 2016 the Central Bank of Sudan63 received $500 million from
Gulf countries, and another $700 million from the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF). Most of this
money was allocated to the security apparatus: army, NISS, and RSF (SDFG, 2018: 28).
In 2016 alone, the RSF’s budget was 3.2 billion Sudanese pounds, “32 times the budget
for education and 6 times the budget for health services” (Elhashmi, 2017: 13). The RSF was
initially under the command of the National Intelligence Security Services (NISS), whose leaders
were appointed by the president, to which the body is accountable (Elhashmi, 2017). Reports
collected by the Asylum Research Center (ARC) (2018) show that the NISS has had far reaching
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Training facilities for the RSF were established in and around Khartoum. See De Waal, 2019.
“The CBOS formulates and executes its regulations and policies under severe intervention from the Republican Palace, the
Cabinet, NISS, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and other government entities. The politically motivated
influence of the executive branch in banking can be seen in the human resources management of senior and sensitive positions in
the banks, and in the instructions for bank management to facilitate transactions in the interests of NCP members and their
affiliates.” (Sudan Democracy First Group, 2018: 29)
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power and function than that of a typical intelligence branch of a military. In Khartoum, it has
and can intervene in judicial (police and courts) processes. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) is
the largest force in the security apparatus, and though it has been involved in military industries
(producing ammunition) and purchasing arms, under the NIF/NCP it has expanded to include
businesses, such as “Danfoudio (engaged in all sorts of business ventures ranging from furniture
to construction); Al-Hiloul al-Mutakamila (in the business of restaurants, cafes, media); and
Alaia Pharmacology (medicine and other related pharmaceutical businesses)” (El-Battahani,
2016: 4). The National Intelligence Security Services (NISS) is also “thoroughly interpenetrated
by the NCP and has its own commercial operations and external links (to many different Middle
Eastern states) and thus parallel sources of finance” (de Waal, 2019: 18). After 2011, Salah
Gosh64 was removed from head of the NISS because he had amassed enough power and foreign
support to threaten Bashir’s position (de Waal, 2019). Alex de Waal (2019) claims that the
formalization of militias and other armed groups was used as “coup-proofing mechanism” by
Bashir. The Popular Defense Forces (PDF), which includes a range of militia and paramilitary
forces (de Waal, 2019), were established by Bashir in 2012 (Verjee, 2011).
According to research conducted by the Sudan Democracy First Group 65, Elfadil
Elsharief Elhashmi (2017) writes that “high ranking officials in the police, military and the NISS

“Salah Abdallah Gosh was the Sudanese Intelligence Chief and had close contact with CIA Director Porter J. Goss and senior
agency officials (Silverstein, 2005). Mukhabarat officials were flown out to Washington and held meetings with U.S. officials.
The Mukhabarat was Sudan’s intelligence office (what the CIA is to the U.S.). Before becoming a valued contact for the U.S.,
General Gosh was once labeled by Congress members as “directing military attacks against civilians in Darfur” (Silverstein,
2005). In the 1990s, the General was known to have regular contact with Al-Qaeda members including Bin Laden, but that did
not seem to matter. His relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE made him a threat to Omar al-Bashir’s regime” (de Waal,
2019). Silverstein, K. (2005). Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America’s War on Terrorism. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved
from: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-apr-29-fg-sudan29-story.html
65 “Sudan Democracy First Group (SDFG) was established by a number of Sudanese Civil Society Leaders, Activists and
Academics in 2010 in Khartoum. The establishment of SDFG was particularly spurred by the failure to democratic
transformation in Sudan that become acutely apparent during the April 2010 national elections, as part of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement. With growing instability, caused by reoccurrence of conflict, lack of justice and accountability, and increasing
exclusion and marginalization, SDFG emerged with the aim to provide a voice to the voiceless, as well as to promote democracy
in its intersection, with peace, justice, and balanced development.” https://democracyfirstgroup.org/about-us/our-mission/
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often have their own private enterprises, which receive favorable treatment from the
government” (14). The paper also shows how the NISS, in cooperation with the RSF and other
militia forces, is controlling the gold sector in Sudan, as opposed to the Ministry of Minerals or
the Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS). For instance, it was Eljunaid 66 Co. (owned by Hemeti and
his family) that was working with NISS to control gold mined from Jebel Amir (North Darfur).
A Reuters report found that by 2017 Hemeti and his militia forces had taken full control of the
Jebel Amer mines, from which they smuggled millions of dollars’ worth of gold to the UAE:
“[t]he documents, covering a four-week period from the end of last year [2018], show Algunade
sent around $30 million of gold bars to Dubai, around a ton in weight” (Abdelaziz, Georgy, and
El Dahan, 2019).
The gold sector in Sudan allows us to understand the extent of the exploitation of Sudan’s
working peoples under the global capitalist chain. Highlighting the extent of wealth 67 available
from gold mining, in 2012, Sudan accounted for nearly 2 per cent of the world’s gold production.
After the secession of South Sudan, and loss of oil, the regime had focused its efforts on gold
extraction (de Waal, 2019). Reports from the Central Bank of Sudan’s (CBOS) show that in
2016 and 2017, gold occupied the largest share of export commodities and the most valuable (in
dollars). About 85 to 90 percent of gold output in Sudan comes from artisanal mines with an
estimated 50,000 artisanal workers just in River Nile and Red Sea states (Elhashmi, 2017). An
artisanal miner is not officially employed by a mining company, but works independently,
mining minerals with their own resources, which usually means using their hands. According to
a 2013 study in the Barber locality of River Nile State, miners earn $2 to $4 dollars a day.
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Written as Algunade elsewhere
“Between 2010 and 2014, more than $4.5 billion worth of gold was smuggled from Sudan to the United Arab Emirates,
according to the report of the U.N. panel of experts.” (Elhashmi, 2018: 5)
67
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Additionally, “mining areas are remote, and they tend to lack food supplies and basic services”
(Elhashmi, 2017: 25). The same 2013 study in Barber locality found that 93.4% of miners are
young males within the ages of 20 to 40 years. As male artisanal miners face exploitation and
lack of social services as they produce one of the most expensive commodities in the world,
where are the women in their lives?
According to the same research, the miners who often work in the gold mines are not
formally educated and immigrate from conflict areas around Darfur (26 percent) and Kordofan
(18 percent), or from areas with failed development projects 68 like Gezira, which accounted for
15 percent of miners (Elhashmi, 2017). Social reproduction theorists have expanded our
approach to labor and the labor process, by analyzing labor not as “a visible, finished entity – in
this case, our worker at the gates of her workplace – but [as] the complex network of social
processes and human relations that produces conditions of existence for that entity”
(Bhattacharya, 2017: 29). Trends of migration in Sudan have shown that as men migrate for
employment opportunities, Sudanese women become responsible for social reproduction (Hale,
1996, Berry, 2015). Since the 1970s, an increase in unemployment, increased migration of men
in search for labor and resulted in women 1) taking on traditionally male responsibilities, and 2)
increasingly engaging in precarious work (Ahmed, 2014, Hale, 1996), and 3) facing increased
violence69 (HRW, 2012). In line with these trends, we can extrapolate, women without formal
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Failed development projects previously concentrated in Northern regions have created a reversal of migration trends (center to
periphery) as workers migrate to remote mining areas.
69 “The reliance on others, particularly male community members, and the lack of livelihood options for female-headed
households also makes women more vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse. While female-headed households are able to
register for camp food distributions, they have no ability or means to buy their children clothes and other basic necessities that are
not included in the ration. The risk of attack while outside the camp is one of the gravest safety and security concerns faced by
female refugees. According to a Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Rapid Assessment of the Doro camp released by the Danish
Refugee Council in October, 2012, “incidents of physical and sexual assault happen mostly in firewood collection places outside
the camp and sometimes at water points within the camp.” (HRW, 2012)
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education, from Darfur, Kordofan, and Gezira are subsidizing gold production as they find or
create alternate means for social reproduction.
Living and Working Conditions of Women
According to Suad M.E. Musa (2018), “investigating violent armed conflict and wars in
Sudan has revealed that rural women, Darfuris in particular, were most affected; women became
vulnerable victims of the atrocities of war, including gender-based violence that left women at
the head of 70 percent of household” (150). Although only 28 percent of women are said to be
participating in the labor market of Sudan (Tønnessen, 2019), the number does not account for
women engaging in precarious work, often central to subsistence. While employed Sudanese
men constitute the majority in all sectors of employment, most available job opportunities remain
outside formalized waged employment (Assal, 2012). Although it was hard obtaining exact data
on Sudanese working peoples engaged in precarious work, one source70 indicates that reports
from 1993 and 1996 show that 60 and 90 percent, respectively, of job opportunities in Sudan
were available in precarious work (Berry, 2015: 166). The precarious work sector, which
remains integrated to global capital by being central to social reproduction, and a source of
revenue for the regime, is operated by unwaged and waged working peoples of Sudan.
Urban Precarious work
In urban areas, professionals, and other waged workers, may also be compelled to engage
in precarious work because their income does not satisfy their needs (Berry, 2015: 167).
According to Khalid Medani, the Sudanese Professional Association’s (SPA) research on wages
among the professional class in Sudan, showed that doctors, lawyers, and engineers are also
living under the poverty line (Ibrahim, 2019). Based on Ibrahim (2019) 27% of urban dwellers to
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live on less $1 a day, and 58% of rural communities with the same fate. Particularly in
Khartoum, studies 71 and reports72 have shown that it is mostly those who have migrated from
areas of conflict and violence (including boys and girls), such as the Nuba Mountains, Eastern
Sudan, and Darfur, that engage in precarious work for livelihood (ARC, 2018; Ali, 2015).
Women mostly work as domestic workers, tea sellers, washing clothes, firewood collection, etc.
Women are compelled to professions like tea selling because they not only make more money
than their men counterpart, but it is often the only means to secure livelihood for those without
capital (Assal, 2012) and of specific ethnic/racial background (ARC, 2018). Similarly, alcohol
brewing has been another one of the limited options for income generation for displaced women
from Western and Southern parts of Sudan in major cities (Ali, 2015).
Expansion of “slums” and “informal settlements” around urban areas have correlated with
the drought of 1984 to 1986, the war in the South (1955-72 and 1983-2005), and the Darfur
conflict (since 2003) (Steel, Abukashawa, and Hussein, 2019). Some have argued the spatial and
demographic shifts in Khartoum, unintentionally caused by the regime, have contributed to the
2019 uprising and the removal of Omar al-Bashir (Ibrahim, 2019). The 2008 census estimated
the population of Khartoum to have surpassed 5 million (Assal, 2011), with estimated figures of
roughly a quarter of the population considered as internal migrants (Ibrahim, 2019). By another
estimate, “in 2005, one in three displaced Sudanese peoples were living in towns, and half of
those populations were located in Greater Khartoum” (i.e. Khartoum, Khartoum North,
Omdurman, and informal settlements in the peripheries) (Assal, 2011: 120). The Ministry of
Physical Planning and Utilities has carried violent demolitions to move internal migrants in
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Abdelmoneium, Azza O., Ways to Survive: Child Labor among Internally Displaced Children in Khartoum Sudan, in Open
Journal of Social Sciences, 5, 1 September 2017, p. 57 (taken from Asylum Research Center, 2018).
72 Waging Peace, Risk to individuals from Nuba Mountains in Sudan, March 2018, p. 13 (taken from Asylum Research Center,
2018)
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Khartoum to camps – Wad Al Bashir, Jebal Awlia, Mayo Farms, and Dar el-Salam – in the
peripheries of Greater Khartoum (Ibrahim, 2019: 7). These resettlement camps remained without
the basic social services necessary for social reproduction, such as healthcare, water, and
education (Assal, 2012; Miraya FM, 2009).
In 2009, “a series of mass demolitions and relocations took place in a range of squatter
settlements in Greater Khartoum” (Assal, 2011: 127). Forced migration was not just happening
in Khartoum, in Blue Nile State, for instance, in 2015, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) forcibly
resettled about 200 families from Derenk area (Bau locality) to a peripheral refugee camp south
of Ad-Damazin (Radio Dabanga, 2015a). The regime utilizes state apparatus, such as the
Ministry of Physical Planning and Utilities and the SAF, to inflict violent and/or forced
displacement. In Khartoum, attempts to remove precarious workers from the centers of the city,
and simultaneously earn revenue (via fines and fees), was facilitated by laws like the public order
act and the Land Violation Act, which criminalized 73 street vendors working in the centers of
Khartoum (Radio Dabanga, 2017). Tea sellers and other street vendors in Khartoum have
continuously stated how security forces, particularly referred to as the kasha74, raided their stalls,
seized their equipment, and continuously harassed them (SIHA Network, 2015; Hendawi; 2019).
In 2014, an initiative by professional women (doctors, lawyers, and journalists) showed
solidarity with tea sellers by serving tea and coffee (Ali, 2015: 57). Recent justification of the
violence and persecution of women street vendors in Khartoum was provided by consistent
attacks on their “womanhood” and associated morality under political Islam: “in 2017, the

According to an article on Radio Dabanga (2017), “[t]he head of the Women’s Cooperative Union of Food and Beverage
Sellers, says that tea sellers in Khartoum are suffering because of the ongoing campaigns organised by the authorities, the
imposition of high fines and the ban on work on the Nile Avenue, the Green Square and the Land Port.”
https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/restrictions-fines-on-khartoum-tea-sellers-cause-suffering-union
74 According to Jok (2007), kasha was also the term used for the forced repatriation program in the 1970s and 1980s of rural
migrants from the south, west, and the Nuba Mountains from Khartoum to “their regions or other more rural areas that detainee
chooses to be taken to, usually the agricultural schemes in southern Blue Nile, Kordofan or south Darfur” (9).
73
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interior minister and the police chief in Khartoum alleged that the tea ladies were running drugs
and prostitution rings and they made sure that the media propagated those allegations” (Hendawi,
2019).
Rural Precarious Work
In rural areas, Sudanese women, with low levels of education engage in subsistence
farming on small farms, carrying water, and petty trade like selling firewood, charcoal, or animal
feed (Berry, 2015). Women, with low levels of formal education, from all states, also work as
seasonal laborers, i.e., they participate at some point of production, such as harvesting, planting,
or cleaning. In areas like River Nile State and Northern State, women often engage in
subsistence farming and unpaid labor, including farming wheat on small plots (Najjar, Abdalla,
and Alma, 2017). Women farmers in Sudan produce at least 30 percent of food in the country
(Najjar et al., 2017). There are mainly two types of farming schemes in Sudan and women
account for “49% of farmers in the mechanized (irrigated) sector and 57% in the traditional
sector” (Najjar, et al., 2017: 10). Other data shows that 84 to 87 percent of the labor force in the
traditional agriculture sector are women (Ibnouf, 2011; Berry, 2015). A study on women’s role
in agriculture in North Kordofan State shows that women work twice as many hours as men. The
findings conclude that not only do women generate 74% of monthly agricultural income, but
they also contribute to more than one-third of the total income, the labor work, and household
activities (Ahmed, Abdalla, and Siddig, 2012). The same study finds that the main drinking
water sources in the region are operated by women, showing how Sudanese women are central to
social reproduction – their labor feeds their families, their communities, and beyond – and wealth
and income generation.
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Fatma Osman Ibnouf (2011) argues that official reports and public discourse on
agriculture in Sudan have too often omitted the contributions of women in the traditional
agriculture sector and their impact on household food security. Ibnouf’s (2011) findings on the
role of women in household food security in the Western region of Sudan shows that women in
high-risk climates and conflict areas produce and provide food for their households as men “are
more likely to migrate seasonally and even permanently.” Ibnouf (2011) adds, “women are [also]
responsible for food preparation, processing, and food preservation and are wholly responsible
for attending to household garden plots” (215). Under the dependent capitalist mode of
production in Sudan, capitalist ideologies of private property and patriarchal gender roles are
sustained by Political Islam, which does not recognize women’s role as breadwinners, and
positions them as doing all the work without the associated social, monetized, or institutional
value. Despite the fact the agricultural sector is one of the largest GDP 75 contributing sectors, the
contribution of women’s unwaged or low-waged work is not recognized (CBOS, 2018). The
omission, rather, the refusal to value women’s labor contributes to their super-exploitation and
oppression: “[b]ecause men are perceived to be the breadwinners in families, [men] own land,
and as such can also access agricultural credit, many agricultural projects largely target men”
(Najjar et al., 2017: 11).
Perceptions of womanhood and women’s subordinate role (Najjar et al., 2017), legalized
through political Islam, limits women’s access to plots on mechanized farms (which have
increased under the NIF/NCP), which structures their role as undervalued subsistence farmers.
Regardless of 80% of Sudanese women in rural communities working in agriculture, and about
70 percent of Darfuri women being head of household (Musa, 2018), less than five percent own
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31.6 % in 2016 and 31.9% in 2017 based on CBOS’s Annual Report (2017).
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land, while they remain in the most impoverished and underserved communities (Najjar,
Abdalla, and Alma, 2017). Despite sharing greater workload and having greater impact on crop
productivity, food security, and household income, women in agricultural production benefit
least from production (Ibnouf, 2011). The invisibility of women’s labor, which sustains family
and community (by producing and reproducing labor power), underlies women’s oppression and
exploitation (Andaiye, 2020).
Commodification of Public Goods & Services
The NIF’s economic salvation claimed to restore and acknowledge the importance of
agriculture and small-scale farmers by expanding mechanized farming. The traditional sector not
only has levels of productivity similar to mechanized farming, but also requires less capital and
is utilized by the majority of farmers in Sudan (Umbadda, 2014). Nonetheless, the NIF/NCP
economic salvation prioritized mechanized farming, and began appropriating land for investors.
The Mechanized Farming Corporation (MFC), an autonomous entity under the Ministry of
Agriculture and Natural Resource was established in 1968 to [among other things] control land
allocation, provide credit loans, sign agreements, and operate state farms (Grawert, 1998). The
MFC was dissolved in 1992 and replaced by the General Authority of Investment (GAI) – a
newly established structure with apparent connection to Omar al-Bashir (Umbadda, 2014). In
just a few years, the GAI had superseded the appropriation of land that was allocated, planned,
and demarcated by the MFC during its 60 years (Umbadda, 2014). In 2010, the “world’s largest
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agricultural irrigation project under single management” was in Gezira 76, Sudan (Berry, 2015:
175). Just three years later, in 2013, there were protests triggered by bread 77 shortages.
The disarticulated restoration and expansion of large-scale mechanized farming was
backed by international finance institutions, such as the IMF, and with financial support, from
the Islamic Development Bank and International Fund for Agriculture Development, and OPEC
(Grawert, 1998). In the 1990s, under the management the GAI, and through funding from the
World Bank Group, mechanized farming was expanded from Al-Gedaref to Blue Nile, Upper
Nile (now South Sudan), White Nile, Sennar, and South Kordofan; and even to areas unsuited for
agriculture in parts of North Kordofan (Umbadda, 2014). The expanded mechanized schemes
were owned by “absentee landlords” that were “mostly merchants from major towns, ex-army
officers and retired government officials,” if not foreigners (Umbadda, 2014: 41). As mentioned
above, in Blue Nile State and the Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan) there has been an ongoing
armed struggle against the regime, but Mayrno (Blue Nile State), Al-Damazin (Blue Nile State),
and Gedaref (Gedaref State) are also regions where some of the first protests broke out in 2018.
The land appropriated by the government was not vacant, which meant nomadic
pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, and traditional and seasonal farmers’ livelihood was threatened
and/or transformed. Based on Siddig Umbadda (2014), much of the land allocated for
mechanized farming schemes was owned by those outside of the designated areas: “in Upper

“The project originated in 1911 when a private British enterprise, Sudan Plantations Syndicate, found cotton suitable to the
area and embarked in the 1920s on what became the Gezira Scheme, intended principally to furnish cotton to the British textile
industry. Backed by a loan from the British government, the syndicate began to construct a dam on the Blue Nile at Sinnar (also
seen as Sannar and Sennar) in 1913.” (Berry, 2015: 174)
77 Wheat production was encouraged under the expanded mechanized schemes to ensure food security. However, millet and
sorghum or root crops are the staple crop for the majority of Sudanese peoples, whereas wheat is a staple mainly for urban
populations (Grawert, 1998). Wheat also requires a significant amount of water (Berry, 2015), which is a limited resource for
Sudan if not in the riverain regions. The prioritization and dependence on wheat dates back to the disarticulated food production
policies installed during Numeriy’s period, with the support of the IMF and U.S. taxpayer subsidized commodity aid program
(Prendergast, 1989). Sorghum production in mechanized irrigated sectors was also extended under the NIF/NCP, but not in
traditional sectors.
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Nile State (now in South Sudan) this amounted to 85 per cent of land allocations, in the Nuba
Mountains 73–84 per cent, in the Blue Nile 76 per cent and in Gedaref 64 per cent” (41). Reports
show that in some areas like Um-Maleeha, Alam, and Daneekola, in Gedaref State, villagers
were dispossessed of all their land (Umbadda, 2014: 14). Umbadda (2014) also uses other
sources that indicate, in 2003 for instance, more than 50 percent of land for mechanized farming
was illegally appropriated. By April 2012, it was revealed that the regime had granted about 2
million hectares (4.86 million acres) to a Qatari and Korean company, and Egypt and Saudi
Arabia: “[t]he land granted to Saudi investors is said to be a freehold (literally a land enclave
within Sudan belonging to Saudi Arabia)” (Umbadda, 2014: 39). A 1997 interview with the
Musa Ibrahim, [then] mayor of Menza and of al-Kadalwa in the Northern Blue Nile area,
demonstrates how the regimes blatant dispossession could instigate armed struggle:
They confiscated our land, turned it into projects and handed it over to strangers.
We became guests in our own home and found no way other than carrying arms
with the opposition and the [National Democratic Alliance] NDA78 (as quoted in
Ali, 2015: 105).
The privatization of land in and around Khartoum has also increased since the NIF/NCP
came to power (Bahreldin, 2020). The impact of privatization was not just felt by rural
communities or subsistence and small-scale farmers, but also other working peoples in periurban areas (that did not necessarily depend on agriculture for livelihood) and consumers in
Khartoum. The appropriation of riverbanks in the peri-urban area of Soba al-Hilla79, for instance,
destroyed the brick-making industry in the region and left workers struggling to find alternate
modes of livelihood (Steel et al., 2018). The mechanized and semi-mechanized schemes have
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The National Democratic Alliance was a group of 17 political parties, 51 trade unions, and other independent groups that
formed in 1989 in opposition to NIF. See Ali, 2015.
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“Soba, a peri-urban area 18 km southeast of Khartoum on the west bank of the Blue Nile.” (Steel et al, 2019)
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also led to environmental degradation, which has affected grazing land80, in a country where
livestock raising and agriculture are the main sources of livelihood (even during the “oil decade”
from 1999 to 2010) (Berry, 2015: 171). Political Islam as an ideology was used to support
capitalist aspirations and institutions. For instance, it was useful to legitimize the regime’s land
grab through laws like the Regional Government Act of 198581, which was amended in 1990, to
invalidate the legitimacy of customary rights to land. The law conveniently vested the control
and usage of land, which is owned by God, with the central government in Khartoum (Umbadda,
2014).
Agriculture to Banking
The regime’s use of political Islam also provided shelter for exploitative and nepotistic
practices through the banking sector. Regardless of the reality of traditional farming and food
security, Islamic banks limited credit loans to commercial farmers and merchants involved in
large scale mechanized farming schemes. Islamic banking protects ownership and lenders by
emphasis on the sanctity of ownership, contractual agreements, and through its non-interest loans
that result in shared risks and returns (SDFG, 2018). The Islamic banking system also functions
similar to asset-based funding, which automatically disqualifies a large majority of Sudanese
working peoples without capital. Islamic banks are exempt from taxation and have seen
favorable access to contracts and licenses issued by the government. Another investigative paper
by the Sudan Democracy First Group (SDFG) (2018) reveals the regime consistently intervened

“In Gedaref area, in particular, as a result of the quick expansion of semi-mechanized farming, the amount of pasture and forest
area dropped from 78.5 per cent in 1941 to only 18 per cent in 1991 (Babiker 2011: 4).” (Umbadda, 2014: 42))
81 This law was revised from the Numeriy era Civil Transaction Act, which declared land belonged to God and the state was
responsible for usage and control. The law was amended in 1985 as the Regional Government Act, to include that the central
government would be responsible for usage and control of land. “Then in November 2011, in a move to protect foreign investors,
Sudanese national newspapers reported that the presidential adviser for investment announced that government had decreed
fundamental amendments to the 1999 investment act, including a provision to prohibit nationals from taking foreign investors to
court” (Umbadda, 2014: 35).
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in the banking sector to determine who gets credit, and foreign currency resources, for
agricultural and other investments. The regime also intervened in the process of recruiting,
selecting, and promoting employees in banks, which often led to hiring loyalists and family
members without adequate experience. In the case of the Bank of Sudan, hired senior officials
could also be from countries like Jordan and Pakistan (SDFG, 2018: 37).
Since 1989, Islamic banks have not upheld mandated regulations and frameworks by the
regulatory and supervising authority, the Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) (SDFG, 2018). Since
the global oil boom (1973/74), finance capital from oil-producing countries increased and led to
the expansion on Islamic banking in countries like Sudan (Ali, 2016). Following the 1983 decree
to Islamize all banks, in 1992 the High Shari’a Supervisory Board (HSSA) was established. In
1985 there were 6 Islamic banks, but by 2005, there were 29 banks, functioning within a system
of other Islamic finance institutions (such as insurance) controlled and micromanaged by the
regime and its supporters. In the following years different institutions, such as the Khartoum
Stock Exchange and the Sudan Financial Services Company 82, were created to control and
facilitate Islamic banking. The same paper by the Sudan Democracy First Group (2018)
illuminates how the newly established structures, along with the patronage system of
employment and ownership, functioned to serve the interests of the regime.
For instance, “[s]trictly speaking, Mr. [Abdallah Hassan] Al-Bashir [Omar al-Bashir’s
brother] has access to the CBOS foreign exchange department at any time, to obtain permission
to transfer foreign exchange resources from the CBOS to Omdurman National Bank (ONB), in
order to allow the ONB to execute/implement ministry of defense imports from abroad by

“The Sudan Financial Services Company (SFSC) was established in 1998 and is 99% owned by the CBOS and 1% owned by
the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The company is the issuing, selling and marketing agent for certificates issued by both the MoF
and the CBOS.” (SDFG, 2018: 23)
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issuing letters of credit” (SDFG, 2018: 26-27). In 2016, the CBOS foreign reserve declined by
about $500million, albeit $750 million recorded from imports, and an unrecorded $1.8 billion
received from Gulf countries. A large portion of foreign currency was distributed to the Ministry
of Defense, whereas $350 million was allocated to Mr. Ali Mahmoud Abdelrasool (former
Minister of Finance) and Mr. Abdelrahim Al-Mutaafi (former Minister of Agriculture) for
importation of sugar. It is important to underscore there was no need to import sugar because of
its availability at the Sudanese Sugar Store, but this was how global flow of capital was
organized (SDFG, 2018: 28).
Privatizing Public Service
According to Mohamed Osman Suliman (2007), “it is clear that all of the potentially
profitable privatized enterprises are managed and controlled by NCP affiliates” (7). The
telecommunication sector dominated by three 83 companies (Sudani, MTN, Zain) can be used to
show the intersection and intertwinement of the private-public-security sectors under NIF/NCP,
and the reinforcement provided by global capital. In 2015 alone, the revenue (excluding taxes 84)
from these three largest telecom companies in Sudan exceeded 1.8 billion dollars (Hamoda,
2017). First, based on a report conducted by the Sudan Democracy First Group, which
interviewed workers and past officials in the sector (along with desk research), the privatization
of the Sudanese National Telecommunications Authority was not only unnecessary (because it
was already “effective and well equipped”), but it was also sold for $60 million when its
estimated worth ranged from $100 million to $400 million.

“These three companies account for 90% of the volume of commercial activity in the telecom sector.” (Hamoda, 2017: 10)
Without including taxes paid by customers and (income taxes) by employees, “[t]he annual value added tax (VAT) that the
telecommunications companies pay directly to the government amounts to about $560 million dollars. In addition, the profit and
commercial excise taxes come to about $33 million dollars annually.” (Hamida, 2017: 24).
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Second, the regime used parastals like the Ministry of Telecommunication to issue
decrees that would set up entities like the Informatics Support Fund, which allowed public funds
to be used without going through the Ministry of Finance. Without declaring income or
expenditures, the fund was not only susceptible to embezzlement 85 but could also divert public
funds for the regime’s violence86. Sub-contracting for maintenance and technical support is also
contracted to companies affiliated to the security apparatus, such as Gasr El Lolo (Pearl Palace).
In the same report, Ammar Hamoda (2017), writes “each [telecom] company includes one or two
family members of president” (40). The findings show how foreign telecom companies
intentionally appointed military men and Bashir’s allies to secure bids and thwart abiding by
frameworks and regulations of the National Telecommunication Corporation (NTC). Zain Sudan
(with all shares87 owned by Kuwaiti company MTC), for instance, used corporate social
responsibility funds to appease political figures, appointed individuals 88 close to the regime as
Board members, and even “targeted service areas that specific political entities want[ed]” (41).
Telecom companies and regulating bodies like the NTC have also directly contributed to
the oppression of the working peoples by facilitating or turning a blind eye to the regime’s
control and violence. Telecom services have been cut to enable military raids, the public has
been surveilled, and subscribers’ data made accessible to the security apparatuses (Hamoda,
2017). The SDFG report also mentions that among other oppressions, workers’ rights to unionize

“In one corruption case documented by the testimony of the Minister of Telecommunications in relation to the Informatics
Support Fund, involved a computer deal in which the specifications were manipulated,6 allowing officials in the ministry to
embezzle approximately 4 million dollars.” (Hamoda, 2017: 19)
86 Hamoda (2017) discusses how there has been credible information linking $300,000 up to $1.2 million from the Informatics
Support Fund been transferred to facilitate the exit of the Janjaweed militia from El Obeid, South Kordofan, in 2014.
87 “In March 2005, the Kuwaiti company MTC bought MSI’s 39% share in Mobitel. By February 2006, the MTC became full
owner of Mobitel by buying Sudatel’s 61% share for US $1,332,000,000. From this figure, we can extrapolate that the total cost
of the acquisition was around $2.2 billion dollars. In September 2007, the brand changed its name from Mobitel to Zain.” (SDFG,
2018: 26)
88 The report shows Zain first appointed the former governor of the Bank of Sudan, and “later added a former president of the
national assembly, and the president's brother” (Hamoda, 2017).
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has been suppressed. The regimes control over public services extended to the NISS’s ownership
of media companies, including all the FM stations in Sudan, which it has used to silence the
regime’s atrocities in Darfur and instead promote the regime’s propaganda (Ibrahim, 2019),
which often meant Arab and Northern riverain supremacy that could further manipulate the
differences within the working peoples. The mode of politics under the NIF/NCP used
militarized political Islam to dominate, accumulate capital, and control the state-industry-finance
sectors, and the working peoples that run and were serviced by those sectors.
Intensification of Contradictions
Following the oil boom (beginning in 2000 to 2011) virtual companies were created by
men like Fadul Mohamed Khair 89 (a local shareholder in the Bank of Sudan), without tax file
numbers or registration number. Such companies (referred to as shell companies) received funds
from CBOS, which contributed to the banking crisis after 2011 (SDFG, 2018). The first few
years of the oil boom saw increased foreign funds entering Sudan, which allowed the regime to
consolidate power within an inner circle: “opportunities, goods and services, became virtually
inaccessible to the public without the support or approval of a state official at some level”
(Sidahmed, 2011: 181). Many of the companies extracting oil were foreign companies or
companies in joint ventures with the government. The flow of capital was maintained by
government and private imports, mainly on equipment and machinery for oil production. The
revenue from oil production was “was spent on lavish government building, financing political
networks, and buffing up cronies with contracts and sub-contracts” (El-Battahani, 2016). There
was also increased infrastructure projects and a real estate boom in Khartoum (El-Battahani,
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In 2018, the NISS arrested him, which led to senior officials, mostly foreigners, in the Bank of Sudan leaving the country.
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2016), which created limited employment opportunities for construction workers and other lowwaged and precarious laborers from the outskirts of Khartoum.
Oil revenue expenditure also led to government subsidies in urban social services, mass
consumption goods, and semi-luxuries (El-Gizouli, 2019), as it exasperated violence (Jok, 2007),
and the appropriation of land in what is now South Sudan (Umbadda, 2014). The security
apparatus particularly benefitted from increased budgets. After a brief period of economic
stability, mostly accessible to the Islamist capitalists, the urban middleclass, and those within the
patronage networks of the regime, however, the independence of South Sudan in 2011 meant
loss of oil revenue. According to El-Gizouli (2020a):
Sudan’s post-oil financial crisis had spawned a rather haphazard policy of rabid
austerity. The banking system fell into a state of near collapse, with queues at
Khartoum’s ATMs and restrictions on the amount of cash those with bank
accounts (and savings to put in them) could withdraw. Monetary policy failed to
address the precipitous depreciation of the Sudanese pound and consequentially
foreign currencies became a commodity in themselves…In these straightened
economic times, local governments had no other option but to squeeze the
population for financial resource wherever it could be found. (2)
Refusal to invest in agriculture, and other non-oil sectors, contributed to high levels of
unemployment, soaring from 14.2% in 1990, to 21.6% in 2010, it has continued to rise (ElBattahani, 2016: 4). Although large migration of workers had been consistent, with more than
10,000 workers leaving Sudan in 2008, by 2012, the numbers had reached 95,000 working
peoples (including processionals) from different sectors (Sharfi, 2014). The value of money
drastically depreciated, which affected the purchasing power of consumers (Sharfi, 2014 :316).
In 2012 and 2013, there were increases in taxation in service sectors, particularly
telecommunication. The increased government scrutiny in private and public sectors affected not
just the working peoples and rural communities, but middle and upper classes, urban

88

communities, and eventually the regime’s inner circle. As Mohammed Hussein Sharfi (2014)
explained:
In every budget before and after secession [of South Sudan] the government
allocated the largest share of oil revenues, to the security and defense sectors.
These huge allocations were effectively used to maintain the current regime's
political and security control…The continuing armed conflicts in Blue Nile, South
Kordofan and Darfur will place more pressure on the economy. (317)
In 2016, 70 % of government expenditure went to the military and intelligence, as compared to
2.3 % for education and 1 % for health (Elhashmi, 2017). Annual reports from the CBOS
indicate three categories of GDP contributors: agriculture (including forestry and fisheries),
services, and industry. The service sector includes education, healthcare, transportation,
telecommunication, etc. For the last few years, the service sector has been in the lead (50 % in
2016 and 52% in 2017) in its contribution to the GDP, with the agricultural90 sector coming in
next, and the industrial91 last. The fact that the service sector is the largest revenue earning sector
is a huge contradiction in and of itself and shows the neoliberal commodification of social
reproduction.
The fiscal policies of the IMF after 2011 not only cut expenditures on education and
health, but also lifted subsidies from petroleum and sugar, cut public service salaries, and
reduced development budgets of public corporations (Sharfi, 2014). As local governments
scrambled to cover their expenses, education and health sectors deteriorated (El-Gizouli, 2020b).
One source shows that the “gross school enrollment rate in Sudan in 2009 was 71 per cent,” but
by 2010, “only one in five children completed primary school” (Elhashmi, 2017: 49). These
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2016 – 31.6 %; 2017 – 31.9%. From CBOS (2017) Annual Report
2016 – 16.9 %; 2017 – 17.3%
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numbers show that rather than the value or desirability of education, it is the conditions that do
not allow the young to receive education.
The regional disparities in access to services further reveals the different levels of
exploitation based on regional, racial, ethnic, and religious differences. Areas in Darfur and
Kordofan have historically been some of the least serviced regions, albeit being sources of some
of Sudan’s top exports, such as livestock and gum Arabic 92. Since the colonial period, Greater
Khartoum has been the center of capital accumulation, with public services like transportation
and hospitals, and industries and financial institutions being concentrated there (Lobban and
Fluehr-Lobban, 1978). Many works, including the Black Book93, have provided tables and
statistics that show not only have senior positions (across Sudan) in the public sector been
exclusively dominated by Northern Arab riverain groups, but education and health services have
also been historically concentrated at the center (Grawert 1998; Cobham, 2015; Ahmed, 2018;
Musa, 2018). The nature of the modern agricultural sector and its concentration Northern-Central
riverine regions having relatively better access to social services than peripheral regions also
meant social reproduction projects (health, education, and water) were relatively better in regions
like Gezira and Gedaref (Ahmed, 2018). This has left the areas in South Sudan, Darfur and
Kordofan – inflicted with violence and used as extractable regions – with significantly less roads,
hospitals, schools, and accessible water (Musa, 2018; Jok; 2007). In contexts where structural

Gum Arabic is “a product that is indispensable to the fabrication of candies, soft drinks like Coca Cola, and pharmaceutical
products. Sudan is by far the most important world producer of gum Arabic.” (Huliaras, 2006, p.719)
93 “In 2000, a mysterious book appeared in the streets of Khartoum under the title “The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and
Wealth in the Sudan”. The mystery of the book was strengthened by its impeccable method of distribution necessitated by the
Regime’s firm grip over information in the country. The launch of the work consisted of a once-off distribution at gates of major
mosques, following Friday prayers…Part Two of the Black Book did not appear until August 2002. Unlike Part One, this one
joined the global world and appeared in a website (Sudanjem.com). Part two has less talk but more statistics. Altogether, there are
more than 200 Tables in it. As of last year (March 2003), some of the activists involved in the preparation of Book took arms
against the government.” (El-Tom, 2004: Introduction)
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adjustment policies, which reduce real wages, and neoliberal policies that commodify social
services, women are overburdened by sustaining social reproduction (Bhattacharya, 2017).
Political Islam’s Contribution to Women’s Capitalist Exploitation
At a 1990 Conference on the Role of Women in National Salvation, Omar al-Bashir said
that the ideal Sudanese woman was one who “cares for her husband and children, who does her
household duties, and who is a devout Muslim” (as cited in Ali, 2015: 55). The care and
domestic work of women subsidizes wage labor, so political Islam has proved to be useful for
capitalist production by justifying women’s uncompensated labor in the household. Sondra Hale
(2010) further explains the conceptualization of women under the NIF/NCP:
The modern woman as the embodiment of the Islamic nation (bearing and rearing
children, tending the hearth, and purportedly, but not in actuality, acting as the
moral gatekeeper) must also carry out the tasks of nation-building (defending the
nation through militias, earning wages, perhaps holding minor office, driving a
car, getting an education, and the like). Thus, she becomes the modern ‘Islamic
woman,’ in line with NIF ideology. (33)
As Anne McClintock (1996) points out, “[w]omen are typically constructed as the symbolic
bearers of the nation, but are denied any direct relation to national agency” (261). Indeed,
regardless of the integral and dynamic role of women in Sudanese society, the National Islamic
Front (NIF) used political Islam to represent women solely as mothers, wives, and combatants 94,
and curtail their agency and freedom. Women and women’s bodies were not only used to mark
modernization (Ali, 2015), but also to fulfill a designated role in society. The attempt to control
and exploit women was exercised by bounding them to roles that fulfill birthing, rearing (care),
and reproducing labor power.

“This exclusion of women [referring to purge of women from the public sector] occurred alongside mobilization of women to
participate in the military and Popular Defence Forces (PDF). Encouraging the development of women’s physical strength is
basically seen as a ‘protective measure’ against ‘rape and killing’ in the absence of men. As one of the female officers in the PDF
states, “(we felt that) it was very important for women to join the PDF after what we saw happening to the women and children
of Bosnia”! (Bukhari, 1995:np).” (Ali, 2016: 12)
94

91

By defining women singularly, as mothers and wives, and creating legal and violent
structures that uphold that definition, the regime ensured the reproduction of social relations that
normalize the exploitation of women. Considering capital as relation, laws limiting women’s
access to capital not only structuralized the dependence of women on men, but also legalized the
oppression of women in the family, creating shared experiences across class 95. The NIF regime
had declared the 1989 coup a National Salvation Revolution that required the “civilization” of
education, culture, and mass media (Khalid, 2003). Using conflated and inconsistent
representations of modernity and fundamentalism, the NIF/NCP, attempted to define, co-opt and
set fixed positions for women in Sudanese society.
Clearly, the regime understood the considerable power held by women in Sudan. On the
one hand, the NIF/NCP liaised with and co-opted powerful women’s groups, such as the AlHakkamat96 (Musa, 2018), to mobilize combatants and/or solicit mass support. On the other
hand, the regime restricted women’s autonomous organizing, political participation, and
outlawed traditional systems, which had previously permitted the articulation of women’s needs
and grievances (Ali, 2015: 60). The rejection of old traditions and the increasing supremacy of
capital, in line with the discourse of progress and modernity, allowed for the removal of nonIslamic traditions, such as the zar97, and customary laws “that supported rectification for women
in family matters” (Ali, 2015: 55). The specific application of political Islam, under the NIF, not

Under Sharia, “women were also forbidden to travel alone irrespective of their age, marital status or profession; they had
always to be accompanied by a 'Muhrim' (chaperon)” (Khalid, 2012: 218). Laws passed under the public order regime affected
women in different ways, but nonetheless, affected all women, which has indirectly created the conditions necessary for a crossclass alliance, such as MANSAM.
96 “In general, al-Hakkamat is a local term that refers to Darfuri Arab females who are gifted with poetic skills and are therefore
recognized as folk poets, who have normally received very little or no education…Aided and motivated by ethnic identity
consciousness, they develop a tremendous agency that enables them to exercise authority and influence in order to fulfill social
and political obligations compatible with the welfare of their tribes” (2018: 47). See Suad M.E. Musa’s Hawks & Doves in
Sudan’s Armed Conflict: Al-Hakkamat Baggara Women of Darfur.
97
“[T]he NIF has also restricted some forms of traditional women’s organization, such as the zar (spirit possession) ceremonies.
The zar constituted an important way of articulating women’s needs and grievances in the past, where women were able to
surpass the boundaries of neopatriarchal society. The GOS considers zar as non-Islamic and has outlawed zar sheikhas (women
who organize spirit possession ceremonies).” (Ali, 2016: 17)
95
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only removed and co-opted traditions and customary laws that had benefitted women, but also
introduced new ones that attempted to define and control them (Ali, 2015).
Between 1991 and 2000, the NIF passed laws and decrees, collectively referred to as the
public order regime. The three sets of laws (Muslim family law, public order laws, and labor
laws) have been related to the oppressive and exploitative experiences of women in the Middle
East and North Africa region (Tønnessen, 2019). In Sudan, scholars have argued these laws were
directed at controlling women and enforcing the regime’s ideology (Abbas, 2015). The regime
established police departments and judicial courts to enforce public order laws and police
women’s “moral corruption.” The 1991 penal laws entitled “scandalous and indecent actions”
did not define what indecent or scandalous clearly meant (Abbas, 2015: 358). The laws defined
prostitution as “women's physical presence in a ‘place of prostitution,’ a location where a person
might perform sexual acts or materially benefit from them” (Abbas, 2015: 362). As these
“locations of prostitution” could literally be anywhere (including houses), not only women’s
sexuality and choice of work, but also their public presence could be criminal. The vagueness of
these laws subjected women not to written law but to the preference of security forces.
The degree to which the public order regime was oppressive to women [that might share
the same class position] varies based on the inherently connected differences they embody.
Depending on the positions women occupy, what some women view as protection, others
experience as discrimination (Tønnessen, 2019). For instance, in 1991, the hijab (headscarf) was
decreed the official dress code for Sudanese women. For non-Muslim women in the Nuba
Mountains, the hijab and other “indecent clothing” that requires covering the body, may not be
just an attack on their autonomy, but also their cultural expressions of beauty and femininity
(Ali, 2015: 113). According to Suad M.E. Musa (2018), for the al-Hakkamat in parts of Darfur
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and Kordofan, the hijab, and the separation of women and men in public spaces, “has forced
people to abstain from performing many folk dances and reduced the scope of innocent
enjoyment and entertainment of rural societies” (124). Nuances also exist among those that
practice Islam. For instance, the Salafists in Khartoum might deem the niqab (face-veil)
appropriate, but for the Islamists, the hijab (headscarf) maybe preferrable because the niqab can
be viewed as backwards (Tønnessen, 2019). The NIF’s deterministic definition of womanhood,
and the legalization of that obscured definition, did not reflect or represent the various lived and
embodied realities among women.
Women’s cross-class exploitation was legalized under Article 51 of the 1991 Personal
Matters Act, which ensured the subordination of wives to their husbands, by stating a “wife does
not deserve maintenance (among other things) if she works outside the home without her
husband’s approval” (as cited in Ali, 2015: 56). Liv Tønnessen’s (2019) research with middle
and upper-class Sudanese women, which she designates as university educated women living in
urban Khartoum and susceptible to Islamist ideologies, shows that though some of the women
she interviewed shared the NIF’s ideology on womanhood, all had rejected the legitimacy of
Article 51. Though most of the women believed household duties were their sole responsibilities,
adhering to what Tønnessen (2019) calls the male-breadwinner model, they found the
requirement of their husband’s permission to earn waged income to be unsubstantiated and/or
oppressive. Even with compensated labor, women’s unwaged care work is prioritized and
expected, but not valued (monetized), so their gendered status/power in the family is not
transformed.
Women are not only restricted from earning income, but they are restricted in how they
can earn income. Reports from the aforementioned 1990 conference showed the regime’s
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ideology supported women’s waged work as long as they were in “suitable” occupations like
nursing and teaching (Ali, 2015). Women’s central and confirmed roles were to remain as
housewives and mothers: “it is only after this primary role has been successfully performed that
women can work for pay. Women have to prove they will not neglect their “second shift” in
order to get permission to pursue wage work” (Tønnessen, 2019: 239). Women’s uncompensated
labor, which is central to social reproduction, is, thus, legalized under the pretense of religion. As
unpaid laborers in the household, women subsidize the waged male worker whose “wage does
not pay for labor, but for the maintenance and reproduction of labor” (Gardiner, 1997).
Tønnessen (2019) uses the formulation “double segregation” to emphasize the limitations
on women’s participation in the labor market, and the limitations on their participation outside of
“suitable” occupations. The formulation “double segregation,” may be suitable to describe the
exploitation of women confined to the household, and to low-waged professional work like
teaching and nursing. However, it is important to note that women with an education and of a
wealthier background, i.e., middle and upper class women, may face a third98 segregation based
on their region of origin, religion, and/or their darker skin color (ARC, 2018). Therefore, the
formulation “double segregation” can only be applied to Tønnessen’s (2019) designations of
middle and upper-class as university educated women living in urban Khartoum and susceptible
to Islamist ideologies. Furthermore, double segregation cannot account for women without
access to capital or from/within specific regions – devastated by the nature of central capital
accumulation and related militarization, in areas such as Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile

“All our interviewees mentioned the difficulties in gaining employment, even though those who spoke to were from wealthier
backgrounds and had relevant qualifications. For instance, Ms B said she had to recite verses from the Quran in interviews, and
was asked questions such as, “Where are you really from?” because of the colour of her skin. As a result, she ended up
performing outsourcing roles for a computer company or a teaching association, where she would be paid, but her name or
identity would not be recorded. This adversely affected her ability to prove her employment history and skills to future
employers.” From an interview with several individuals from the Nuba Mountains conducted for the March 2018 report of
Waging Peace (Asylum Research Center, 2018: 65).
98
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State – that experience an additional level of exploitation, by being systematically restricted to
labor-intensive and precarious work. The rigidity and obscurity of the definition of womanhood,
the appropriation of women’s labor, and the violence to enforce both has created particular and
shared forms of exploitations and oppression among different women in Sudan.
In Khartoum, the Public Order Police (POP) were created to enforce the laws and in each
neighborhood, the POP had their own police force and court system (ARC, 2018: 55). Based on
the U.S. Department of State’s annual human rights report, “[i]n Khartoum Public Order Police
occasionally brought women before judges for allegedly violating Islamic standards. One
women’s advocacy group estimated that in Khartoum, Public Order Police arrested an average of
40 women per day” (ARC, 2018: 62). Women working in precarious and/or labor-intensive jobs
suffered the most from the public order regime (SIHA Network, 2020). In addition, to gendering
space and labor, the laws prohibited alcohol consumption and criminalized certain forms of
trade. Because of the nature of their work laws restricting women’s mobility 99, public
presence100, and labor, affected most the women whose livelihood depended on their ability to
work late and in various public settings, including the streets (SIHA Network, 2015). These
women not only lost their family incomes and means of sustenance, as a result of the public
order regime, but they suffered most from the systems and structures built to uphold them. Ali
(2015) writes how “[l]iquor brewers and sex workers suffered flogging, fines, or imprisonment”

The labor laws of 1997 restricted women, that were not engaged in “administrative, technical, social, health, and professional
work,” from working in the evenings. Women were also not allowed to travel outside the country without a male guardian
(Tønnesen, 2019).
100 “Agricultural work during the peak seasons, for example, cannot be completed during day time. Sale of food and drinks is
usually most profitable not only during breakfast time, but also after sunset at dinner time. If wood needs to be collected, women
now have to return earlier from the fields. The national government has not really tried to implement these decrees forcibly, but
in some areas, local forces shut down women's market activities and intervened in beer brewing (Gray and Kevane, 1993, p. 19)”
(Grawert, 1998: 198).
99
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(Ali, 2015: 57). The state and its security apparatus, thus, defined morality and womanhood, and
became its violent enforcers.
Conclusion
In a social formation where agriculture is the main source of livelihood, privatization of
land and lack of articulated investment in the sector, has created a struggle for social
reproduction. Basically, privatization and liberalization, negotiated and encouraged by
multilateral finance institutions like the IMF, funded and incentivized by countries like Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, and assured by state apparatus like the GIA, NTC, and RSF, ultimately
benefitted these actors, and not the dominant social classes in Sudan, the Sudanese youth and
working peoples. To maintain the power structure, based on the global flow of capital, the
NIF/NCP used political Islam and intensified militarization. The Islamist patriarchal regime
established state structures for appropriation and violence, in the forms of parastals, public funds,
and paramilitary forces; it set up bodies that would control, coerce, and oppress (such as the
Popular Committees and the Public Order Police); it created military and nepotistic patronage
networks of capital accumulation that did not allow for women’s or popular political
participation; and it privatized and commodified the public sector – all of which led to the
conjunctures of 2018/19. This has created precarious living and working conditions for multiethnic, multi-racial, multi-religious groups of men and women: working peoples living in
Khartoum and other cities, working peoples in the urban-peripheries, students and unemployed
youth, rural communities under stress, and without access to basic social services. The following
chapter explores how these social groups in Sudan organized in 2018/19, with the leadership of
women and youth, to challenge the structural and systematic exploitations and oppressions
discussed in this chapter.
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Chapter 4
Political Possibilities
This chapter is meant to illuminate how the 2019 uprising in Sudan was not an isolated
event. It was part of the process of struggle that was intensified [at least] over the last few
decades (Figure 3). Between 2018 and 2019, the Sudanese working peoples and youth, under the
leadership of women, managed to subvert the state and its militarized repression. Despite the
regime’s militarization, its manipulation of differences within the working peoples, and its
subjugation of women, the 2019 uprising saw multi-ethnic, multi-racial, multi-religious, and
multi-regional participation and solidarity. The demonstrations and protests, organized based on
alternate forms of political and economic organizing and structuring, emerged as an insurrection
that challenged the power structure in Sudan. This chapter focuses on 1) the popular participation
of working peoples, i.e., the intervention of the grassroots, as affecting the structures of
organizing through non-hierarchical (horizontal) and autonomously organized groups, 2) on the
alliances and networks built between different groups among the working peoples of Sudan, and
3) Sudanese women’s militant role and the disruption of their imposed representation. The
practices and networks that emerged during the uprising reorganized politics and economy to
serve the interests of the dominant social classes, i.e., the working peoples and youth, instead of
the dependent capitalist interests vested in the Islamized, Arabized, and militarized state serving
global capitalism.

98

Figure 3 Timeline reflecting the continuity and evolution of the 2019 uprising
Prelude
After the loss of oil revenue in 2011, the regime turned to the private and public sector as
a source for capital accumulation. Armed rebel movements had erupted in South Kordofan
(Nuba Mountains) and Blue Nile, and were ongoing in Darfur (Verjee, 2012). The 2011 budget
contained austerity measures, including lifting of subsidies of sugar and petroleum, and cuts in
development budgets of public corporations, downsizing state and central government, etc.
Whereas “the 2013 budget added further taxes in vehicle licensing and overseas travel exit fees
as part of a policy aimed at expanding the tax umbrella and developing tax revenues and
reviewing service charges” (Sharfi, 2014: 219). The 2013 budget also included fuel and wheat
subsidy removals; with rural communities depending on firewood for energy and sorghum and
millet as staple foods, the subsidy removal most affects the urban and urban-periphery
populations, including those who had benefitted from importing wheat. With hard currency
shortage, wheat imports decreased and created bread shortages. As conflict, migration, and
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livelihood concerns remained consistent, the subsidy removal, import restrictions, public sector
cuts, of 2011 and 2013 mostly affected aspiring capitalists, bureaucrats, and the urban and urbanperiphery working peoples.
Following these economic “reforms,” there was increased protest and demonstrations,
mainly by students and the urban working peoples. There was also a proliferation of youth and
women’s movements during the period between 2000 and 2015 (Ahmed, 2014; Ali, 2015; Hale,
2015). Some of the notable youth groups created, which are also signatories of the FFC
declaration, were Girifna and Change Now. The Sudanese Professionals Association also
resurfaces in 2012, and neighborhood resistance committees start forming in 2013. Nada Mustafa
Ali’s (2015) ethnography of exile politics shows how countries like Egypt, Kenya, and Eritrea,
were grounds for practicing Sudanese political and civil opposition. The nature of repression by
the NIF/NCP created institutions and organizations that practiced “exile politics” and/or
underground politics in Sudan, neighboring African countries, and beyond:
Over the years opposition activities became transnational as parties and
movements forced into exile moved between countries in the regions of East and
North Africa and the Great Lakes-depending on geopolitical alliances of GOS or
the opposition with countries in the region. Chad constituted a haven for Darfuri
movement for several years after the eruption of war in Darfur in 2003. Since
2011, Uganda has become the key location for the SRF101. Mainstream political
parties are currently organized in the Sudan-based alliance of “the Forces of
National Consensus.” A number of youth and women’s organizations such as
Girifna (we are fed up), al-Tagyeer al-An (change now), and La Liqahr al-Nisa’
(no to oppression of women) are also openly opposing the government. (Ali,
2015: 20-21).
In 2012, women university students protested problems in dormitories, the austerity
measures and related increase in transportation fees (Medani, 2019). Thousands of people were

“Founded in 2011, the SRF is an umbrella organization that unites the SPLM-N, three Darfuri movements, factions of the
Beja Congress, and members of the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party serving in their personal capacity.
Movements comprising the SRF fought several battles in Darfur and South Kordofan” (Ali, 2015: Footnote, p. 19).
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out on the streets of Khartoum. Women organized campaigns like Kandaka Friday, which led to
the detention of many young women and men by NISS (El-Sanosi, 2012). In 2012, Bashir
responded by mobilizing yet another extension to the security apparatus, the Popular Defense
Forces (PDF), under the campaign “mobilization of Jihadists” (Verjee, 2012: 39). The regime
continued to use ideologies of political Islam to mobilize support and manipulate racial,
religious, and ethnic differences within the working peoples.
The Sudanese Professional’s Association’s (SPA) website states that several attempts had
failed, particularly in 2012 and 2014, to create the current alliance of unions, because of the
repressive nature of the regime and the persecution of “key founding members.” In October
2013, protests were happening in different cities and towns, and the security apparatus responded
violently. The protests had started in some of the same cities in which the first protests erupted in
2018: Wad Medani (Gezira), Khartoum, Port Sudan (Red Sea State), and El-Obeid (North
Kordofan). The Sudanese Doctors Union reported that more than 200 people were murdered in
Khartoum alone (Sudan Tribune, 2013; HRW, 2013). The same year, there were heavy floods,
with urban-peripheral areas around Khartoum being particularly hit: “with at least 15,000 homes
destroyed and thousands of others damaged. Across Sudan, at least 25,000 homes [were] no
longer habitable” (Tran, 2013). By 2014, the possibilities of the FFC were increasing, as
women’s organizations and networks joined the Sudan Call Declaration 102, which was reached
among rebel groups and political opposition: “The declaration pledged to “dismantle the oneparty state and replace it with a state founded on equal citizenship, through daily popular
struggle” (Ali, 2015: 187). By 2015, the regime intensified its exploitation of the working

“SRF, represented by its vice president Minni Arko Minnawi, Sudan’s Civil Society Initiative represented by Amin Mekki
Medani, National Umma Party represented by Chairperson al—Sadiq al-Mahdi, and the National Consensus Forces represented
by Chairperson Farouk Abuessa signed the Sudan Call Declaration.” (Ali, 2015: 187)
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peoples; using the words of professor and economist Feisal Hassan Awad, the regime was
“living on taxes and fees” (Radio Dabanga, 2015b). In 2016, for instance, there were increased
charges on electricity fees, and subsidies on medicine were removed. By January 2017, inflation
had reached a two-decade high, and mobilization and reactionary repression continued at
different levels.
Interconnected Networks
In 2018, the Bashir regime introduced new austerity measures based on recommendations
from and in order to please the IMF (Sykes, 2019). By March, it attempted to boost revenue by
squeezing harder on the private sector. For instance, the CBOS used the Banking Regulatory Act
to issue the banning of 23 companies and 19 individuals, citing non-commitment to repayment
(Fitch Solutions, 2019: 34). In August 2018, the SPA announced its existence and held a
conference on minimum wage, where it was revealed a study that the professional class
(including doctors and lawyers) were living below the poverty line. The SPA shared its intention
to present parliament with a list of demands regarding these concerns 103 (El-Gizouli, 2019c). On
December 19, three medical professionals were arrested in Al-Damazin, Blue Nile State, were
arrested by NISS agents for striking against payment arrears (Radio Dabanga, 2018a). But by
December the first protests broke out in peripheral cities and the SPA quickly used the
momentum to coordinate. The initial sites of protests (Figure 4) were areas that have suffered
from the privileging of commercial farming, such as Al-Damazin, Gedaref, and Wad Madani.
Al-Fashir, which is the capital of North Darfur, is also home to Jebel Amir, a site of gold

“The SPA announced its existence in August 2018 at a press conference during which it unveiled a study on the minimum
wage. Their original intent was to submit the study together with a list of demands to Parliament in a demonstration of
professionals. The turn of events in December 2018 pushed them to adopt a new strategy. So they drafted a declaration dubbed
the ‘Freedom and Change Declaration’ demanding the immediate resignation of President al-Bashir and his government and the
formation of a ‘Transitional National Government’ composed of ‘technocrats’.” (El-Gizouli, 2019c)
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extraction that has been militarized 104. The protest reached Atbara on December 19, Khartoum,
on December 25, and within a few days, Sudanese diaspora echoed the calls of the people in
cities across the world (Franck, 2019). In January 2019, Radio Dabanga (2019b) reported
solidarity demonstrations were held in France, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, the UK, and
Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Nebraska in the USA, to condemn killings of demonstrators in
Sudan and demanding the removal of the regime.
After protests erupted
in Atbara, the SPA called on
other cities and rural areas,
and encouraged them to
follow suit (Elsheikh, 2019).
Regardless of Bashir’s
regime systematically
attacking labor and civil
organizations, unions proved
to be key in organizing the
Figure 4 Locations and dates of initial protests
2019 uprising. Considering
the resilience of progressive groups in Sudan, and the role of professional and worker unions,
and their alliance in 1964 and 1985, it is not surprising that one of the leading forces of the
uprising was the SPA. The organization was able to effectively collect and distribute information
through its various networks and social media platforms. Although it may not be considered a
key factor for success, social media platforms played a significant role in mobilizing and
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Musa Hilal and Hemeti both have militia forces controlling gold mining (SDFG, 2017).
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exchanging information (Ali, 2019), which has expanded the possibilities of networking. Online
platforms became one of the ways daily schedules for resistance and civil disobedience were
disseminated (Elhassan, 2019).
Emerging from an alliance charter formed in 2016, the current status of the SPA 105 is a
culmination of the continued struggles of professional groups like doctors, journalists, lawyers,
engineers, and university teachers. In 2019, other professionals, including teachers, health
inspectors, engineers, etc., “formed their own associations along the SPA model to join the
Freedom and Change Declaration” (El-Gizouli, 2019a: 9). The founding members of the SPA
include three of Sudan’s largest professional groups: The Central Committee of Sudanese
Doctors, The Sudanese Journalists Network, and The Democratic Lawyers Association (Bakhit,
Ibrahim, and Madani, 2019). The Sudanese Journalists Network and the Central Committee of
Sudanese Doctors emerged in 2012 and 2016, respectively. These groups not only show the
extent of women’s role in 2019 and the overlapping of their networks, but also highlights how
the role of professional Sudanese women is not a new phenomenon. The co-founder of the
Sudanese Journalists Network is Amal Khalifa Idris Habbani; she is a freelance journalist and
contributor to the Sudanese news outlet Al-Taghyeer. Women like Samia El-Hashmi, who cofounded the women’s group, Mutinant, is also a longstanding member of the Democratic
Lawyers Association. Whereas, Dr. Sara Abdelgalil, who is the head of the U.K. branch of the
Sudan Doctor’s Union, is also a member of the SPA secretariat. Additionally, at least half of the
spokespeople for the SPA are also women (Hanna, 2020). For many years, women have been

The Sudanese Professionals Association is a continuation of the long history of Sudanese professionals’ persistent attempts to
form independent trade unions and bodies to defend their rights and seek to improve their working conditions. Several attempts to
form such bodies were made in the past; most notably the attempts to form a professional alliance in 2012 and 2014. Both failed
to achieve their goal because of the regime’s opposition which extended to the persecution and arrest of key founding members.
The SPA is currently comprised of many bodies united under an agreed upon charter and common goals. Excerpt from
https://www.sudaneseprofessionals.org/en/spa-important-announcement/
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organizing within and outside of Sudan and have held positions within and across professional
and political groups (Ali, 2015).
The SPA used different tools and technologies for protest, including cultural and art
forms. Depending on the expertise and the issue at hand, groups under the SPA functioned
separately and as a collective. Each of the bodies under the SPA staged independent strikes
across their respective sectors and exchanged information based on expertise. For instance, on
December 25, 2018, the Sudan Pharmacists Central Committee, in cooperation with the
Community Pharmacists Committee and the Department of Pharmacy Owners, called for a strike
and closure of all pharmacies in Khartoum state (Radio Dabanga, 2018b). A day before, the SPA
had coordinated an open-ended national doctors strike. The Sudan Doctor’s Committee collected
and shared information about protestors that were killed and wounded in various places,
including on the June (Ramadan) 3rd massacre. And during the general strikes held in May and
June, independent unions called on their members in different regions to join the call. The SPA
allowed for 1) each sector, with different levels of progress, to play a role and 2) for unionizing
of different sectors, including teachers, accountants, veterinarians, pharmacists, plastic artists,
etc., and 3) for regional coordination of different unions and their regional members.
El-Gizouli (2019a) credits the response to the SPA’s calls, among young men and
women, to its usage of popular language and general ideas of freedom and equality. The
Declaration of Freedom and Change, published on January 1, 2019 (on the day of Sudan’s
independence), also referred to specific concerns particular to different regions (Casciarri and
Manfredi, 2020). The SPA served as a ‘political agent’ without claiming any specific political
orientation (El-Gizouli, 2019a). Their online statements on behalf of the FFC, referred to “the
noble people of Sudan” and called for “revolutionary escalation” (SPA, 2019). Information
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posted and shared through “old-fashioned flyers” was not limited to the process of “non-violent”
civil obedience (Hassan and Kadouda, 2019). Instead, it included information about negotiations
and events pertaining to the uprising and eventually the transition process (SPA, 2019). Further
reaching the masses (political society), they used places of social organization, such as places of
worship and learning, neighborhoods, and rural community centers. Creating networks with the
grassroots and a means for popular participation, the organization also helped organize
neighborhood resistance committees.
By January 2019, the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), an umbrella organization of
different opposition groups was formed. The groups in the FFC include secular and sectarian
political parties, such as the National Umma Party and the Sudanese Communist Party 106; rebel
groups from Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile States; and civil organizations like No To
Women’s Oppression and MANSAM. One of the leading women’s coalition group during the
uprising – emerging among “urban and educated” women – was MANSAM107 (Kadoda and
Hale, 2020). Although organizations like the SWU and No to Women’s Oppression108 have since
left (Abbas, 2020), MANSAM was made up of more than 20 civil society organizations
(including young women’s organizations), women’s sectors of political parties, and civil groups
including unions, forums, and independent activists (al-Nagar and Tønnessen, 2019). No to
Women’s Oppression Initiative is a Khartoum based organization, which was launched in 2008,
in solidarity with journalist Lubna Ahmed al-Hussein. Lubna Ahmed al-Hussein was arrested for
wearing “indecent” clothes as defined by the Public Order Laws discussed in the previous
chapter. Throughout the years, No to Women’s Oppression Initiative has been monitoring
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According to various news outlets, the party left the coalition in late 2020.
https://www.darfur24.com/en/2020/11/08/sudanese-communist-party-withdraws-from-ffc-coalition/
107 MANSAM is the Arabic acronym for Civilian and Political Feminist Groups (Achcar, 2020).
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violations, raising awareness, and providing legal aid and financial support. This organization
also visited prisons and monitored the situation of women, who were mostly alcohol brewers,
street vendors, and sex workers, convicted by public order laws. Activities evolved to include
supporting women in the conflict areas of Darfur, Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan), and Blue
Nile (Ali, 2015). Since its inception after Hussein’s trial, No to Women’s Oppression Initiative
has been organizing press conferences, sit-ins, and demonstrations on different issues pertaining
to women, and especially disenfranchised women (Nugdalla, 2020).
The organization, along with the coalition MANSAM, was one of the first members of
the FFC and signatory of the Declaration of Freedom and Change. Together and separately, both
organizations have been successfully attempting to engender the uprising and the transition
process. There were numerous documents being produced, through MANSAM’s efforts, to
articulate women’s specific experiences and visions (Kadoda and Hale, 2020). Their efforts
ensured at least 40% of the seats in the legislative council, which will be formed, would be
reserved for women (Achcar, 2020). MANSAM not only insisted that members in the SPA and
FFC were aware of patriarchal language and gendered processes (Kadoda and Hale, 2020), but
they also released speeches and statements that ensured “women’s issues” were being discussed.
The participation of women’s organizations within and alongside the FFC and SPA served to
counter patriarchal practices (Kadoda and Hale, 2020) and the sidelining of women within the
progressive forces (Nugdalla, 2020). Although MANSAM is considered to be of the professional
and urban working class, its inclusion of groups like the Sudanese Tea Seller’s Association, at
the very least, make it a potential cross-class coalition.
In an article interview, Awadeya Koko, founder of the Sudanese Tea Sellers Association,
described that “[n]one of the existing workers unions defended [the street vendors] because they

107

cared more about working with the government than speaking for regular people…so I decided
to do it myself” (as quoted in Lavrilleux, 2019). Along with women like herself, Koko
established the first Women’s Food and Tea Seller’s Cooperative in Khartoum, in 1990 109
(Lavrilleux, 2019). Koko’s statement shows 1) how the Tea Sellers Association emerged as a
historical necessity, 2) the need to recognize and organize the most exploited groups of working
peoples, which would also mean recognizing gendered, raced, and ethnicized exploitations and
precarious working conditions, and 3) the value and need for self-articulation and selforganization. In a focus group discussion held in 2018 and 2019, women from Darfur, expressed
peace as an end to war and disarmament, whereas women from Khartoum expressed safety as the
ability to “walk[ing] in the street or stay[ing] home without fear of becoming a crime” (Damir,
2020: 41). The need for autonomous organization arises from the fact that regardless of shared
experiences women in Khartoum cannot profoundly articulate peace and safety for all women in
Darfur, or other areas in Sudan.
The Sudanese Tea Sellers Association represents tea sellers and women run street
vendors. Koko was born in the Nuba Mountains (in South Kordofan), and like many internal
migrants and working peoples 110 in urban and urban-peripheries, her family fled to Khartoum to
avoid conflict; and like many women 111 run street vendors, she joined the profession to support
her family (Lavrilleux, 2019). The association formed to offer legal aid and confront local police
authorities that are known to consistently harass street vendors. Koko herself has been
imprisoned before because of debt she had incurred (Lavrilleux, 2019). In an interview article,
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Hendawi (2019) lists the year 1993.
Like many older women that participated in the 2019 uprising, Koko had also participated in the 1985 uprising.
111 “Almost all the tea ladies of Khartoum hail from western Sudan’s Darfur and Nuba Mountains or the Blue Nile, south of
Khartoum.” (Hendawi, 2019)
110
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Koko has expressed that she seeks to run for government. Her priorities112, which are borne from
her experiences, may benefit those who share similar positions with her. In 2013, she became
president of the Multi-Purpose Cooperative Union, which ran three community centers in
Khartoum, Omdurman, and Bahri. The union now has 20 associations within it and an
outstanding 27,000 members, with at least 10,000 being tea sellers (Hendawi, 2019). The
organization helps women secure vendor permits, which can be a difficult task for many street
vendors. It also provides members’ assistance to educate family members and to conduct funeral
processions (Hendawi, 2019). The services provided by the organization clearly show how lowwaged and unwaged women are exploited by the state and overburdened by social reproduction.
During the uprising, members participated and provided care work,113 negotiated alongside
longstanding labor unions, served as a powerful network with reach to more than 20,000 people,
and raised funds for the SPA.
The Tea Seller’s Association is one of the two grassroots organizations highlighted in this
work. In many places, the SPA's mobilization effort was supported and undertaken by
neighborhood resistance committees. Neighborhood resistance committees, which have now
been formed in major cities and rural communities, emerged during resistance demonstrations of
2013 (Abbas, 2019). In some places, the neighborhood committees have replaced the Popular
Committees – accused of surveillance and corruption – that were implanted under Bashir’s
regime (Debuyser, 2020). The committees have since brought together many people, “mostly
young and previously politically unorganized,” in and across neighborhoods. Bahri (North
Khartoum), a historically middleclass neighborhood and an active site of resistance during the

“She says that her top priority will be to abolish Article 243, the legal provision that landed her, and thousands of other
women, in prison. She also wants to provide shaded kiosks for her former tea seller colleagues” (Lavrilleux, 2019).
113 For weeks the women volunteered and prepared meals for thousands of protestors (York, 2019).
112
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uprising (Rowsome and Provan, 2020), has several hundred members in about 80 resistance
committees (Achcar, 2020).
The committees began organizing in 2013 as a response to the struggle for social
reproduction. For instance, a resistance committee in Ombada, Omdurman, organizes a solidarity
market once a week. Products, many of them necessities such as oil and rice, are sold at cost
price, instead of the inflated market prices (Debuyser, 2020). Other volunteers from the
resistance committee of Arkawit, a neighborhood in Khartoum, mobilized to monitor the
distribution and use of flour by the bakeries, in order to control inflated prices of bread that
resulted from wheat or bread smuggling (Lewis, 2020). In the resistance committee of Haj-Yusef
district, in Khartoum, some members “have jobs, others don’t; everyone is committed to
improving the daily life of their community” (Debuyser, 2020). Many of these neighborhood
resistance committees were established and/or led by young women (Abbas, 2019; Lewis, 2019).
By the time demonstrations began in 2018, Khartoum alone had 30 active resistance
committees, and many dormant and new committees were being formed. From rural
communities in Nertiti (Central Darfur State), to urban peripheries around Khartoum, and
upscale neighborhoods in Khartoum, the structure and function of the resistance committees are
being replicated (El-Gizouli, 2020a). The FFC had also called on people to create neighborhood
committees, to coordinate the nationwide demonstrations (Hassan and Kadouda, 2019). The
Resistance Committee, which signed the Declaration of Freedom and Change, became an
informal, widely and loosely organized residents’ network at the neighborhood and town levels.
It now has “an elected leadership council and branches in many towns across the country”
(Abbas, 2019). The committee formed local coordination committees that received calls for
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popular action, mostly from the SPA, and facilitated people in their neighborhood to respond
accordingly.
In many places, locals now depend and call on the resistance committees to manage dayto-day matters or settle neighborhood disputes (Debuyser, 2020). The committees work on all
fronts, including street cleaning campaigns, road works, school repairs and equitable distribution
(Lewis, 2020). They have basically become alternate apparatuses that address the collective and
basic social reproductive issues in their communities. Most of the committees I have found data
on disclose that they are funded by community inhabitants (Debuyser, 2020). Though the
Resistance Committee has delegated the FFC to speak on its behalf, they have rejected any kind
of centralization or infringement on their autonomy. In 2020, the committees refused an attempt
to institutionalize them into formal state structures. In November 2020, the committees walked
out of a meeting with the FFC and the Sudanese Congress Party, chanting “you parties, the
suffering is enough.” The committees denounced the exclusion of the grassroots from essential
meetings regarding the formation of the Legislative Council (Radio Dabanga, 2020b). Many
committees have not only declared independence from the FFC, but they have resisted the
security apparatus’ “attempts to appropriate their revolutionary credentials” (El-Gizouli, 2020a:
6).
The neighborhood resistance committees consider themselves as the “pillars and
protectors of the revolution” (Debuyser, 2020). Yet, as Gilbert Achcar (2020) points out, aside
from those in Sudan, little attention has been paid to these grassroots organizations and their
complex networks – distorting the possibilities. Much to my agreement, Achcar (2020) considers
the committees the “most radical element” of the uprising, which have maintained “revolutionary
pressure.” The committees not only continue to provide social services neglected by the state, but
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they continue to organize through horizontal networks114 to influence the transition process
(Radio Dabanga, 2020a).
Subverting the State
In the early period of the uprising and before the violent attacks on demonstrators in
Khartoum, some of the most brutal crackdowns were in Atbara, Gedaref, Sennar, and on Darfuri
youth (El-Gizouli, 2019c). El-Gizouli (2019c) briefly mentions how the regime attempted to
invoke racial and ethnic differences to obscure the reason for the protests. The divisive rhetoric,
cloaked under religious purity and fundamentalism, launched to obscure the resistance of the
working peoples did not hold. In the words of young Sudanese activist Sara Elhassan:
The fact that people [were] chanting “We are all Darfur” in the streets of
Khartoum is a huge step forward. It’s something that wasn’t happening at the
height of the Darfur conﬂict. People in Khartoum didn’t even know there was a
conﬂict. And if they did, it was through the government’s propaganda of “well
they deserve it” or whatever reason. (Elmahadi, 2020: 157).
In 2019, the horizontal networks of multiple autonomous [civil and grassroots]
organizations served as a strategy to subvert the state, its security apparatus, and ideologies
sustained through Political Islam. Houdoy and Ressler’s (2019) rich visual mapping of the
protests in Greater Khartoum (Figure 5) encapsulates the reasons, extent, and continuities of the
protests discussed in this work. It also illustrates how the demonstrators efficaciously subverted
state force. The SPA offered centralized coordination and dissemination, but its effectiveness lay
in its reach to networks of autonomous organizations. The neighborhood resistance committees
functioned as a grassroots extension of the SPA, which distributed national schedules for
demonstrations and other forms of resistance (Abbas, 2019). Local coordinating committees of
the resistance committees launched “guerrilla-style urban protests,” which meant daily
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“[L]ocal coordination committees link neighborhood resistance committees in a nationwide network.” (Achcar, 2020)
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organized-sporadic protests in multiple regions (Hassan and Kadouda, 2019). In the
neighborhoods of Khartoum, different neighborhood resistance committees coordinated:
Their plan was simple. If Wad Nobawi was out on the streets and came under the
grip of the police and security, they relied on the committee in the other two
neighborhoods to hit the streets and take the pressure off them. “We called Wad
Nobawi, Beit Al-Mall and Abu Rouf the ‘terror triangle’ because we were
organized and had each other’s back,” said Abdulhafeez. (Abbas, 2019)
Such organizing ensured that
the uprising was not vested in
a few organizations or groups,
rather it was vested in the
people. Unlike in 2013 and
2014, persecuting key figures
in the SPA would not stall the
revolutionary process. This
time, it would not be enough
to dissolve the unions and the
political parties, or kill and
exile opposition leaders, to
stifle the voices of opposition
Figure 5 Mapping demonstrations in Greater Khartoum
and resistance. Furthermore,
Abdulhafeez’s statement ‘we…had each other’s back,’ shows how trust was built through local
and networked self-organizing. Unlike the popular committees that served on behalf of the
NIF/NCP and its interests, the resistance committees served the people of the neighborhood on
behalf of their own interests.
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Considering the defiant role of women at the forefront, women were especially targeted
by security forces in Khartoum. Sexual violence and dehumanization were not just used as a
threat, but as a weapon to demobilize and discourage protestors (Byaruhanga, 2019). The 2019
uprising was not the first time that security forces in Sudan weaponized violence against women
(Jok, 2007; Ali, 2016). Nada Mustafa Ali (2005) reminds us that not only have “women’s bodies
have been used as tools of ethnic cleansing – in the South, Nuba Mountains and Darfur – but also
that women have been actively engaged in peace promotion” (50). Violence against women’s
bodies has a societal context which has been mercilessly manipulated by the regime: “[s]exual
violence has long been a taboo topic and a source of shame for survivors who are likely to be
regarded as broken, unhonourable, and unfit for marriage” (Tønnessen and al-Nagar, 2019).
Therefore, it was no surprise that Bashir supposedly gave the instructions to “break the girls” in
an attempt to discourage participation of men and women (Elbagir, Mckenzie, Bashir, Nasiir,
and Abdelaziz, 2019). According to women who participated in demonstrations in Khartoum,
detention could involve "blackmail," "taking photographs of you naked," or ‘the threat of rape.”
(Elbagir, Mckenzie, Bashir, Nasiir, and Abdelaziz, 2019).
As protests continued, women endured public beatings, rape, and abuse from security
officers, which “set off a ripple-effect of abuse – husbands began to divorce their wives out of
shame, and fathers beat their daughters into submission, in an attempt to keep them at home”
(Elbagir et al., 2019). The manifestations of Sudanese women’s oppressions – by the state
apparatuses and within the family structure – in the uprising did not deter the militancy of
Sudanese women. Many young women did not get blessings from their families to participate in
the demonstrations, nonetheless, they did (Tønnessen and al-Nagar, 2019). During a protest in
Khartoum, men attempted to encircle women to protect them from security forces, but women
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“insisted on standing in the front lines” (Elbagir et al., 2019). Testaments from women
demonstrators (Elbagir et al., 2019) show that women, even those that were repeatedly detained,
continued to mobilize and demonstrate on the streets and at the sit-ins (Tønnessen and al-Nagar;
2019). Demonstrations were held in solidarity with sexual violence survivors and to denounce
the dehumanizing retaliation on women, which Tønnessen and al-Nagar (2019) have referred to
as nothing short of a social revolution.
Instead of deterring protestors, the violence unleashed by the security apparatus were
humanizing moments harboring the impetus for mobilization. Security forces also raided
people’s houses, and many were being detained. On January 18, 2019, an elderly man, Muawiya
Bashir, was shot and died inside his house, as officers raided his house searching for harbored
revolutionaries. The funeral procession in Burri neighborhood of Khartoum became a march
with thousands of people chanting for the fall of the regime and the death penalty for Omar alBashir and his security forces (Suleiman, 2019). By February, Bashir had declared a state of
emergency, which meant increased violence from security forces on demonstrators, and
indefinite closure of schools and colleges. The same month the Human Rights Watch reported
that Sudanese activists shared that at least 50 people were killed since December:
Video footage, verified by Human Rights Watch, shows security forces driving
around in armed vehicles, shooting bullets and teargas at unarmed protesters, and
rounding up and brutally beating protesters and bystanders with sticks and gun
butts. The footage also shows gruesome, bloody injuries from gunshots; evidence
of harsh beatings and torture; and the effects of raids by security forces on
hospitals, filling emergency rooms with teargas and hindering medical care.
(HRW, 2019)
After a hospital raid in Blue Nile State, doctors and hospital workers responded by striking
(Radio Dabanga, 2019e). The intense violence unleashed by security forces created consistent
momentum to mobilize throughout the uprising. At times, the events created solidarities across
regions. For instance, in February, a teacher demonstrating in Kassala was tortured to death,
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which ignited protests in Kassala and Khartoum (Radio Dabanga, 2019a). Later in August,
demonstrators hold a vigil in El-Obeid (the capital of North Kordofan State) to commemorate
four demonstrators shot dead in Omdurman (one of the three tri-cities that make-up Khartoum)
(Radio Dabanga, 2019d). By April, gruesome reports were coming out from different regions.
One of the first people killed on April 6 was Badrya Ishaq, a new mother living in a
displacement camp in Zalingei, Central Darfur (Awad, 2019). Ishaq was shot by security forces
during a protest in a camp for internally displaced people. The Sudan Doctors Committee also
released a statement that a lab technician was killed in Omdurman (HRW, 2019). According to
Human Rights Watch, at least 8 people were killed in the days between April 6 and April 8
alone.
Insurrection
April 6, 2019, also marked the day the sit-in in front of the military headquarters in
Khartoum began. Ibrahim Bahlredin (2020) offers an in-depth analysis of the complex and
comprehensive structures and roles that emerged during the sit-in. He argues that the
reappropriation of public space by the political society contested the regime’s power, by
challenging the function and symbolism of the space occupied by thousands of demonstrators.
The sit-ins, which have been referred to as “tent-cities” (Kadoda and Hale, 2020), took place in
multiple cities across Sudan, including El-Obeid, Gedarif, Wad Medani, and Port Sudan
(Elhassan, 2019). The one in Khartoum, which attracted many working peoples and youth from
other parts of the country, lasted fifty-eight days and sealed Bashir’s fate.
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After four months of nationally coordinated street protests, strikes 115, a few days of the
sit-in in Khartoum, and the deaths and injuries of the young, old, [un]employed, women, and
men in different regions of Sudan, the power of the political society was realized on April 11,
when Bashir’s Vice President and [then] Defense Minister, General Awad Ibn Auf, announced
the security forces (SAF, NISS, and RSF) had removed Bashir (Hassan and Kadouda, 2019). The
army also announced it would hold power until democratic elections could be held in two years.
The TMC was supported by external powers, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE
(Jacinto, 2019). Chapter four has shown the benefits such external powers accrue from
supporting the forces that have and can maintain structures and systems of exploitation and
oppression. Nonetheless, demonstrators continued to organize across Sudan. In the words of
Yousef Mohamed, a banker from Omdurman, “we tried a military government, but it didn't work
for us in Sudan” (AFP, 2019).
Once the militarized regime clothed in religious dogma had cracked, two general trends
emerged, with one side demanding civilian rule and adherence to the initial demands of the
uprising, and another side willing to make compromises and make strategic arrangements with
the Transitional Military Council (TMC). Magdi el-Gizouli (2020a) uses Riyadh and Kalakla,
two neighborhoods in Khartoum, with the former made up of mostly middle/upper-class and the
petty bourgeoise (including graduates of elite universities abroad), and the latter with mostly
unemployed youth, hustlers, and other working peoples. Those from Riyadh were willing to
consider negotiations with the TMC, whereas those “younger and disenfranchised” in Kalakla
were overrepresented on the side unwilling to accept a role by the security apparatus (5). Riyadh
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Particularly in March, hospitals, pharmacies, and clinics in Khartoum and Gederaf, private and public universities in
Khartoum, were organizing strikes (Radio Dabanga, 2019a). Before the national strike, doctors in Blue Nile State had gone on
strike following raid in hospitals (Radio Dabanga,2019g).
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is an upscale neighborhood, whereas Kalakla is a densely populated area in southern Khartoum.
Part of the demands raised by the residents of Kalakla, which were demonstrated in front of the
Jebel Awlia locality office, was for rainwater to be removed from the streets (Radio Dabanga,
2019d).
The nature of dependent capitalism and the structural positioning of different groups
leads to different experiences and lived realities, which creates the need for working peoples to
understand and confront the different forms and hierarchies of oppression and exploitation. The
inhabitants of Kalakla not only faced daily struggles for social reproduction but they have also
been confronted by the violent systems and structures of appropriation and control more
frequently than the inhabitants of Riyadh (El-Gizouli 2020a). According to Walter Rodney
(1990), just “because a people understand their own immediate environment and are performing
tasks which are necessary in that environment, it doesn't mean that they have the capacity and the
tools to actually bring about radical change or overthrow that system” (74). This is why the
dialectical process of organization between the SPA (and FFC) and the grassroots was central to
contest and delay the TMC’s interest to monopolize power.
The professionals, industrial workers, public sector employees, and petty bourgeoise are
not the dominant social classes in Sudan, but they are central to social processes in Sudan, which
create revenue for the masculinized dependent capitalists controlling the militarized state. The
power of these groups, to challenge the power structure, was demonstrated during the two-day
general strike called for May 28 and 29. Although the TMC and the FFC116 had come to some
agreements, such as the three-year transition period led by a sovereign council, the FFC claimed
the generals were reluctant to give up power by failing to agree that a civilian should lead the
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It is important to note that the National Umma Party opposed the strike, citing unanimous decision was not reached (Amin,
2019).
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sovereign council. Siddiq Farukh, a protest leader from Khartoum, told a reporter that “the twoday strike aims to deliver a message to the whole world that the Sudanese people want a real
change and they don’t want the power to be with the military” (Amin, 2019).
Thousands of Sudanese workers (factory workers, lab technicians, doctors, accountants,
bankers, railway workers, dock workers, etc.) in private and public sectors joined the national
strike. Despite the fact that the TMC had warned government employees would be fired if they
participated (Radio Dabanga, 2019f), civil servants in the Labor Ministry, employees at the
Electrical Distribution Company in Khartoum, employees of the Thermal Power Station in
Khartoum North, workers in the telecommunications sector (Amin, 2019), and bankers at the
Central Bank of Sudan, joined the strike (500 Words Magazine, 2019). On the second day, RSF
forces went inside the Bank of Sudan and beat up demonstrators (Radio Dabanga, 2019f). A
strike organizer and employee of the Bank of Sudan, Muez Ahmen, told reporters, “I can confirm
that the 110 branches of the Bank of Khartoum are striking, also the banks of Faisal, Farmers,
Animal resources, Alnilain, Exports development, Sudanese-French bank, Albaraka and others
are all striking” (Amin, 2019). The commonly reported impact of the strike is the paralysis it
caused as airport staff in Khartoum International Airport refused to show up to work. One flight
after the other got cancelled (Shaban, 2019) as Sudanese airlines Badr, Tarco and Nova, and
EgyptAir were forced to cancel flights (France 24, 2019).
Flight travelers were not the only ones stranded, the interstate bus drivers had also joined
the strike: "I have to travel to Gadaref to be with my family for Eid, but I'm not angry as I
understand the reason for the strike," traveler Fatima Omar said as she waited with her children
at the bus terminal” (AFP, 2019). Images also showed empty images of loading docks (500
Words Magazine, 2019). Osman Tahir, a worker at the dock in the Port of Sudan said the strike
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was meant to ensure civilian rule and "get rid of the corruption in Port Sudan," (France 24,
2019). In downtown Khartoum, markets, restaurants, shops, and public transportation was at a
standstill (Amin, 2019). The second day of the strike had even more workers join (Radio
Dabanga, 2019f). The working people of Sudan had demonstrated that the people run the
country, and collectively, they could stop it, again 117.
All this was happening, as the sit-in erected in front of the military headquarters in
Khartoum was ongoing. Bahreldin (2019) describes how the sit-in in Khartoum was transformed
into a space where culture, art, and politics could be observed and/or practiced. The sit-in in
Khartoum became a space to practice a mode of politics built on popular participation,
transparency, and accountability. The SPA and FFC used the sit-in space to disseminate
information and update the people with intended actions and ongoing negotiations between the
FFC and the TMC (Elmahadi, 2020). On April 14, representatives of the Sudanese Evangelical
Presbyterian Church (SEPC) and the Baptist Church and the Sudanese Church of Christ,
delivered a Christian service at the sit-in, and demonstrators (Muslims and Christians) sang
hymns together (CSW, 2019). Viewing land as relation, it is important to highlight the relations
that have emerged from the shared occupancy and governance of space, by multiple groups of
people in Sudan representative of different sections of the society. From at least nine cities across
Sudan youth, tea sellers, doctors, artists, engineers, elders, religious groups, unemployed youth,
etc., with different religions, races, ages, ethnic groups, and genders, came together to form the
sit-in (Bahreldin, 2020).
Activists have expressed how the collective organizing, dwelling, and producing has
developed a strong sense of solidarity across region, race, class, and gender (Elmahadi, 2020).

During the 1964 uprising, unionists and teachers had organized a general strike that “paralyzed” the country (Berridge, 2015:
23).
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As mentioned in chapter one, the sit-in in Khartoum drew so many people that security forces
had barricaded roads and bridges entering Khartoum (Amin, 2019). Hundreds of workers took a
convoy of trains from Atbara and Port Sudan to join the sit-in: “When the train started moving
from Atbara, thousands of people joined along the way from the cities of Damar, Shandi and
others and even from the villages of Jaili, Fadnia and other outskirts and neighborhoods of
Khartoum city itself” (Amin, 2019). Sudanese in the diaspora also returned to participate in
demonstrations (Elmahadi, 2020).
What emerged in the sit-in has been described as “a microcosm of the future Sudan that
the protesters envision,” (Osman, 2019); a “fully-functioning micro society” (Elhassan, 2019);
and a “mini-state” (Hassan and Kadouda, 2019). According to Engeler, Braghieri, and Manzur
(2019) the sit-in in Khartoum was visited by tens of thousands of people daily, and “was
maintained by hundreds of volunteers who erected makeshift health stations, classrooms,
pharmacies, food distribution stations, and security checkpoints on the territory.” With women’s
roles “remarkably unchallenged,” volunteer teams created elaborate systems that addressed
concerns of food, security, social services (health, education, transportation), and gendered
violence (Bahreldin, 2020). Arising from the realities of the movement and the experiences of
many Sudanese women, the Maydanik118, “a safe zone for women,” was also established inside
the sit-in. The space provided legal and psychological support for women and became a space for
discussing the gendered nature of the uprising (Nugdalla, 2020). The sit-in also became a place
to negotiate “diplomatic” relations.
In April, Saudi Arabia and the UAE pledged to provide $3 billion to improve Sudan’s
economic situation, which was welcomed by the military (VOA, 2019). However, the sit-in
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gendered word translating to ‘her space’ (Nugdalla, 2020)
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space echoed with anti-imperialist chants to "keep their money," "we don't want Saudi support”
(Radio Dabanga, 2019e) and “we do not want Saudi aid even if we have to eat beans and
falafel!” (Bearak and Fahim, 2019). Demonstrators also called for rallies to consulates and
embassies, including the Egyptian embassy, to denounce any intervention by Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and the UAE (VOA, 2019). Sudanese women, youth, and working people were running
indispensable, and complex political networks and systems with radical possibilities. Elnaiem
(2019) uses a quote "governing without a government,” to describe the sit-in, I would restate the
phrase to self-governing without the dominant mode of politics.
In this sense, we can understand why a few days after the incapacitating general strike of
May 28 and 29, we witnessed one of the most violent attacks by security forces. On June 3, 2019
– what is now remembered as the Khartoum or Ramadan Massacre – the Rapid Support Forces
(RSF), the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), and the riot police, raided the sit-in in front of the
military headquarters in Khartoum (El-Gizouli and Thomas, 2020). More than a hundred people
were killed119, and many hundreds injured. More than 70120 women were raped, and at least three
committed suicide after the incident (Hassan and Kadouda, 2019; Ali, 2019; Salih and Burke,
2019). This event garnered international and regional condemnation, including the suspension of
Sudan from the African Union 121 (Medani, 2019). By June 4th, the military transition was
scrapped, and the military announced elections would be held in 9 months. Using the humanizing
moment of the June 3rd raid, the FFC announced the “March of Millions” to be held in the three
towns of Khartoum State. A few days before the march, the organization posted on their website:
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Some of the massacred bodies were found floating in the Nile.
Before June 3rd “[a]t least 15 women have reported being raped during the uprising, according to Nahed Jabrallah, one of the
demonstrators [in the uprising] and the founder of SEEMA, a charity tackling violence against women and child marriage”
(Elbagir, Mckenzie, Bashir, Nasiir, and Abdelaziz, 2019).
121 Considering the support external forces had shown to the TMC, the AU proved to be a better source of external support
towards Sudanese peoples struggle.
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A million’s march will take place on this Sunday 30th of June, in mourning of the
victims of the 3rd of June and demanding the handover of power to a civilian
authority, at 1:00 pm Sudan (revolution) time. The marches are to set out from the
trio cities of Khartoum, Khartoum North (Bahri), Omdurman and from all over
villages and cities of Sudan.
These demonstrations will be in synchronous with Sudanese marches abroad.
Routes and maps will be issued later.
SPA Media Team
The FFC also announced another effective general strike on June 9 in which many participants
were suspended, relocated, or fired (Radio Dabanga, 2019f). By June 17, the TMC disclosed that
investigations have shown the order to break up the sit-in in Khartoum did not come from the
generals and was the mistake of soldiers. But the FFC continued to call for protest, and members
were threatened by arrest. The TMC scrambles and oscillates between the dominant mode of
politics it has practiced and the concessions necessary to ease the political society. After three
weeks of organizing through the neighborhood committees, tens of thousands of people came out
to the streets of Khartoum, on June 30th (30 years after the 1989 coup) to demand civilian rule.
Simultaneously, many major cities, including Atbara, El-Obeid, and El-Gedaref, and others in
Darfur, and smaller towns in Sennar staged protests. According to a report from Radio Dabanga
(2019c), “Red Sea, El Gedaref and Kassala witnessed “the largest demonstrations ever seen.” By
July 5th, the TMC and FFC reached an agreement, which continued to be negotiated among
different forces within the FFC. In August, for instance, MANSAM accused the FFC of the lack
of representation of women in the proposed members for the sovereign council and other
political leadership roles.
Overall, women’s role was central to mobilization. In parts of Darfur, women organized
and “encouraged peaceful protests” (Damir, 2020: 37), while in Khartoum, they went door to
door to encourage people to join the demonstrations (Badri and al-Fatih, 2019). Aside from
mobilizing, women’s militant role in the 2019 uprising disrupted gendered representations
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prescribed through Political Islam. The visible and varied roles of women during the uprising,
not only provided a social battle against Islamized masculine superiority and its varied
manifestations, but it also, in the words of Social Anthropologist Azza Ahmed Abdel Aziz
(2019), “reinstates women from all walks of life onto the map of Sudanese public life.” In
Khartoum, women spending the night at the sit-ins has been marked as “an act of collective
female agency and a claiming of public space in a way hitherto unseen” (Abbas, 2020). Whether
on the streets, their homes, or the tent-cities122 erected in different regions, women played
multiple roles that reflected their multiple positionalities. The mere fact that women visibly
engaged in various activities and roles challenged the manipulated representations of
womanhood and the rigid gender roles maintained by Political Islam.
Women’s activities ranged from roles that reinforce and simultaneously challenge the
NIF/NCP’s representation of women. On the one hand, women, as individuals and members of
an organization (such as the Tea Seller’s Association), carried out domestic and care work. They
volunteered and ran the kitchens that fed demonstrators and used traditionally female calls and
ululations to energize crowds. Elderly women opened their homes to replenish and hide
demonstrators fleeing security forces (Gaafar and Shawkat, 2019), whereas women doctors
tended to injured demonstrators (Badri and al-Fatih, 2019). However, men were also working in
roles considered as traditionally female. For instance, many men prepared food and took orders
from women to assist in preparation of food (Lavrilleux, 2019). These practices challenge the
deterministic classifications of men as breadwinners and women as dependent unpaid workers,
and may restore value in the undervalued (non-monetized) roles of women. On the other hand,
women “participated in and led many efforts that contradicted traditional gender roles, such as

“’Tent cities’ refers to temporary settlements established by protesters around various cities in Sudan to accommodate
protesters. In Khartoum it refers to the sit-in outside the military headquarters.” (Kadoda and Hale, 2020)
122
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building roadblocks and barricades” (as cited in Engeler et al., 2019). Of course, considering the
roles of women in rural communities and the unwaged labor sectors, covered in chapter three,
this might be contradictory only in the context of what is imagined as a traditionally male role.
Nonetheless, these disruptions challenge the rigid classifications of women and womanhood, by
contradicting the gender role and relations prescribed by Political Islam, in allegiance with global
capital.
Alternate forms of Political Organizing
In creating alternate forms and structures of political organizing, women, youth, and
grassroots organizing have provided the Sudanese people with the possibilities of making a break
from the dominant mode of politics in Sudan. They have developed a mode of politics that does
not exclude or relegate women and the most exploited groups, but instead benefits from their
self-organization and political agency. The progressives and professionals depended on women’s
groups and the neighborhood resistance communities, for subversion and insurrection, and the
grassroots depended on the professionals and working class to challenge the power structure and
effectively coordinate the uprising. The grassroots represented themselves at the local level and
joined networks that could represent them at the national level. The neighborhood resistance
committees supplanted the Bashir-era Popular Committees and challenged the nepotistic and
patronage networks. They built networks that continue to hold more powerful groups
accountable. With locally elected representation, horizontally structured networks, and equitable
resource distribution, the neighborhood resistance committees and the Tea Sellers Association
also exemplified the value and possibility of bottom-up politics that emerge from historical
necessities.
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Instead of a top-down hierarchical format for organizing and building networks, a
horizontal structure with autonomous organizing of different sectors can transform power
structures. "[S]ectors of people have different levels of power, including different sectors among
women,” so simply organizing likely means the more powerful sectors and their concerns will
dominate by virtue of the progress made by those groups in the hierarchies of exploitation and
power (Andaiye, 2020: 197). As indicated earlier, autonomous organization also served for the
self-articulation and self-realization of groups/sectors:
It is only possible to confront hierarchies from a base that recognizes that
hierarchies exist, and reflects this by having sectors with different levels of power
organize autonomously. In this way each sector, particularly those with the least
power, can independently analyze its experience, work out strategies, and bring
all of this to the common table. Increasing the power of the least powerful sectors
is essential to ensuring accountability from the more powerful sectors and
essential to ensuring that women who rise in the power structure stay accountable.
(Andaiye, 2020: 12)
Therefore, it is no small feat that some of the core organizations in 2019 were the neighborhood
resistance committees and the Tea Sellers Association, which organized autonomously, and
through horizontal networks and within coalitions and around common tables (such as
MANSAM and the SPA). Most of the neighborhood resistance committees are autonomous and
self-organized, which has been useful in holding political parties (in the FFC) and more powerful
sectors accountable to the masses (political society). Although the committees have delegated the
FFC to represent them in negotiations, they have not been shy from revoking their delegation
when the FFC has not represented their interests (Achcar, 2020; Radio Dabanga, 2020b).
Conclusion
As protests began in December, some of the most common slogans on the streets and on
social media were Tasgot Bas (which translates to Fall That Is All) and Freedom, Peace, and
Justice (Nugdalla, 2019). As demonstrations continued, various slogans and chants, including
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those of welcoming a new Sudan, and the revolution being of women and girls, were
commonplace (Ali, 2019). The slogans and chants, on the streets and online, not only reflected
what was going on in the streets, but they also expressed women’s and the youth’s “claim to
power” (Nugdalla, 2020). The clarity of the youth, women, and working peoples depicted in
slogans such as “civil government is a decision not a choice” (Badri and al-Fatih, 2019), has the
2019 uprising dubbed the “revolution of consciousness” (Nugdalla, 2020). There have already
been decisive changes brought on by the alliance and collective resistance of women, youth, and
working peoples in Sudan. Some of these victories in the revolutionary process include the
removal of Bashir and dissolving of the NCP, the refusal of a military-led transition and the
withdrawal of Sudanese troops from Yemen, and the repeal of the public order laws.
At the time of this writing, demonstrations and organizing continue, because among other
concerns, livelihood and insecurity are daily struggles for many Sudanese. In July 2020, for
example, sit-ins, which attracted women from neighboring areas, were held in in Nertiti, a
conflict-hit city in Central Darfur. People’s demands included the removal and replacement of
government officials that remain after Bashir’s removal, the disarming of the militias, protection
for the farming and herding communities and their livelihoods, and equitable control over mining
operations (Radio Dabanga, 2021). Sudanese women’s clear and interconnected demands –
which include “participation in political life, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); securing
women’s agency; rebuilding the economy; creating social peace; eliminating discriminatory
laws, ending hunger, wars and the government’s cycle of fear and silencing; and adopting gender
quotas in the legislative and executive bodies and commissions” (Damir, 2020: 38-39) – which if
and when it is achieved can transform Sudanese society and challenge the global capitalist chain
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of exploitation. For Pan Africanists with an inherited123 vision of a multi-religious, multi-ethnic,
multi-racial, multi-gendered, and multi-cultural democratic African social formation, the 2019
uprising in Sudan has awakened many possibilities.
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I want to show gratitude for Global Pan Africanists who have fought and labored towards the pragmatic vision of a united
Africa, that is bound to transpire to liberate Africans, descendants of Africans globally, and our oppressors. Despite repression,
internal contradictions, personal loses, white supremacist pessimism, and at times, misguided disrespect from your children, you
have sustained a pragmatic vision, which we must now move forward with based on the realities that confront us today.
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Chapter 5
Implications for Pan Africanism
This thesis emerged in the context of the contribution of Sudanese women in challenging
their oppressions and exploitations. To reveal women’s contributions and positions, chapter one
looked at the historical nature of their oppression and relegation, alongside their presence and
resistance in the dominant forms of political organizing. The oppressions of women and the
working peoples through Islamization and Arabization was also highlighted in chapter one to
explicate the need and significance of a demilitarized multi-racial, multi-gendered, and multiethnic bottom-up democratization process. The second chapter conveyed the theoretical
approach used to understand women’s contribution and their resistance alongside other working
peoples and youth. This chapter intentionally built on anti-imperialist and Pan African scholars
and activists that have allowed us to understand liberation, struggle, and organizing, by centering
the dominant social classes in society and evaluating women’s fundamental and militant roles.
Horace G. Campbell’s teachings and conceptualizations of fractal thinking and humanized
politics, alongside Walter Rodney and Amilcar Cabral’s writings on African resistance, and
Wagaye Bekele Kassa’s role124 as breadwinner and caregiver, provided me with the
understanding necessary to undertake this work. Mamdani and Wamba (1995) offered an
articulated and flexible framework to studying social movements in Africa. To understand
Sudanese women’s exploitation, oppression, and modes of resistance, and ensure the
reproduction of radical and timely African/Black women scholarship, the ideas and practices of
Andaiye, Ella Jo Baker, and Claudia Jones – women who have immensely contributed to
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I was raised by a formidable mother whose existence and encouragement disrupted my socialized imagination of gender.
Although she does not claim feminism, she was the first woman who taught me to be a radical feminist. Because of her and my
sister, Mahlet Serekberhan, their work, labor, and care, I have always known women’s portrayal or assigned social value has
never re3flected our realities and capabilities.
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progressive, Pan African, leftist, Marxist, and womanist struggles – were used in parallel with
Tithi Bhattacharya’s (2017) work on social reproduction and Nada Mustafa Ali’s work on Sudan
and Sudanese women.
The third chapter laid out the conditions of patriarchy, militarization (violence),
neoliberalization, and imperialism in the Sudanese context and in relation to women’s
oppressions and exploitations. The allegiance of political Islam to dependent capitalist and
imperialist exploitations was analyzed alongside women’s rigidly defined and imposed positions.
To understand “women” in Sudan and the possibilities they hold, chapter three looked at the
realities of different groups of women, with a focus on some of the most exploited and oppressed
groups. The brief introduction of women farmers is to extend and highlight the possibilities of
the organization of women, central to subsistence and care, similar to the Tea Sellers Association
in Greater Khartoum. The purpose was not only to highlight the significance and necessity of
women’s participation and leadership in the uprising, but to divert conversations about women’s
empowerment125 that frame African women as being helpless. What Sudanese women need is an
anti-imperialist, anti-racist, and anti-capitalist form of solidarity, because as chapter three
attempted to reveal, Sudanese women are more than capable of sustaining whole societies even
in the worst and most precarious of conditions.
The discussion of women as part of (one in the same with) the working peoples, the
youth and other groups in society was also intentional. Too often femocrats 126 have used isolated

“…More especially, in current agricultural policies, there has been a failure of development planners to recognize areas of
women’s work, their important economic contribution, and the high percentage of women-headed households. Development,
rather than generating and supporting self-help initiatives, became aid-dependent projects, thereby dealing a serious blow to
African women’s independent efforts toward gender equality and a better life for all.” (58-59). See Amadiume, 2001.
126 I use femocrat here to refer to state feminism and feminisms serving global capital, i.e., within bilateral and multilateral
institutions. Sara Farris (2017) writes about femocrats’ impact particularly in regard to Muslim women and their
contextualization in European and American politics: “[W]omen’s organizations as well as top-ranking bureaucrats in state
gender equality agencies—often termed femocrats—all singled out Islamic religious practices as especially patriarchal, arguing
that they had no place in the western public sphere.” (2)
125
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analyses of women to justify NGOization and reform policies when realistically women’s
oppression and exploitation is tied to the uncompensated service they provide to other groups in
society and their unacknowledged/undervalued positions and roles. Femocrats in the West have
made obscuring conclusions about Islamic principles oppressing women (Farris, 2017), but this
work has attempted to show that political Islam is a structural and ideological tool used to sustain
capitalist production. The last chapter provided a detailed account of the forms and methods of
organizing in 2018/19 and the challenge it brought to the entrenched militarized Islamist
dependent capitalist state, controlled by a minority of Northern-Arab Muslim men that deployed
political Islam to justify exploitative and oppressive relations, structures, and systems used for
capital accumulation. This chapter not only highlighted the social forces and networked
organizations that challenged the system, but the participatory and radical forms of organizing
used to disrupt, supplant, and challenge the state and its security apparatus.
It has been 45 years since the Soweto uprisings and 10 years since Tahrir square – both
social events in Africa that challenged the entrenched systems and structures of oppression and
exploitation through networked organization reflective of the mass character of the formations.
We are now reaching the third year since a similar social event was witnessed in Sudan. Except
this is also the third time, albeit structured, populated, and organized differently, popular uprising
has resurfaced in Sudan. As the “microcosm of Africa,” the possibilities emerging from Sudan
should be of interest to those of us interested in governance, politics, economy, and liberation
that centers diverse populations. As the Sudanese working people, women, and youth, continue
to struggle against the forces attempting to co-opt and compromise their movement, including
the military and liberal forces inside Sudan, the question remains how will/can the loosely
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organized networks that subverted the state and led towards supplanting some of its apparatus be
sustained?
Unlike the “over-emphasis on armed struggle” in Soweto’s aftermath (Mafeje, 1978), the
working peoples, women, and youth in Sudan have been clear about their demands of
demilitarization. Awadeya Koko and other tea sellers like Haleema remain hopeful with the
revolutionary process because they consider the “disappearance of the kasha police from the
streets of Khartoum as an irreversible sign of victory” (Lavrilleux, 2019; Hendawi; 2019). In
December 2020, the death of 45-year-old Baha al-Din Nouri in Khartoum, under custody of the
RSF, led to demonstrations in front of the RSF headquarters that demanded its shutdown (HRW,
2021). Following the event, the attorney general127 passed laws limiting the arbitrary and violent
actions of security forces and ordered an investigation on the cause of death. The RSF was
forced to accept responsibility, but Mohamed Nouri, Baha al-Din Nouri’s brother, told Human
Rights Watch (2021):
“For us, the case should not be only against those who tortured my brother,”
Mohamed Nouri said. “All those involved, including those who issued the orders,
aided, and contributed to the death of my brother, should be held accountable”
(HRW, 2021).
When the Sudanese working people did call for any form of military presence, it was in 2021, by
protesting the withdrawal of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)
from Central Darfur. Demonstrations and sit-ins took place in Zalingei and other parts of Central
Darfur, and “solidarity protests took place in North Kordofan, North Darfur, South Darfur, El
Gezira, and River Nile states to demand the extension of the UNAMID mission” (Radio

“His Excellency the Attorney General Maulana Taj Al-Secret on Ink on January 11, 2021, issued a directive to all the security
services (Chief of the Military Justice - Director General of the General Intelligence Service - Representative of the Director
General of Police - Head of the Legal Department of the Fast Support Forces - Unit Manager Military Intelligence) prohibits
arrest of civilians except by police and prosecution.”
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=244491147053108&id=111158367053054
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Dabanga, 2021). The political society have also made clear their views on global capital by
denouncing the $300 billion aid proposed by the delegation of Saudi Arabia and the UAE (VOA,
2019). The clarity observed reflects the delineation of structure from individual, of force from
protection, of dependency from independence, and manipulation from self-determination. Now
the question remains: how will the Sudanese working peoples, women, and youth use this clarity
to demand and work towards dismantling structures and networks of capital accumulation to
ensure that the budget of the military and the flow of global capital128 be returned to the
structures of care and labor (which include housing, healthcare, education, water, electricity,
technology, infrastructure, etc., and will inherently disassemble the super-exploitation of
women). Based on Andaiye (2020), organization of the least powerful sectors alongside more
powerful sectors in society is not just about building consciousness, but about building
possibilities; and counting129 unwaged work is not only about the renumeration for services
provided by women, but about valuing care (as the essence of human relations), community
building, and sustenance.
As covered in the last chapter, Sudan’s uprising has brought to the forefront political
(democratic) methods to struggle. We have seen networks of non-hierarchically organized
structures that have transcended the need or use of a vanguard party. Instead, the forms of selforganizing witnessed since 2018 have shown horizontally structured organizations are better
suited to counter co-optation and repression and hold powerful groups accountable. In the
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According to a June 2018 report by the Political Economy Research Institute (University of Massachusetts), estimates of
capital flight from a representative sample of 30 African countries over 1970-2015 “finds that this group of countries lost a
combined $1.4 trillion through capital flight over the 46-year period. Including interest earnings on capital flight, this brings the
cumulative amount to $1.8 trillion. This amount vastly exceeds the stock of debt owed by these countries as of 2015 ($496.9
billion), making the group a “net creditor” to the rest of the world. Moreover, these countries lose more through capital flight than
they receive in the form of aid or foreign private investment.” https://www.peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1083-capital-flightfrom-africa-updated-methodology-and-new-estimates
129 “Unwaged work has always existed, but it became product and producer of the inequalities between groups only as the
dominant economic system became one based on wages, and unwaged work became devalued. For us in the Caribbean, the
campaign against unwaged work therefore begins with slavery. (1994)” (Andaiye, 2020: 107)
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process, political practices that facilitate popular participation, trust, bottom-up process of
change, and interconnection amongst peoples and communities have emerged.
Ahmad Sikainga’s (2010) reflection on the railway workers of Atbara shows how
village130 networks served to care for and assist new workers: “[i]n addition to providing shelter
and guidance, older workers helped their relatives and fellow villagers find employment” (38).
Migration trends to cities and towns also reflects how familial131 networks serve multiple
purposes. The central question this thesis concludes with is how can familial and village
networks be transformed into political networks? How can the networks that emerged from a
historical necessity and connected various sectors representing different levels of power be
expanded to the villages and rural areas? How do the organized tea sellers in Khartoum call to
their sisters and mothers that remain in the village, farming and engaging with other precarious
work, to autonomously organize and join the political networks that are being established? And
how will the neighborhood resistance committees, with their locally elected representatives and
emerging forms of resource distribution, be established in all areas in Sudan?
Although this work focused on the networks established on the ground, it is important to
highlight the possibilities of global and online networks that emerged before and during the
uprising. Ali’s (2015) book reflects the transnational networks and political organizations built
by Sudanese peoples over the years, which expands the possibilities this thesis has explored. The
death of Mohamed Mattar created the #BlueforSudan hashtag that evolved when Shahd Khidir

“The most conspicuous of these were village networks. Typically the older generation of workers who had established
themselves in the town played a major role in helping newcomers. In addition to providing shelter and guidance, older workers
helped their relatives and fellow villagers find employment. The existence of village networks in Atbara became a major
incentive for many people in the North to move to the town. According to oral accounts, there was a popular belief among the
region’s inhabitants that any newcomer in Atbara would easily find a relative or a fellow villager who would guide him and help
him find a job” (Sikainga, 2010: 38).
131 “The displaced and migrant populations of Sudan are sustained, as they have always been, by kin-based affinities. But kinship
takes its place in an expanding set of social bonds, of personal loyalties and patron-client relationships.” (Ryle, 2011: 86)
130
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asked her friends to turn their profile132 pictures to blue (Mattar’s favorite color), which led to
hundreds of Sudanese and non-Sudanese peoples showing solidarity (Bendimerad and Faisal,
2019). How do these networks challenge imperialism from its centers, and how can the diaspora
networks be expanded and linked to the village networks?
Reflecting on Soweto’s aftermath, Archie Mafeje (1978) wrote, “[i]t is in the light of this
possibility the militant youth inside South Africa should take seriously the question of ideology,
theory and organization” (Mafeje, 1978: 29). The same stands true for Sudanese youth today.
And to those of us Africans outside and neighboring Sudan, to take seriously our role in forming
solidarities with the Sudanese forces pushing for democratization. It is in 2019 that Dr. Sara
Abdelgalil, a spokesperson for the SPA, told DW:
"The revolution will end when we have a complete civilian government, a
successful election, an elected parliament, transitional justice and peace all over
Sudan," she said. "We are worried that we will have a coup. We are worried about
internal violence and we are very cautious about it, but at the same time we are
hopeful. So it's hope and fear, that's how we describe our emotions." (Allinson,
2019)
The women of Sudan have challenged colonialism, protested the execution of Patrice Lumumba,
and demanded the release of Algerian freedom fighters, while confronting their own internalized
chauvinisms 133. During the 7th Pan African Congress (1994), Fatima Mahmoud Babiker 134, a
Sudanese living in exile at the time, and a founding member of the Pan African Women’s
Liberation Organization (PAWLO), addressed the general assembly and proposed clear
objectives regarding the liberation of African women (Roy-Campbell, 1996). Now is the time to

“Once he was murdered, his friends and family changed their profile picture to match his, and eventually other people began
to join in,” said Shahd Khidir, a friend of Mattar’s and a beauty influencer on Instagram who asked her followers to change their
profile pictures to blue.” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/13/blueforsudan-why-is-social-media-turning-blue-for-sudan
133
See Ali, 2015.
134 In her dissertation, Dr. Nada Mustafa Ali shows gratitude to those who have contributed to her learning process, and she
mentions Dr. Fatima Mahmoud. As I learn from and build on Dr. Ali’s work, I share my gratitude with her, and remain proud to
have continued in a learning process propelled by African women.
132
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consider how the global Pan-African peoples can build solidarity with the Sudanese struggle –
which is essentially our struggle – that has manifested the possibilities of moving beyond the
nation-state, towards an African social formation, based on a multi-religious, multi-cultural,
multi-ethnic, and multi-gendered democracy and democratic relations.
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